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Abstract
Water wars are coming! Water is the defining security threat of the 21st century! The future
belongs to the water-rich! These types of warnings are frequently proclaimed, urging
attention to looming water conflict, which will occur as stores of freshwater diminish in both
quality and quantity. Yet the issue of water security is far more complex than as an inevitable
source of future violent conflict. Water is a central component to all aspects of life and
planetary health and thus it contains within it a multiplicity of social and political meanings,
pivotal to our understandings of security. This dissertation begins with an acknowledgment
that conceptions of security are conditioned by larger understandings of being and reality,
and that water security in particular is emblematic of traditional allegiances within the
subject of international relations that are resistant to change. At its core, it is designed to
answer the question: What are the relationships between water and security? It adopts a
critical security approach to excavate traditional security narratives and then construct and
identify emancipatory visions immanent within relationships over water. It argues that an
emancipatory vision of water security that is inclusive, communicative, and cosmopolitan is
desirable and possible in human water relations. It concludes by identifying various
contemporary water relationships that offer potential emancipatory appellations of water
security.

Keywords
Critical Security Studies, Emancipation, Environmental Security, Hydrosolidarity,
Securitization, Water
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1.1

CHAPTER ONE: Introduction: Water, security, and
emancipation

Introduction

Water wars are coming! Water is the defining security threat of the 21st century! The
future belongs to the water-rich! These types of warnings are frequently proclaimed,
urging attention to looming water conflict, which will occur as stores of freshwater
diminish in both quality and quantity. For the past three decades, the story often told has
been one of a “coming anarchy,” where a host of environmental problems, in which water
1

factors significantly, inevitably erodes the state’s capacity to govern. According to this
type of interpretation, this will eventually lead to an upswing of violence as states and
groups fight over access to and control of dwindling natural resources, while at the same
time experiencing their effects as conflict multipliers, coalescing with simmering ethnic
and historical tensions.
The persistence of this type of thinking has led to the conclusion that water will drive
conflict in the future, and is likely to lead to instability, state failure, and increase regional

1

Robert Kaplan. “The Coming Anarchy,” The Atlantic Monthly 273.2 (1994): 44-77; Michael T. Klare.
Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001); Thomas
Homer-Dixon. “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence From Cases.” International
Security, 19.1 (1994): 5–40; Thomas Homer-Dixon. Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. (Princeton N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1999); Thomas Homer-Dixon. “Terror in the Weather Forecast” New York
Times 24 April 2007 Online. 14 February 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/24/opinion/24homerdixon.html>; Gwynne Dyer. Climate Wars (Toronto: Random House, 2007); CNA, 2007. National Security
and the Threat of Climate Change. Report from a panel of retired senior US military officers. Alexandria,
VA: CNA Corporation, April 2007. Online. 14 February 2013 <http://www.cna.org/reports/climate>;
Defence Intelligence Agency of the United States (DIA). Global Water Security: Intelligence Community
Assessment. ICA 2012-08. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2012.
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2

tensions. However, the continued reliance on familiar tropes of water scarcity leading to
war and conflict is problematic in a number of ways. First, it ignores the historical record,
3

which displays a distinct absence of water wars. Secondly, freshwater scarcity and
ecosystem degradation hold far more importance as an inevitable source of conflict than
“21st Century oil.” Water is more important than other resources, including oil. As
Steven Solomon puts it, “Oil is substitutable, albeit painfully, by other fuel sources, or in
extremis, can be done without; but water’s uses are pervasive, irreplaceable by any other
4

substance, and utterly indispensable.” Thirdly, focusing upon historically absent and
hypothetical future water wars obscures the complex relationships individuals,
communities, and ecosystems have with scarce water sources; relationships that defy
5

simple classification as competitive and protectionist. The result is that it diverts
attention away from more pressing concerns related to the sustainable management of
water resources and the integration of holistic water practices ensuring equitable
distribution, which is fundamental to empowering individuals so that they may live a
good life. Finally, it reflects an uncritical allegiance to state-centric, traditional security

2

DIA, 2012; Ban, Ki-Moon. “Address as prepared for delivery to the Davos World Economic Forum.” UN
News Service 24 January, 2008. Online. 5 January, 2013.
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=177>; Association of American
th
Geographers. “United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan addresses the 97 Annual Meeting of the
Association of American Geographers” [Transcript of speech]. Association of American Geographers.
2001. Online. 5 January, 2013.
3

Aaron T. Wolf. “Conflict and Cooperation Along International Waterways,” Water Policy 1.2 (1998):
251-262; Lucia De Stefano, Paris Edwards, Lynette de Silva and Aaron T. Wolf. “Tracking cooperation
and conflict in international basins: historic and recent trends.” Water Policy 12.6 (2010): 871-88.
4

Steven Solomon. Water: The Epic Struggle for Wealth, Power, and Civilization. (New York: Harper,
2010): 367.
5

Mark Zeitoun, Naho Mirumachi and Jeroen Warner. "Transboundary water interaction II: Soft power
underlying conflict and cooperation." International Environmental Agreements 11.2 (2010): 159 - 178
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approaches to managing security, approaches that have been clearly ineffective for most
individuals on the planet. Narratives that causally link water scarcity and conflict
reinforce the deeply embedded assumptions of just what security means (survival) and for
whom it exists (states).
Despite the tenuous links between resource exploitation and conflict, there has been a
continued tendency to situate resource wars as a prevailing fact of history and an
inevitable focus for the future. Various UN organs and institutions have debated the
concept of water security. In 2012, it was the subject of a major national security report in
6

the United States. In 2007, The Government of Australia detailed A National Plan for
Water Security.7 And certainly a large number of think tanks, NGOs, and academic
studies have pointed to water as a major threat to security. Much of the talk of water is
deeply connected to a growing awareness of the dangers posed by climate change. In
February 2013, for just the third time in its history, the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) met to discuss and debate the security implications of climate change. The 2013
meeting was galvanized by an increasing awareness that the frequency and severity of
climate change effects, like hurricanes, wildfires, droughts, monsoons, and flooding,
required a new sense of urgency. Given the deep connections between climate change
security and water security, it is obvious that the issue will be of paramount importance in
the coming years.

6

United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence. “Global Water Security.” Intelligence
Community Assesment. ICA 2012-08, 2 February 2012. Online. 1 February 2013.
<http://www.dni.gov/nic/ICA_Global%20Water%20Security.pdf>>

7

Government of Australia. A National Plan for Water Security. Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2007.

4

However, there are developments that point to alternative understandings of water
security in an international context. In December 2010, the United Nations General
Assembly proclaimed 2013 as the United Nations International Year for Water
8

Cooperation. Launched at UNESCO headquarters in Paris on 11 February 2013, there
are four messages of the International Year: The first is that water cooperation is crucial
for poverty alleviation, and social equity; the second, that there are tangible economic
benefits; the third, that it protects water resources and the environment from degradation
9

and overuse; and perhaps most importantly, that water builds peace. Such timing is
reflective of a growing awareness that water is a central component for sustainable
development, including the eradication of poverty, the improvement of human health and
well-being, and for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. It also
suggests the growing weight of a counter-narrative to the dominant water wars thesis: one
that recognizes water as having the potential to bridge divides and encourage
cooperation. Such an acknowledgment is crucial in an increasingly vulnerable age; where
the challenges of meeting rising water demand are exacerbated by degraded and
dwindling water resources.
There are 276 international river basins in the world today and 148 riparian countries. 80
percent of the world’s freshwater originates in basins that traverse through more than one

8

United Nations General Assembly. “International Year for Water Cooperation, 2013 (A/RES/65/154).”
United Nations (20 December, 2010)
9

Gretchen Kalonji. “Editorial: We shall sink or swim together.” A World of Science UNESCO, 11.2
(2013): 3.

5

country and approximately 2.75 billion people live within transboundary river basins.

10

The sheer number of people and countries that are directly impacted by transboundary
water relationships makes the stakes all the more important. Yet for all of the debilitating
fears of potential conflict, there is only anecdotal evidence to suggest that water has ever
directly led to war. In fact, cooperation is far more common. The most comprehensive
study of water conflict and cooperation ever undertaken found
The incidence of acute conflict over international water resources is overwhelmed
by the rate of cooperation. The last 60 years (1948-2008) have seen only 44 acute
disputes (those involving violence), 30 of which occurred between Israel and one
of its neighbours. The total number of water-related events between nations of
any magnitude is also weighted towards cooperation: 759 conflict-related events
versus 1705 cooperative ones, implying that violence over water is neither
11

strategically rational, nor hydrographically effective, nor economically viable.

The UN’s designation of 2013 as “The International Year for Water Cooperation” may
have few tangible effects in alleviating water problems. It is also unlikely that the
designation itself will be successful in overcoming the intuitive sense that the less water
there is, the more valuable it becomes and the more probable it is that people will fight
over it. But it does point to something important - the sense that alternative conceptions
of water security are not only possible, but also necessary in an age where climate
change, resource exploitation, and the continuation of volatile regional disputes threaten

10

Lucia De Stefano, James Duncan, Shlomi Dinar, Kerstin Stahl, Kenneth Strzepek and Aaron T. Wolf.
“Mapping the Resilience of International River Basins to Future Climate Change-Induced Water
Variability.” Water Sector Board Discussion Paper Series The World Bank 15 March 2010.

11

Annika Kramer, Aaron T. Wolf, Alexander Carius, and Geoffrey D. Dabelko. “The key to managing
conflict and cooperation over water.” A World of Science UNESCO, 11.2 (2013): 7. [Emphasis added]. See
also Aaron T. Wolf. “Conflict and Cooperation Along International Waterways.”

6

to undermine human potential and environmental sustainability. It is at this juncture that
this dissertation hopes to add significantly.

1.2

Problem Question

Robert Cox claims that, “ontology lies at the beginning of an inquiry. We cannot define a
problem in global politics without presupposing a certain basic structure consisting of the
significant kinds of entities involved and the form of significant relationships among
12

them...There is always an ontological starting point.”

It is true that the continued

frequency of popular warnings that privilege Malthusian concerns over dwindling water
supplies and increasing human needs reflect deeper-rooted philosophical allegiances.
When a wide range of world leaders, including the past three UN Secretary Generals, at
one point or another, raise dire warnings of impending violence over water, they are
reflecting long-held assumptions about the purpose and possibilities of international
security, itself symptomatic of much deeper beliefs. When the United Kingdom’s
Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Ed Davey, warned an audience in
13

2013 that “water wars are just around the corner,” he was not simply reporting facts, but
was signalling a commitment to water security defined and held within a traditional
ontological interpretation of state self-preservation, political enmity, and human control
over nature.

12

Robert Cox. “Towards a posthegemonic conceptualization of world order: reflections on the relevancy
of Ibn Khaldun.” Approaches to World Order R.W. Cox and Timothy Sinclair (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996): 144.
13

Fiona Harvey. “Water wars between countries could be just around the corner, Davey warns.” The
Guardian 22 March. Online 7 February 2013.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/mar/22/water-wars-countries-davey-warns>

7

The resilience of the traditional interpretations of water security prepares the way for a
particular comprehension of the problem, as well as arranges the types of responses
considered appropriate. Water security is, in this regard, illustrative of what Horkheimer
and Adorno referred to as a “corrosive rationality” that binds existence with repetition. In
their reading, reason becomes locked in instrumental terms, in the service of domination
and control, rather than in progress or emancipation. In modern terms, an idea of
inevitability sets in because that which is sets the boundaries of possible experience.
These boundaries work to reflect and replicate the essence of the existing order –
characterized as cyclical motion, fate, domination of the world, and the renunciation of
hope.14 Reason and logic, the foundations of the enlightened spirit, become reduced to
instruments of purposes, used to determine the prospects for either survival or doom. The
rigid dualistic formulation expels actual thought from its methods of logic.15
The consequences are extensive. Western social science, based upon the division of fact
and value is meant to describe reality without making any judgments. But because this
division rests upon an instrumental conception of rationality, the knowledge derived from
it is used to control and exploit rather than for freedom or emancipation.16 Rationality in
this regard is blindly applied with little capacity to think about its ends or its relationship
to the specific character of the objects studied, or for that matter, the subjects observing
the phenomena. Rationality replaces critique with affirmation, and as a result, truth

14

Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment. Ed. Gunzelin Schmidd Noerr, Trans.
Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004): 20.

15
16

Horkheimer and Adorno, 23.

Columba Peoples, “Theodor Adorno,” Critical Theorists and International Relations, Eds. Jenny Edkins
and Nick Vaughan-Williams, (London: Routledge, 2009): 13.

8

evaporates.17 Social institutions and processes appear as self-directing and autonomous
rather than as something actually directed by humans.
The starting point of this dissertation then is an acknowledgment that conceptions of
security are conditioned by larger understandings of being and reality, and that water
security in particular is emblematic of traditional allegiances within the subject of
international relations that are resistant to change. It takes this critical observation and
extends it to examine the possibilities for emancipation in water security. At its core, it is
designed to answer the question: What are the relationships between water and security?
It approaches this question with two central objectives: First, by combining analytical
reasoning and normative theorizing it seeks to excavate the complex relationships
individuals and political communities have with scarce water sources; relationships that
defy simple classification as competitive and protectionist. An individual’s connection
with water, a unique and essential resource, is characterized by a wide and shifting
confluence of personal and social needs and identities. Thus, the dissertation aims to
reveal and examine how various security discourses are prevalent in the ways people
manage their relationships with water, and more broadly, with each other. It does so by
focusing on the prospects for change in international relations, and by detailing the ways
in which myths (e.g. “great debates,” “water wars”) work to condition that which is
possible in security.
Second, it aims to further the contemporary debates on the nature and characteristics of
critical security theory by providing a sketch of water security as emancipation. To date,

17

Horkheimer and Adorno, xviii.

9

the concept of emancipation has been left theoretically and empirically adrift in critical
security accounts, rendering its usefulness suspect and leaving it open to sustained
18

critique. This dissertation provides one of the first useful examples of the way in which
the concept of security as emancipation can be analytically and normatively valuable in
relation to an absolutely essential resource, highlighting the concept of emancipation’s
new potential in a real-world application. It provides a vision of emancipation in water
security by focusing on three interrelated criteria: inclusion, communication, and
cosmopolitanism.
The central argument of the dissertation is that security as emancipation is desirable and
possible in human relations over water. The basis of this argument is founded on the
reality that,
Water is an essential resource required for sustaining life and livelihoods: safe
water is required for drinking, hygiene and providing food; and adequate water to
produce energy and support economic activities such as industry and
transportation. Water in the natural environment ensures the provision of a
multitude of ecosystem services to meet basic human needs and support economic
and cultural activities. For too long water has been an issue that is at once
everywhere and nowhere…

19

18

Hayward Alker.“Emancipation in the ‘Critical Security Studies’ Project.” Critical Security Studies and
World Politics. Ed. Ken Booth (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005): 189-205; Mark Neocleous.
Critique of Security, (Montreal: McGill University Press, 2008); João R Nunes. Rethinking Emancipation
in Critical Security Studies, PhD thesis University of Wales – Aberystwyth, 2010. Online. 17 February
2013 http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/handle/2160/7179?show=full; João R Nunes. "Reclaiming the
Political: Emancipation and critique in security studies," Security Dialogue, 43.4 (2012): 345-361.
19

World Water Assessment Programme (WWAP). “The United Nations World Water Development
Report 4: Managing Water under Uncertainty and Risk.” (Paris: UNESCO, 2012): 23.

10

This pivotal insight, from the 2012 World Water Development Report (WWDR),
compels us to consider water as a critical natural resource upon which all social and
economic activities and ecosystem functions depend. The subject of security, traditionally
understood, is unable to fully account for the range of uses, meanings, and functions of
water, frequently placing it within a dominant narrative of state security, and avoiding the
implications of water insecurity upon individuals. Traditional security paradigms that
focus upon always-over-the-horizon, existential, threats to the state, are fundamentally
ill-equipped to solve the myriad problems of water insecurity in the twenty-first century.
The 2012 WWDR concludes, “Greater recognition is needed of the fact that water is not
solely a local, national or regional issue that can be governed at any of those levels alone.
20

On the contrary, global interdependencies are woven through water…” The echoes of
this are to be found in the insights of critical security studies. As Ken Booth reminds us,
“In the first truly global age the answers to the questions about security must begin by
being global.”

1.3

21

Scope of Analysis

This dissertation offers a critical perspective on water security. It seeks to interrogate and
uncover traditional allegiances held by security practitioners and scholars and understand
how and why these allegiances contribute to problematic understandings of
vulnerabilities related to water security. It begins with the critical observation that
ontology lies at the beginning of inquiry. As such, it devotes considerable space to
investigating the way in which understandings of being and reality work to condition

20
21

WWAP, 23.
Ken Booth, Theory of World Security (CambridgeL Cambridge University Press, 2007): 90.

11

dominant attitudes towards water and security. That said, there are necessary limitations
to the following analysis that must be acknowledged. There is neither space nor would it
be appropriate here to provide an in-depth examination into the very ontology of
humanity and its material relation to water. Such an undertaking is beyond what is
attempted, though the dissertation does focus on aspects of those ontological and
epistemological issues. Overall, the aims here are more modest. This dissertation is
primarily meant to offset particular understandings of water security that privilege
conflict over cooperation, state sovereignty over human and ecological needs, and
instrumental rationality at the expense of reflexive understanding. It argues that water is a
profoundly connective and supportive substance that disrupts the conventional
boundaries of human life through its physical and social properties. Extending this
reasoning and focus allows for the potential reimagining of security in equally profound
ways. The chapters that follow accept this premise, but focus more attention on the
conventional ways water is principally conceived: as something over which people fight,
and as something over which people negotiate its distribution in fair and unfair ways.
This is a deliberate decision meant to limit the scope of analysis to a manageable form. It
would be unwise to open the dissertation up to such a wide expanse of possible inquiry –
into the very ontology of humanity and its relation with water. A much narrower focus on
particular strains of security studies is offered instead. This more managed focus
produces pointed adjustments to discourses of security, while showing appreciation for
larger questions that must necessarily be here left unanswered.

1.4

Methodology

A section on methodology is warranted. Despite some notable exceptions, there has been
a distinct lack of critical approaches that disrupt the political, economic, and security

12

frameworks that have given rise to environmental problems and vulnerabilities.

22

The

dissertation seeks to help fill this gap by exploring how the concept of security is mutable
and how water security itself can be situated as a progressive concept of hope. To put it
simply, an analyst’s theoretical and epistemological position selects the choice of
methods deemed appropriate. With few exceptions, environmental conflict scholars rely
23

upon a positivist epistemology that takes its cues from the natural sciences. This means
that most environmental security work relies upon quantitative approaches. On the
subject of water security, some of the most well-known and cited studies attempt to make
causal connections between water and conflict by cross-referencing large statistical data
sets on freshwater availability with incidents of intrastate and interstate armed conflicts.

24

But, as Rita Floyd points out,
The predictive value of this type of analysis is unclear for at least two reasons. First,
environmental change endlessly creates a new context for social behaviour and
therefore the future is always unlike the past. Second, the density of connection in the
human world suggest to many analysts that outcomes will tend to be more
comparable to the non-linear models of quantum physics than the linear models of

22

A small number of these exceptions include, Jon Barnett. The Meaning of Security. (London: Zed
Books, 2001); Robin Eckersley. Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach
(Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992); Simon Dalby. Environmental Security. (Minneapolis: University of
Minneapolis Press, 2002); Matt McDonald. Security, the environment, and emancipation: contestation over
environmental change. (New York: Routledge, 2011).
23

Rita Floyd. “Analyst, theory and security: a new framework for understanding environmental security
studies.” Environmental Security, Approaches and Issues Eds. Rita Floyd and Richard A. Matthew (New
York: Routledge, 2013): 24.
24

Thomas Homer-Dixon. Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1999); Aaron T. Wolf. “Conflict and Cooperation Along International Waterways.” Water Policy
1.2. (1998): 251-262.

13

Newtonian physics. These reasons also explain why study results often are not easy to
replicate with new data.

25

Positivism assumes a social world that is observable and replicable through falsifiable
studies. In contrast, critical methodologies rely upon a reflectivist position: the world is
given through our methods of studying it. In this way, the social world cannot (and
should not) be studied the same way as the natural world. Social and political life is too
messy. While exhibiting methodological pluralism, all critical inquiries start from a
position of self-doubt or a tendency towards self-undermining.

26

They are inherently

skeptical that the researcher is a value-free vessel for unattached observation. This creates
a necessary openness to research and a reluctance to design programmatic research
designs, for fear of closing off innovation, discovery, or most importantly, emancipation.
Instead of the positivist belief in the separation of the object and the subject studying it,
the critical tradition highlights the idea of the theorist as practitioner. One of the aims of
inquiry is to develop praxis, borne of a commitment to not only identify issues of
concern, but to contribute to their undoing. Matt McDonald, drawing upon Andrew
Linklater, suggests that a critical theoretical approach “requires engaging with normative,
sociological and praxeological questions that combine a focus on the composition of the
ideal, the context of political action, and the feasible means of action or possibilities for

25

Floyd, Analyst, theory and security: a new framework for understanding environmental security
studies,” 24-25.
26

Mark B. Salter. “Introduction.” Research Methods in Critical Security Studies: An Introduction Eds.
Mark B. Salter, and Can E. Mutlu. (New York: Routledge, 2013): 2.

14

realizing the ideal. The praxeological dimension is advanced through the method of
immanent critique.”

27

In approaching the central questions of water security the dissertation thus employs the
method of immanent critique. This is defined as a method of critique used to locate the
28

emancipatory potential embedded in existing social and political orders. Essentially, it
uses a critique of concepts to obtain a critique of the real experience which is already
sedimented in those concepts.

29

Immanent critique rejects the notion that present

situations reflect a timeless pattern and focuses instead on ‘subjugated’ voices to produce
alternative understandings of security. The theorist acknowledges how a particular time
and historical context is necessary to explain the origins, development, institutions, and
the possibilities for change. By weaving a conceptual net that suspends the object
‘momentarily’ it can reveal the processes at work, including the ways in which it is
30

potentially becoming. It is put to use here to identify conceptions and practices of water
security that transcend traditional understandings of security. This is important in chapter
two specifically, where analyses of traditional discourses, literature, ideologies, and
practices, are used to show the historical and conceptual inconsistencies that create such
problematic understandings of security and environmental change. Immanent critique
exposes the internal contradictions of seemingly intractable water conflict in politically

27

McDonald, The Environment, Security, and Emancipation, 90.

28

Christopher S. Browning, and Matt McDonald. “The Future of Critical Security Studies: Ethics and the
Possibility of Security.” European Journal of International Relations First published on 27 October 2011:
14.
29

Simon Jarvis. Adorno: A Critical Introduction. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998): 6

30

Andrew Biro. Critical Ecologies: The Frankfurt School and Contemporary Environmental Crises.
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011): 123

15

volatile regions. These contradictions are the fault lines where alternative visions of
security can be identified, empowered and amplified.
Chapters five and six reflect the praxeological focus of immanent critique by constructing
a sketch of emancipatory water security built on the pillars of inclusion, communication,
and cosmopolitanism, and then searching for those identifying features in contemporary
water security practices. This form of analysis arises from the idea that even the bleakest
situations have within them the possibilities of a better life. We are not doomed to repeat
the failures of the past. Or, as Max Horkheimer argues, “Man can change reality, and the
31

necessary conditions for such change already exist.” Chapter six presents a case that
hydrosolidarity is one of the overlooked discourses of contemporary water politics. It
argues that hydrosolidarity, in various institutionalized forms, can provoke radically new
understandings of water security as emancipation. It does so by pointing out the tensions,
inconsistencies, and, contradictions of traditional water security. All told, the dissertation
relies upon a practice-orientated theory, capable of proposing scenarios and critical
methods for citizen deliberation, all in the service of building what Richard Wyn Jones
refers to as “concrete utopias.”

1.5

32

Definitions

It is useful here to clarify many of the terms and concepts that will be used throughout the
dissertation.

31
32

Max Horkheimer, quoted in Booth, Theory of World Security, 250.

Richard Wyn Jones. Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, 76-78. See also Oliver Escobar. “The
Dialogic Turn: Dialogue for Deliberation.” In-Spire: Journal of Law, Politics, and Societies 4.2 (2009): 43.

16

1.5.1

Traditional Security

“Traditional” security is perhaps most succinctly summed up by Stephen Walt as “the
study of the threat, use, and control of military force.”

33

It refers to a wide span of

approaches to security that employ an instrumental logic derived from a rationalist
epistemology. It is exemplified in the broad range of studies that holds assumptions of
actor rationality, self-interest, and value-maximization.

1.5.2

Critical Security

“Critical” security refers to a wide range of approaches that take as starting points a selfreflective awareness to produce research that critiques the status quo, rather than simply
trying to explain and understand it. It is heavily indebted to the tradition of critical theory,
most actively associated with the Frankfurt School of the 1930s. Nancy Fraser observes
that no one has improved upon Marx’s definition of critical theory as “the self34

clarification of the struggles and wishes of the age.” While the ideas of critical security
have percolated for decades, it was not until 1997 that Keith Krause and Michael C.
Williams issued their now-famous call to reconsider the concepts and methodologies
35

traditionally employed in security studies. They argued that rethinking security required
“making the definition of the political a question, rather than an assumption.” Thus
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critical security is premised on the political nature of security – how understandings and
practices of security affect social relations and the political order itself.

1.5.3

36

Traditional vs. Critical Security

Reflecting an essentialized security foundation, both traditional and critical approaches
begin from the idea of security as the absence of threat. But from there the approaches
diverge almost immediately. Their perceptions of security are contingently based; that is,
they are not logically necessary. From similar starting points, traditional approaches
focus on protection through the use of power, while critical theorists focus on shared
vulnerabilities and the emancipation of the individual through “the extension of dialogic
possibilities in the contemporary world order.”37 In each case, security becomes security,
or security is understood as security, but through two distinctly different political
readings of the term. In traditional approaches this means that security conforms to the
“real side of politics,” that is, as policy action in an unchanging international sphere,
where states are the only significant actor and their relations are naturalized mainly
because they are structurally pre-determined.38 It is different from critical approaches that
argue that traditional views on security, the state, and the international system are
historically conditioned, socially constructed, value-laden, and remiss at questioning the
naturalness of the prevailing order. Instead critical theory problematizes the
contemporary world order and the power relations that characterize it on the grounds that
they both solidify and perpetuate exploitative social relations. According to this point of
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view, there is nothing organic to, or necessary within, human relations to suggest that the
existing system of exploitative social relations is a fixed and necessary historical creation.
Rather it represents but one particular socio-historical interpretation of reality.39 To sum
up, as Timothy Sinclair maintains, traditional theory “assumes the functional coherence
of existing phenomena, critical theory seeks out the sources of contradiction and conflict
40

in these entities and evaluates their potential to change into different patterns.”

1.5.4

Emancipation

Emancipation is a complicated and thorny concept - one that has received relatively
minor attention despite being a central component of critical security. Its pursuit is the
central intent of scholars who adhere to the Frankfurt School model of critical theory and
it provides the necessary impetus for the construction of alternative, progressive, security
discourses and practices. Indeed, while critical theory itself encompasses hugely diverse
41

approaches, the linkage among all critical theory is “the emancipatory intent.”

This

dissertation relies upon the definition put forth by Ken Booth, perhaps the most
prominent theorist of the “Welsh School” of security studies. He conceives of
42

emancipation as “the philosophy, theory, and politics, of inventing humanity.”

This

deliberately obscure definition holds within it the possibility of progress, but it is a view
of progress that is both dynamic and reversible. This dissertation relies significantly on
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the Welsh School, principally its commitment to critiquing state-centrism in security
studies and its normative appeals for emancipation as a guide in theory and practice. An
emancipatory vision of security is holistic, non-statist, and de-emphasizes the use or
threat of force. The practical fulfillment of security as emancipation requires the freeing
of individuals from arbitrary structures preventing them from living as they would
43

otherwise wish. It entails overturning structures of oppression or exclusion. Its principal
characteristics are that it is radically cosmopolitan; predicated on the rights and needs of
the most vulnerable; and that the means envisaged to achieve or preserve ‘security’ will
44

not deprive others of it. Given that individuals’ experiences of security and insecurity
are heavily tied to their access to water resources, it is logical to situate the critical
concept of emancipation as a rejoinder to traditional, dominant security discourses.

1.5.5

Emancipatory Water Security

The vision of water security put forth in this dissertation relies upon an integrative
understanding of the problem and possibilities that water security offers, and is derivative
of the insights of critical security. It argues for an emancipatory security of water that is
dependent upon an inclusive morality, a communicative rationality, and cosmopolitan
ethics. Water security becomes then much more than adequate access to quality water
supplies, though this is certainly a prerequisite. It entails a political understanding of
water security that unshackles the barriers to inclusion, communication, and refrains from
barring others from also exercising their rights. Thus, emancipatory water security is
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defined herein as, the process of securing vulnerable populations from the structural
violence caused by the political, social, and natural impediments to adequate water
supplies needed for a good life, while simultaneously ensuring the means by which water
security is achieved does not also deprive others of it nor degrade affected ecosystems.
This definition is designed as a targeted and practical application of Ken Booth’s
deliberately obtuse vision of emancipation as “the philosophy, theory, and politics of
inventing humanity.” It de-privileges the dominant actors of traditional security, and
places the overriding focus of security on individuals and communities (and the natural
environment upon which they rely) who suffer the most from inadequate water supplies.
It is thus able to provide an actionable theory of water security, providing both
intellectual coherence and practical guidance for designing future institutional and
governance architecture that alleviate suffering. By reframing water security along
individual lines, it can provide agency-possessing actors and those who challenge them
with a reference point: are the policies currently in practice and are the policies
envisioned for the future able to alleviate human suffering and ecological degradation
caused by water insecurity?

45

To answer these pivotal questions, emancipatory water

security, as defined, relies upon the development of three central criteria that can help
alleviate human suffering and which are also reflective of the overall spirit of
emancipation in critical security studies. They are inclusion, communication, and
cosmopolitanism. All three criteria are explored at length in chapter five, which seeks to

45
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balance Booth’s emancipatory approach with a pragmatic application, all the while
avoiding schematic, instrumental blueprints.

1.5.6

Water Stress, Water Scarcity, Water Security

Given the frequency with which the terms are employed in the dissertation it is useful to
elaborate upon what is meant by water stress, water scarcity, and water security. The
relationship between them is one that is often assumed to be interchangeable, though in
reality, they remain distinct. The prolific Swedish hydrologist, Malin Falkenmark, has
most succinctly defined water stress. Her Falkenmark Water Stress Indicator labels a
country or a region as water stressed if its annual water supplies dip below 1,700 cubic
metres (m3) per person per year. Water scarcity occurs when water supplies fall below
46

1,000 m3 per person per year. That said, given the range of agricultural and industrial
practices and expectations throughout the world, it is not especially useful to assign a
specific value to water scarcity or stress. Water scarcity is best understood simply as
“imbalances between availability and demand.” When demand outstrips supply, water
scarcity occurs. Contributing factors include “the degradation of groundwater and surface
water quality, intersectoral competition, and interregional and international conflict.”
47

Altogether, water scarcity is most often an issue of poverty. Water stress represents the
effects of water scarcity or shortage including growing conflict between users and
competition for water, declining standards of reliability and service, harvest failures and
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food insecurity.

48

Water security, is perhaps the most difficult to pinpoint. Cook and

Bakker write, “Framings of water security are by no means consistent and tend to vary
with context and disciplinary perspectives on water use.”

49

There are both broad and

narrow approaches to defining the concept. The most commonly used broad-based
definition comes from the Global Water Partnership. In 2000, at the Second World Water
Forum, it defined water security as a central goal “…where every person has access to
enough safe water at affordable cost to lead a clean, healthy and productive life, while
ensuring the environment is protected and enhanced.”

50

This implies a central

preoccupation with watershed management (for “life”), and demands adequate water
quantities and quality for human and ecosystem needs. More narrow formulations often
focus on the differentiated sectoral needs. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) defines water security in direct connection with food security, arguing it is the
51

ability to provide adequate and reliable water supplies to meet agricultural demands.

The British non-governmental organization (NGO), WaterAid, conducted a literature
review of the field, and found that most definitions of water security relate to food
security, essentially asking - do we have enough water to grow the food we need?
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1.6

Chapter Outline

This dissertation is divided into two broad sections. The first – chapters two, three, and
four – undertake a sustained critique of the traditional concepts inherent in accounts of
international relations, international security, and environmental security. These chapters,
while each standing alone, work together to lay the groundwork for the second section of
the thesis – chapters five and six – which builds a framework for emancipatory water
security. It builds this framework in chapter five, and then identifies hydrosolidarity in
chapter six as an emancipatory potential embedded in contemporary water security. A
more thorough outline of each chapter is useful to situate the reader moving forward.
Chapter two, “Historical Paradigms in International Security” characterizes theoretical
complacency as prevalent in the study and construction of what is generally labeled
“traditional” approaches to security. It does so by questioning the myth of tradition that
permeates traditional security studies. It argues that “historical geographies”, such as the
“The Great Debates” misrepresent the diversity of experiences related to security and are
too easily employed to justify contemporary policies. It furthers this line of thinking by
revisiting the Kuhn/Popper debate on the nature and resilience of particular paradigms.
The central line of argument is that the disciplines of international relations/international
security have clung to contradictory and obscure myths of tradition, to damaging effect.
In other words, scholars of international relations have, “little practice in imagining what
it considers ‘impossible things.’”
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It argues though that water security may be

demonstrative of a Kuhnian paradigm shift, showing what was thought to be permanent is
in fact alterable.
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Chapter three, “Water Wars and Environmental Security,” reviews the literature on
environmental and water security. It begins by delineating the onset and subsequent four
phases of environmental security literature, emphasizing the deepening moves apparent
in the latest, fourth stage of environmental security. It does so with a critical awareness
also apparent in chapter two, that delineating vast bodies of literature into uniform phases
comes with its own set of problems. It then discusses the history of the concept of water
wars and their use as a “hegemonic concept” and examines the discursive use of water
wars as a legitimating force for traditional security studies. Much of the traditional water
security literature follows the same trajectory as the broader environmental security
literature. It evokes a picture of water as a dwindling natural resource that has the
potential to act as a threat multiplier in an age of climate insecurity and domestic
upheaval in a warming world. In response, a normative and theoretical critique is offered
that disputes the usage of the water wars discourse and lays the groundwork for the
theory building of emancipatory water security in chapter five.
Chapter four, “Water Securitization in the Anthropocene” argues that the securitization
framework of the Copenhagen School is useful for analyzing when water becomes
designated as a threat using security language. Despite its analytical use however, the
Copenhagen School puts forth a flawed reading of security, one that is largely inspired by
the work of the twentieth century German Jurist Carl Schmitt. This reading is
increasingly incoherent, in an ecological age when the distinction between exception and
the rule is blurred. Chapter four provides an extended case study of the securitization of
the Nile River Basin region, and the ways in which securitization is used to justify a
security logic predicated on the threat of water wars and conflict. In the end, it argues for
a deeper understanding of security, away from the securitization thesis and its Schmittian
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definition of “security as extremity.” It does do so by arguing that the use/misuse of
“securitization” as an employable theoretical construct replicates problematic
understandings of security and fails to bring us closer to understanding its diverse nature,
especially as it relates to water.
Chapter five, “Towards an Emancipatory Security of Water: Inclusion, Communication,
and Cosmopolitanism,” marks the beginning of the second section of the dissertation. It
explores the idea that water can act as a progressive site for the articulation of
emancipatory policies based upon cosmopolitan ethics. It asks the question, “What does
an emancipatory security of water look like?” The chapter answers by constructing an
“emancipatory security of water” that has three defining features: inclusion,
communication, and cosmopolitanism. These three features are identified as central
because they represent an ethically viable approach to water conflict and degradation in
the twenty-first century. Without some combination of all three features it is difficult to
envision the future looking anything other than a worsening reflection of the present. The
idea in this chapter is not to provide a rigid policy blueprint for scholars and practitioners,
but a process-oriented vision that is mutable and open to adaption, provided the principles
remain.
Chapter six, “Hydrosolidarity: the Ethics of Water Security,” isolates Swedish
hydrologist Malin Falkenmark’s concept of hydrosolidarity as a promising alternative to
traditional water security discourses. It provides a historical overview of the concept of
hydrosolidarity, originally used as the ethical component to the dominant water
management paradigm, Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). It then
examines the promise and perils of IWRM, arguing that despite some promise, the
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scientific and technical rationality at its heart is being overemphasized at the expense of
normative judgments. The chapter’s final section analyzes the potential of Global Water
Solidarity, a United Nations Development Programme-led initiative, to act as an
immanent representation of emancipatory water security.

1.7

Anticipated Contributions

This thesis presents an overview, assessment, and reconsideration of water security.
Stemming from dissatisfaction with the continued intransigence of conventional
approaches to water security, it seeks to recast water security using emancipation as its
ordering principle. The commitment to emancipation as an ordering concept for future
water security practices is not without potential problems, as the following chapters will
show. However, it does provide some measure of theoretical sophistication and should
help push forward actionable designs for future security policies that take human
suffering and structural violence seriously.
This thesis is primarily theoretical. Its validity will rest on the internal consistency of its
core propositions and the existing literature upon which many of its arguments are based.
Empirical illustrations are offered, particularly in chapters four and six. These are done in
the service of crafting a legitimate critique of existing approaches and in building a
critical security of water. Arising from a critical theoretical stance, there are justified
hesitations to construct schematic blueprints that should be adhered to by water officials
and communities. That said, this thesis is committed to a form of praxis, of actively
thinking about and acting in the world. By contributing a detailed emancipatory
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framework this thesis can offer valued insight into how to think about, and respond to
ongoing human and ecological suffering related to water.
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2

2.1

CHAPTER TWO: Historical Paradigms in International
Security

Introduction

Susan Strange, writing almost two decades ago, argued, “social scientists, in politics and
economics especially, cling to obsolete concepts and inappropriate theories.”

54

This

observation guides the next chapter, which produces an immanent critique of the
historical and conceptual trajectory of the broad program of International Security
Studies (ISS). It argues that Kuhnian paradigm shifts are indeed possible; international
security is constantly vulnerable to change and to the usurpation of dominant ontologies.
Moreover, it maintains the concept of water security is at the forefront of a contemporary
paradigm shift – away from Westphalian notions of state-centrism and exclusionary
binaries of inside/outside, friend/enemy – towards critical ontologies of emancipation.
The overall critique lays out the inconsistencies of traditional accounts of the field of
international relations and security and argues for a better appreciation of the concept of
change in ISS. The intention is to acknowledge the space for alternative theorizing in the
field, which bring forth multiple visions of security. Such a maneuver is crucial for later
attempts in the manuscript to outline an emancipatory security of water. It begins first by
isolating and disrupting the “myth of tradition” that continues to order international
relations and international security studies as a whole. It then re-examines the Kuhn-
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Popper debate in the philosophy of science to highlight the impact that shared beliefs of
an academic community have in conditioning orthodoxy, rather than critically examining
or altering the foundations of their knowledge. All told, most approaches to security fail
to adequately account for the possibility of change on an ontological and epistemological
level. The result then is the continued prevalence of analyses that replicate conventional,
approaches to security that cannot envision alternative transformations that may further
emancipatory change. This commitment to reproduction brings us no closer to solving the
complex problems of water scarcity and degradation for individuals and communities.
Later chapters in this dissertation will examine the extent of alternative possibilities in
water security and detail emancipatory opportunities that provide models of hope and
progress.

2.2

The Story of Security Studies

The story of security studies mirrors the discipline of international relations (IR) in its
attachment to a set of foundational myths. As a subset of IR it may come as little surprise
that international security studies (ISS) largely depends on a linear history of itself to
organize and order its arrival and evolution as an academic field of study. The historical
trajectory of IR is often taught to students as a series of “great debates,” between idealism
and realism, traditionalism and behaviouralism, the inter-paradigm debate, and the
positivist-post-positivist debate. The disagreements historically arising within the
discipline have been used as the principal signposts through which students can most
easily absorb the complexities associated with its thematic evolution. It makes for a good
story, and thus a generally effective pedagogic device. The creation of the great debates
mythology has been used to impart a sense of tradition in IR. James Der Derian has
pointed out that “the power of a tradition lies in its ability to condense and simplify this
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complexity into uniform, teachable expressions…”

The danger is that the prevailing

reliance on tradition allows for a naturalizing history of international relations that makes
56

it difficult, even heretical to “think the unthought.”

In much the same way, ISS has developed its own attachments to historical myth making,
fashioning a narrative that is an enabling gateway for students to begin to understand its
agendas of study. A typical account of ISS begins by acknowledging its relatively recent
addition as a sub-discipline of political science in general, IR in particular. Perfunctory
historical accounts hold the discipline as emerging with the onset of nuclear-age
international politics. Accordingly, ISS arose from a new need by governments and
militaries to plan strategically during peacetime – fusing military power and political
57

purpose. The end of World War Two, with the division of the world into two competing
super power systems, and the eventual nuclear stalemate between the U.S. and USSR,
created a new, diffuse, influence for non-military strategic planners. According to most
historical overviews it was at the end of World War Two where the field of study
recognized as ISS first emerged. The new possibility of influence in the late 1940s and
early 1950s experienced by civilian experts in social science and physicists was the result
of a new acceptance of a wider understanding of “security”, beyond simply war and
defence. Security studies (at this point, probably more aptly referred to as “strategic
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studies”) entered a “golden age” of influence from 1955-1965.

58

During this time, it

concentrated almost exclusively on great power politics and nuclear deterrence. The
inclusion of civilians into strategic planning during the war paved the way for this
“golden age” of security studies. The war made clear that the potential for destruction
was now too important to be left to the generals. Individuals not previously
commissioned to be included in the corridors of military power and strategy were able to
exert a new and unique influence upon warfighting and the pursuit of strategic advantage.
The nature of the Cold War, and the intensity of the conflict absent of direct military
confrontation, was conducive to the inclusion of both military and non-military aspects of
the generalized subject.
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Increasingly events in the Third World began to disrupt and reorient strategic studies
analyses. The oil crisis in the early 1970s and the defeat of American forces in Vietnam
generated new doubt about the utility of force and the ability of third world cartels to
weaken the Western economy. The 1980s saw a rise of new studies in security that
questioned the traditional approaches and sought to widen the scope of threats under
review and to deepen the meaning of security. The end of the Cold War produced an
invigorated debate between and amongst traditionalists, and those who sought to widen
and deepen the traditional ISS framework. The inclusion of new topics such as the
environment, terrorism, poverty, AIDS, and immigration in security studies was
vigorously debated, and was responsible for disrupting traditional security studies’
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epistemological and methodological coherence. Today, the story of security studies is one
of multiple approaches and meanings. And, depending on whom you ask, the expansion
of security studies into new and diverse approaches has further enriched the
understanding of threat, or has produced an incoherent and ineffective field of study,
removed from the reality of contemporary international affairs.

60

A similar approach orders the intellectual history of international relations. As the story
goes, IR, first coined over two hundred years ago by Jeremy Bentham, began as an
academic discipline with the endowment of the Woodrow Wilson Chair at the University
of Wales, Aberystwyth, in 1919 in a noble attempt to differentiate the study of war and
peace from other disciplines like history and economics, with which it was usually
lumped. It was believed that rigorous inquiry into the relations between states was
necessary to assuage the human impulse to war. The level of devastation wrought by the
First World War compelled academics and policy makers to commit to correct the errors,
miscalculations, and distrust created by historical international interaction. The pursuit of
scholarly inquiry for this central aim was intended to be an important contribution to state
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relations. The idealist impulse in the first years of IR as a formal academic discipline was
thus a strong component in its institutionalization.
However, the onset of World War Two produced a significant disruption in the broad
idealist project. E.H. Carr, in his opus, Twenty Years’ Crisis, published in 1939, produced
a seemingly devastating critique of idealism arguing that it was unable “to provide any
61

absolute and disinterested standard for the conduct of international affairs.” Instead of
idealist attachments to unknowable and unreachable utopias, what Carr and others
envisioned was much further attention to ‘what is’ before turning to ‘what ought to be.’
While Carr himself eschewed crude commitments to empiricism (‘the facts of history
62

never come to us as pure…they are always refracted through the mind of the recorder’ )
his book was “the first to grapple with a range of international matters in the spirit of
science…of detached enquiry stripped of the liberal rationalist teleology that
63

subconsciously infused virtually all works on the subject of the period.” This turn in IR
arrived at a specific time and in a specific context – as a response to the perceived failure
of liberal internationalist approaches that relied heavily on an absolutist morality that
64

believed reality could be transformed by an act of will. The emergence of The Twenty
Years’ Crisis in 1939, at the onset of another catastrophic world war, seems to suggest
that it was stimulated by the failure of both policy and analysis. The book was a
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remarkable achievement in that it bridged together diplomacy, security, war, and policy
prescription. Authors as diverse as Kal Holsti, James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgreff,
Michael Banks, J. Ann Tickner, James Der Derian, and Chris Brown have all, at one
point or another, worked to consolidate a view that the theory of realism defeated
utopianism/idealism/liberal internationalism.
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The arrival of the Cold War and the beginning of the second great debate saw IR scholars
move away from traditional interpretivist methods and embrace the move made by most
North American social scientists towards the methods proposed by rational choice theory.
Rational choice theory examines the behaviour of actors (whether they be individuals,
states, companies, etc) under the assumption that these actors are rational, self-interested,
and value maximizing.
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The third discipline-defining debate occurred between
67

neoliberals and neorealists and is often referred to as “the inter-paradigm debate.”

Finally, the fourth debate, first arriving in the mid-late 1980s, occurred between
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positivists and post-positivists. It dealt with themes like meta-scientific units, the concern
with underlying premises and assumptions, and saw a drift to methodological pluralism.
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There are genuine problems in producing unified intellectual histories of IR and ISS. It
replicates the dominant normative position of a few theoretical approaches, legitimating
their presence and value, while simultaneously ignoring and devaluing the plurality of
voices that have offered cogent alternative interpretations. Beyond that, it presupposes a
coherence and continuity within a specific theoretical paradigm that avoids critically
investigating the differences across time and space. Despite what many writers in IR/ISS
would have us believe it is not at all self-evident that Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Carr
occupy a genuine historical pattern of thought. Arising across many centuries, and in
vastly different contexts, it is more appropriate to speak of the “intellectual history” of
IR/ISS through nebulous connections between authors and not through a uniformity of
thought. The traditional approach is misleading and generally legitimates and validates
the interests of the presenting authors instead of performing a true uncovering of the past.
Brian Schmidt expertly argues this line of reasoning in his critique of the historiography
of academic IR. He argues that there have been two pervasive intellectual errors in most
historical studies of IR. The first is the confusion between an analytical and historical
tradition. The second is the mistaken premise that events in world politics have had a
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determinative and causal effect upon the development of the discipline. Schmidt looks
to K.J. Holsti’s important survey of IR, The Dividing Discipline, first published in 1986,
as an expert example of the power that the myth of tradition holds upon many IR
theorists. While acknowledging that international theory was in disarray during the fourth
70

debate in the mid-1980s, enabling new conceptions and images of the world to emerge” ,
Holsti frames this “disarray” as a “breakdown” of a dominant realist paradigm that
extended back to Hobbes, Rousseau and Bentham and forward to modern authors like
Carr, Martin Wight, and Hans Morgenthau. In so doing, Schmidt argues that Holsti
produces a generally false sense of coherence and continuity.
The disrupted, incongruent history of ideas that marks the development of IR and ISS has
been generally overlooked for the sake of clean and demarcated lines of progression and
development. The ubiquity of the linear narrative results in the historicity of the
genealogical relationship being taken as given, with rarely any demonstration of the
accuracy of its connections. One can then see that the use and reliance on grand
narratives obfuscates what are principally analytical traditions rather than historical ones.
As Schmidt writes, “the primary concern of many of the disciplinary histories of
international relations is really to say something authoritative and critical about the field’s
71

current or desired character.” To participate in the idealization of the past is to utilize
one of the many disciplinary tools that help maintain the fatalist logic that seemingly
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dominates both IR and ISS. Narratives that stretch IR back to Ancient Greece, or to the
beginning of the Cold War nuclear rivalry between the US and USSR ‘naturalize
categories of identity’. It tells us about the expected character of the discipline,
73

privileging particular ontologies of power and individualism. Isolating Thucydides as
the father of IR claims the preeminent position for realism, only to be reinforced by the
historical inclusion of such theoretical “heavyweights” as Machiavelli and Hobbes into
74

the historical narrative. All of this ignores the myriad ways that an author as seemingly
canonical as Thucydides can be interpreted. Richard Ned Lebow’s The Tragic Vision of
Politics (2003) and A Cultural History of International Relations (2005) have recast
75

Thucydides through the lens of tragedy and honour. For him, the Ancient Greek world
can be generally reduced to the role that honour played. This is a much more optimistic
(though still weary of the ‘tragic’ nature of the human condition) interpretation of
Thucydides that would likely appear unfamiliar to most students of conventionally-taught
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IR. In this reading of Thucydides, humans are able to adapt and learn from art, history,
and experience. Indeed, it is not difficult to find examples from the ancient world that
privilege other sets of principles, separate from realism and power politics. In the second
century BC, the Greek historian Polybius chronicled Rome’s rise to power in forty books
that came to be known as The Histories. Book VI on the Roman Constitution argues that
Rome was not simply dependent on power for its hegemonic position, but also derived
77

authority from the strengths of its political structure and mixed constitution.

This

parallels modern liberal theory, specifically the general character of the democratic peace
thesis in its emphasis on internal political structure playing an important role in foreign
and military policy. It also frees us from the misguided assumption that the ancient world
only exhibits the ‘timeless’ character of realism. Overall though, it is wrong to paint
complex ancient writers like Polybius with contemporary brushes; their ideas are often
multifaceted, exhibiting characteristics that are both present and absent modern theories
of IR/ISS. But, Polybius’s ancient moral judgments,
Are deeply expressive of a concern for the maintenance of ethical behaviour in a
difficult and complex world…Polybius’s desire for the ‘improvement of his
audience was not limited to the creation of more pragmatically efficient decisions
makers – although of course he had much to say in that direction. Rather,
Polybius also hoped that those who studied his Histories would emerge with a
firm determination to live their lives nobly – according to the κ α λ •ν ..
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We might also ask “why Thucydides?” or “why Polybius?” The traditional approaches to
international relations derive their authority from proving the enduring connections
across space, time, and context. But by consulting ancient western authors and
interspersing interpretations of their general themes, traditional IR writers create a
thematic vacuum that subsumes alternative readings and explanations of international
relations and security. Readers of the Melian Dialogue can easily be led to assume that
international relations has always been and must always be primarily concerned with the
relations between great powers in the international system. This trajectory from Ancient
Greece to modern times then becomes a linear historical narrative that understands
international relations primarily in terms of successive struggles between great powers
and the rise and fall of powerful states.
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If, as Kenneth Waltz points out, “a general
79

theory of international politics is necessarily based on great powers,” then traditional
international relations and security studies must necessarily be Eurocentric, because, well
that is where we find all the “great powers.” The regrettable downside is that traditional
IR and ISS become characterized by historical geographies that reproduce a set of
Eurocentric categories and assumptions; this, instead of a more appropriately nuanced
understanding of the mutual constitution of European and non-European worlds, and their
80

joint role in producing history. The question then might rightfully be asked why nonWestern historical social practices are predominantly underrepresented? Why Thucydides
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and not Sun Tzu? Why the Melian Dialogue and not the Analects of Confucius? The
seventeenth century Japanese guide A Book of Five Rings by Miyamoto Musashi might
teach us as much as Carl von Clausewitz or Antoine-Henry Jomini about military
strategy. Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani wrote his Islamic treatise on the
international law of nations, Kitab al-Siyar al-Kabir (or Shaybani’s Siyar), hundreds of
years before Grotius and other European thinkers, yet is conspicuously left out of most
81

traditional studies of IR. What this points to is the perpetuation of a historical tradition
in IR/ISS that fails to adequately interrogate the limits of its theoretical boundaries in any
sustained way. This is because in traditionalist approaches to IR and ISS, the disciplinary
boundaries are made possible, and reinforced by, discursive practices that animate a
select few canonical texts as the lightning rods for acceptable analogy and the limits of
appropriate criticism. The result of this is the stagnant and unreflective privileging of
ontologies that fail to fully manage the complexities related to perceptions of security.
Of course it would be foolish to diminish the profundity or significance of what may be
conveyed by ancient and modern canonical authors. Writers like Thucydides, Hobbes,
Machiavelli, and others selected to be the bearers of a timeless wisdom have much to
teach us. Despite that they may only be true progenitors of a specific “reality” of their
own time and context (male, European), their thoughts on life, community, peace, and
war, can help better inform our own modern conceptions and policies related to security.
But we would be well served to appreciate that the particular meaning of the historical
text cannot help but be shaped by our contributions to the readings. Our own discourses,
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interests, histories, goals, and idiosyncrasies influence what we choose to decipher. This
understanding stands in direct contrast to traditional approaches to security, which follow
the logic that Raymond Aron explicated in 1969: “strategic thought draws its inspiration
each century, or rather at each moment of history, from the problems which events
82

themselves pose.” The traditional problem-solving approach to security, as explained by
Aron, relies upon an implicit assumption that facts, both historical and contemporary,
speak for themselves. They are to be uncovered by observers and put to use in describing
new emerging phenomena or problems. The security analyst can then through
observation and reasoning secure a conceptual grasp and locate it within a particular
philosophical tradition, or identify it as an important theoretical lacuna, to be filled
primarily through empirical testing or logical reasoning. Essentially this approach
collapses knowledge and belief into a single form.
In response to this, some, such as David Welch, tell us that the task of the security
theorists and practitioner is then, “to discipline the activity in such a way that we
83

minimize our own contributions.” Welch believes that while we may never discover the
essential truth of an author, we still are able to learn something. Another way of putting it
is that while we may not find the essence, we can still view patterns. This is not a terribly
convincing argument. Patterns are generally put to use to simplify and generalize a
complex range of knowledge. Their usage eschews the more troubling and daunting
incoherence and indeterminacy that can be found existing at any given time and space.
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Our continued search for transhistorical truths in traditional IR and ISS can generally
only amount to a particular contemporary understanding of a particular event, author, or
grand work. It is not possible to fully understand the essence of a particular author or
event in the past. This is because escaping the web of interconnections between the realm
of the political and the identity of the individual is a rather impossible task. Rather we are
better served if we succumb to the understanding that our identities create the lenses
84

through which we view international relations and security. As sociologists have shown,
these identities are not derivative of a fixed human nature, but rather the product of social
construction – a mixture of our own genetic makeup and the social structures in which we
exist.
Attempting to mitigate the effects of the self in analyzing and ordering the study of
security is a losing battle, one that can have damaging consequences for both the object
and subject of security. Writing in the 1950s, historian Herbert Butterfield deplored the
use of history in providing a “heroic narrative”, in which the past was made to speak for
the present.
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For him, uncovering histories that yield lessons for the present was the

result of the contemporary makeup of the historian’s mind. Thus history for Butterfield
was an ongoing process, with interpretation ever evolving. He writes, “The best any of us
can do at a given moment only represents the present state of knowledge in respect of the
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subject with which we are dealing.” This is because the past consists solely of isolated
facts that can only be ordered by those interpreting them from the present. Michael
Oakeshott explained this lucidly when writing, “the past in history varies with the
87

present, rests upon the present, is the present.” In other words, the past cannot exist
independently of the present. And the present is never separate from the subject. Thus,
the use of analyses for formulating and justifying present policies related to security is a
dangerous exercise because it relies upon a construction of truth. And this construction is
not an infallible tower; it is dependent on the facts, values, and experiences of its
builders, the authors. The truth claims posited can never be demonstrably shown; they
can only be inferred from available evidence.
Brian Schmidt has argued that with regard to international relations, “instead of a history
that traces the actual lineage of scholars who self-consciously and institutionally
understood themselves as participating in the academic discourse of international
relations, we are presented with an idealized version of the past in the form of a tradition
88

stretching from Ancient Athens to the present.” What it leads to is the reification of
structural analyses that are unreflective, uncritical and hardly close to showing a
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historical truth. The “epic renderings” of the field’s history may be rhetorically effective
but it obscures its disciplinary function, bringing us no closer to its past and present
characters.

90

An artificially constructed tradition helps create the conditions for action

that are fixed on power and order, limiting the possibility for emancipatory change.
Instead of enabling true security for the individual, traditional uses of history in ISS work
mainly to falsely objectify the security dilemma, whereby one actor’s security must lead
to another’s insecurity. There are alternative approaches to the way we might use the
“ancients,” the “fathers,” or the “traditional” study of security without simply reducing it
all to caricatures of ancient realism proving a timeless quality for privileged disciplinary
theories. This is not to diminish the depth of thought that such authors present but is
rather to convey that totalizing histories of IR and ISS can mislead students and
practitioners into theoretical complacency and impose practical limitations on
implementing security practices. It seems that to participate in this tradition is to enter
“into a debate the terms of which have been largely set beforehand.”
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2.3
Science, Change, and Critique in International Security:
Ducks and Rabbits
The outset of this chapter has sought to characterize theoretical complacency as prevalent
in the study and construction of what are generally labeled “traditional” approaches to
security. This complacency manifests itself in an uncritical acceptance of a monological
approach in international relations and international security studies. The previous section
used immanent critique – a historically specific, self-reflexive critique of society - to
justify the blurring of disciplinary boundaries of security. The intention has been to pave
the way for a critical theory of water security with emancipatory intent. For critical water
security to offer progressive alternatives that alleviate suffering – to remain optimistic – it
must first allow for the possibility of change. These possibilities derive from disruption of
the conceptual principles and standards of an object (international security) on its own
terms. As the thesis unfolds it will become clear how the implications and consequences
of traditional approaches to security are broadly negative for water security.
It is here that the concept of change becomes important. While one must be wary not to
mischaracterize traditional approaches to security through the use of straw-man
caricatures, there remains an allegiance within academia and policy-making circles to a
mythologized culture of “strategy”, dependent upon social constructions of the past for
legitimation. The “one-eyed science”
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this generates prioritizes and privileges one

particular branch of scholarship using history and science as validation. What is needed,
as Rosenau argued over two decades ago, is for us to “jailbreak” our intellectual
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equipment and look for new ways to interpret the world.

93

In such spirit, what is

attempted here is an approach to water security that relies on communicative rather than
instrumental logic; one that pursues a more inclusive discussion and a more critical
engagement with important and venerable traditions in international security, rather than
a valorization of an evolutionary history that rationalizes traditional approaches and
obscures the very real possibilities for emancipatory change.
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It is clear that the historical dominance of traditional forms of security analysis belies the
abundant diversity of approaches to understanding security. Despite the fact that in the
last three decades, IR/ISS have experienced a significant deepening and widening in
approaches, it is apparent that the traditional paradigm maintains a particular resilience.
Traditional ISS (as a more-or-less uniform approach) is dependent upon a particular
reading of human affairs that privileges a rational accumulation of knowledge, put to use
95

to solve contemporary problems. In so doing it maintains a particularly strong grip on
the principles of acceptable scholarship. Because the ontological and epistemological
assumptions implicit in traditional security studies create the conditions by which the
world is ordered, it constitutes its own set of shared understandings that render critical
analysis as inconsequential, illegitimate, or downright dangerous.
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terms, “today, traditional concepts act as ontological blinders rather than as aids to
understanding.”

2.4

97

Kuhn, Popper, and “Paradigm Shifts”

One of the more familiar charges against critical security studies is that it maintains a
naïve attachment to the potential for change. It is necessary then, if we are to create a
theoretically and methodologically strong critical research project, to develop a good
understanding why it is so hard to unseat commonly held assumptions. Thus it is
worthwhile to focus some brief attention on the Kuhnian-Popper debate on the resilience
and revolution of scientific paradigms. This is undertaken to better understand the base
structure of scholarship and policy that maintains an allegiance to traditional approaches.
Multiple authors in IR have highlighted the importance of the concept of change. Holsti
points out that, despite change being crucial for distinguishing different IR theories, it
remains undertheorized. He writes, “In International Relations we do not have even the
98

beginning of a consensus on what constitutes change or transformation in political life.”

A longer examination of Kuhn’s sociology of science is provided because he is so useful
for critical theorists interested in the evolution of academic disciplines. But a brief look at
the Kuhn-Popper debate also allows us to upset the traditional narrative of their
disagreement, which generally divides Kuhn and Popper along reflectivist-realist axes.
The truth though is more complex, demonstrating both convergences and divergences
between the authors and their ideas. The principal aim of this discussion is to continue
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unseating the logic of static paradigms in IR, so that we may move forward in upcoming
chapters to develop visions of a radically emancipatory and open future for water
security. It is a final precursor to the last section of this chapter, which describes the
historical and contemporary literature one might broadly categorize as traditional water
security, showing both the problems and potential for a project of emancipatory water
security in relation to the traditional record.
Thomas Kuhn’s enunciation of scientific paradigms provides useful insight to
understanding the resilience of traditional approaches to security. This, despite the fact
that Kuhn himself was skeptical about the transferability of his concepts of paradigms
from natural sciences to social sciences. Kuhn believed that social sciences were often
dominated by “overt disagreements” about “the nature of legitimate scientific problems
and methods”
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This was contrasted with the natural sciences, where the fundamentals

failed to evoke the same level of controversy. According to Kuhn, social scientists are
misconstruing his ideas if they take from him “the view they can improve the status of
their field by first legislating agreement of fundamentals and then turning to puzzle
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solving.”

While it is true that the discipline of international security has not reached a

similar stage of development comparable with the natural sciences, Kuhn - and the lively
debate he spawned on the nature of discovery and the role of thought communities – can
provide us with analogies to the roots of scientific controversies.
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level a significant critique of positivist science through his development of the notions of
scientific revolutions and paradigms. Kuhn’s classic work, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, first published in 1962, is considered one of the most important modern
books dealing with the process of intellectual discovery. In it he argued against the
classic model of positivism (what he termed “normal science”), which describes (and
prescribes) knowledge production as a cumulative process of discovery that gradually
brought researchers to the truth. The positivist approach to science develops theories and
conclusions by testing and measuring observable phenomena. It seeks the continual
extension of scientific knowledge through increasingly precise conclusions. However, for
102

Kuhn, “normal science does not aim at novelties of fact or theory…”

Instead,

positivism is considered successful when it finds none. Kuhn believed that science should
not accurately be seen as a cumulative process, but one that undergoes a series of stages.
This schematic description of scientific development and evolution can be summarized
by the following scheme:
Pre-science – normal science – crisis – revolution – new normal science – new
crisis
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Normal science first exists in pre-paradigm form, which transitions into a definable
paradigm following the acceptance by the scientific community of a disciplinary matrix
of conceptual frames, experimental procedures, and acceptable solutions. Normal science
proceeds to “puzzle-solve” within a so-called paradigm until the emergence of periods of
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crises, caused by alternative candidates.
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These periods of crises represent the

‘extraordinary’ final stage that can occur within normal science - the paradigm shift - that
arises to radically alter basic assumptions about the previously accepted paradigm.
The study of shifts in scientific paradigms is important because it sheds light on the
impact the shared beliefs of an academic community can have on conditioning
orthodoxy, rather than critically examining or altering the foundations of their
knowledge. The epistemological commitments to normal science held by the community
within a paradigm are reinforced by particular assumptions of how ‘reality’ is structured.
While the aim of positivist experiments is explicitly one of discovery, and thus by
extension, one of knowledge disruption, this is rarely the case. Kuhn writes “the scientific
enterprise as a whole does from time to time prove useful, open up new territory, display
order, and test long-accepted belief. Nevertheless, the individual engaged on a normal
105

research problem is almost never doing any one of these things.”

Instead, the

assumptions, rules, and world-views, are reinforced by social incentives perpetuated by
scientific authority, existing both in administrative and ideational capacities. The first
accepted paradigm holds accepted ideas about the valid equipment, vocabulary, and
skills, needed to produce legitimate scientific results. According to Kuhn, this
“professionalization leads, on the one hand, to an immense restriction of the scientist’s
vision and to a considerable resistance to paradigm change. The science has become
increasingly rigid.”
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These impediments to scientific change contravene the positivist
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commitment to objective knowledge creation. Instead of a gradual and smooth transition
from one paradigm to another emerging from a set of superior scientific results, what is
required is a ‘gestalt’ switch – a revolutionary re-ordering of individual conceptions of
the world. Deliberation and interpretation, the hallmark characteristics of positivistic
science, can only articulate a paradigm; they cannot alter it. Interpretations must be
logically or gradually linked to the old experiences of the paradigm. Because of this, the
technique of scientific interpretation is incapable of producing a new paradigm. Instead,
what are required are the “flashes of intuition” that transform old experiences and
transform them to a new bundle of experiences – and thus a new paradigm - separate
from the one preceding it. When a paradigm shift occurs, the severity of the change that
occurs within the researcher defies rational explanation. One might compare it to a
religious conversion. Kuhn writes, “in so far as their only recourse to that world is
through what they see and do, we may want to say that after a revolution scientists are
responding to a different world…what were ducks in the scientist’s world before the
107

revolution are rabbits afterwards.

In 1965, Imre Lakatos, a colleague of the philosopher of science Karl Popper, organized a
conference at the University of London aimed at the exchange of ideas between Popper
and Kuhn and their respective supporters. The contents of this debate were published in
1970 under the title Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Popper is best known for
The Logic of Scientific Discovery, a publication first translated into English in 1959, in
which he developed the thesis of “falsifiability.” Falsifiability is a method used to judge
the validity of a truth claim. For Popper, science should not attempt to “prove” a
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knowledge claim is true but rather should constantly subject it to systematic attempts to
falsify it. The deductive principle of falsifiability compels scientists to “test the
consequences of their general knowledge claims in particular cases by issuing predictions
that can be contradicted by the findings of empirical research.”
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Popper argued, contra

Kuhn, that researchers are incentivized to produce positive findings, preferably paradigmaltering ones – and this leads to a breakdown in scientific method. Knowledge, however
accumulates through falsification. What is needed is the continuous replication of a study,
testing whether new results confirm the original theories. If the original findings are
falsified, that is if the evidence does not support the theory, then it is scrapped and a new
theory with better explanatory power is developed in its place. The cumulative
falsification of theories produces knowledge. If researchers do not pursue falsification
then incorrect findings are often blindly accepted without the vigorous retesting
necessary.
The debate between Popper and Kuhn concerned three central differences in their
philosophies. The existence and role of normal science; the role played by sociological
and psychological factors in the development of scientific knowledge; and the manner in
which scientific change occurred. Both philosophers agreed that something called
“normal science” could be identified and that its allegiance to orthodoxy is troubling.
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However Kuhn saw this allegiance as an inescapable and endemic characteristic, while
Popper believed it to be the product of bad teaching and indoctrination.
Their second disagreement concerned the extent that sociological and psychological
factors played in the growth of scientific knowledge. Kuhn argued that social and
psychological factors embedded in the minds of individuals who share a paradigm assist
that growth. The logic of scientific discovery was not as important in the development of
knowledge as was often assumed. Popper countered by attacking the spurious scientific
nature of factors such as sociology and psychology. For him, relying on unfalsifiable
phenomenon such as history, sociology, or psychology to account for paradigm shifts
could easily be misused to legitimate uncritical, totalitarian truth claims?
In the last major difference, Kuhn argued that a revolutionary gestalt switch was more
often the cause of paradigm shifts, and that this turnover could not be evaluated
rationally, because paradigms are necessarily incommensurable. Popper did agree that the
smooth transition from one scientific paradigm to another was rare, but that did not mean
that the new theories produced could not be evaluated equally and critically. He argued
that not only did commensurability exist between old and new paradigms, but that
dialogue, debate, and rational comparisons were all required to offset scientific
109

dogmatism.

Kuhn and Popper’s discussion on the sociology of knowledge can be useful here in two
significant and interrelated ways. First, it provides a lucid and penetrating interrogation of
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knowledge paradigms, particularly the nature of their persistence, and the pitfalls that
arise with an allegiance to this persistence. A theme up to this point of the chapter has
been that continued allegiances to the notion of uniform paradigms within international
security studies stifle the possibility of an emancipatory agenda. Second, the debate
between Kuhn and Popper also neatly demonstrates the tendency (discussed earlier in the
chapter) to create uncritical mythical narratives that simplify complex arguments and
debates, often reducing them to caricatures used to satisfy particular knowledge claims. It
is useful to examine both benefits more closely.
Regarding the first use, Kuhn and Popper present differing approaches to understanding
paradigms. Both though are able to convey how the creation of paradigm mentalities
within international security studies obscures the multitude of voices that actually exist.
Kuhn believed that paradigms are formed when a tightly bound and highly invested
research community adopts the same world-views and methods, usually after a major
scientific discovery. It seems obvious that distinct research communities within ISS
continually reinforce separation along paradigmatic lines. The reduction of true
multiplicity to seemingly incommensurable “paradigms” (e.g. traditional vs. critical
security studies) impedes the acceptance of more nuanced studies that might derive
insights unencumbered by theoretical singularity.
The reification of singular paradigms allows researchers to order their research via a strict
coded narrative. Parameters are established that create expectations of acceptable
theoretical insight. These parameters operate to create communities of identity, often
exclusionary and hostile to alternative approaches. The presence of these communities
may be convenient and reassuring, but it can hardly bode well for theoretical pluralism.
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For instance, operating within the so-called realist paradigm allows researchers to
automatically operate with useful assumptions such as the existence of states operating as
unitary actors in an anarchic international structure, (neatly separated from domestic
politics), and forever struggling for power. Indeed, it has been claimed that realism is the
only theory within IR that could be recognized as a theory by philosophers of science.
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According to this view, “theories” put forth by other schools in IR are often only
interpretations. Kenneth Waltz has said, “Interpretations and explanations are plentiful;
theories are scarce.”

111

This type of thinking is typical of the Kuhnian-inspired realist

paradigm. As Thomas Walker has eloquently pointed out, according to this logic, “any
criticism of a theory becomes pertinent only when it is packaged with a new research
program that can subsume its standing rival.”
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The result is that singular paradigms are

continually reinforced and reproduced - reduced to waiting for revolutionary gestalt
switches - all at the expense of critically examining how different viewpoints might be
better compared or combined.
The Kuhn-Popper discussion can also illuminate our understanding here in another way.
Kuhn should not simply be seen by critical theorists as the preeminent legitimating
scientific philosopher, arguing passionately for interpretive science that is at once radical,
open, and democratic. He may have indeed re-affirmed that science is better seen as a
historically situated social practice, but he also did so without jeopardizing rational
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choice in science. His postscript to the second edition of The Structure of Scientific
Revolution directly confronts the charges against him of relativism, subjectivism, and
normativity by highlighting how he used methods of historical description to
reconceptualize, not refute, rational choice theory.
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Likewise, Popper is too often

crudely characterized (both by critics and defenders) as a conservative defender of a rigid
positivism. Popper exhibited a more nuanced view of science and epistemology,
accepting non-foundational claims against objectivity, while also safeguarding
rationalism. He wrote in 1932,
Science does not rest on a bedrock. Its towering edifice, an amazingly bold set of
theories, rises over a swamp. The foundations are piers going down into the
swamp from above. They do not reach a natural base, but…one resolves to be
satisfied with their firmness, hoping they will carry the structure…The objectivity
114

of science can be bought only at the cost of relativity.

There is not enough space to adequately excavate the Kuhn-Popper debate and the
insights it provides into the resilience of academic paradigms and the dangers of
historical myth making. But what is important is to further develop the notion that their
ideas are at once convergent, divergent, critical, and traditional. Kuhn and Popper, while
often placed at philosophically opposite ends of the spectrum, display similar attachments
to modified conventionalism and anti-foundationalism. While critical theorists often
reserve Kuhn as the legitimating force in philosophical science, Popper’s political
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philosophy was able to preserve the emancipatory potential that arose from the late
enlightenment. While grand, progressive narratives, such as the ones produced by Kuhn
were often the targets of criticism from Popper, he retained hopes for progress and
freedom, and eschewed any finality through empirical evidence.
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And in contrast to

predominant Kuhnian charges, Popper did not propose simply a cold rationality that
pledged allegiance to logical analysis. What Popper’s falsifiability sought was a critical
attitude, which he felt was crucial to rational discourse.
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This critical attitude must be

adopted to emphasize multiple theories and methods (though falsifiability must remain
the cornerstone). The pluralism, criticism, embrace of anomalies, and the desire to see
even the most corroborated theories challenged, comes across as closer to critical theory
than a call for detached rationalism. That Kuhn and Popper retain distinct separation as
preeminent philosophers of the science of reflectivism and rationalism speaks to the hold
that community identities have on theoretical disciplines, ISS being no exception.
The impact all this has for this study is to reaffirm the commitment to carefully
interrogating established practices in order to reveal and uncover the dangers that a
dominant theoretical framework, like realism, may pose to establishing a radical and
emancipatory form of water security. Kuhn and Popper both offer significant insight for
this study. Kuhn brings us closer to understanding the seeming incommensurability of
paradigms and the hostility to change that arise amongst their practitioners. He teaches us
that scientific rationality is often a cloak used to disguise the important role that human
filters may play in the way facts and events are understood. Popper allows us to open up
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paradigms for vigorous theoretical debate. This encourages a cross-pollination of ideas,
theories, and methods, absent of scientific dogmatism. What can emerge from such a
view is a humble theoretical inquiry that speaks less of absolutes, and more of relative
pluralities.

2.5

Conclusion

Beginning with the foundation – with a conceptual analysis – will be a recurring theme of
this study. Without the continual disruption of the disciplinary norms of international
security the substantive problems of research and policy will remain unsolved and likely
to persist. As David Baldwin has pointed out “conceptual clarification logically precedes
the search for the necessary conditions of security, because the identification of such
conditions presupposes a concept of security.”
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However, a conceptual analysis, while

important, cannot on its own bring us closer to an emancipatory security of water. Later
chapters will further develop the empirical and theoretical observations necessary for a
clearer picture of the potential emancipatory alternatives that water security
demonstrates.
One of the arguments put forth here is that international water security can demonstrate a
potential Kuhnian paradigm shift. While alternatives to dominant paradigms are always
present, and confrontation is inevitable, IR/ISS have clung to myths of tradition that are
monolithic and reductive. Duncan Bell eloquently summarizes the problems of the “great
debate” narrative:
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…The ‘debates’ are illusory anachronisms, based on an inaccurate interpretation
of the scope, coherence and interests of the field. In the traditional historiography
of IR, they serve as post hoc legitimating devices for the construction of a
narrative about the progressive evolution of theoretical inquiry: first the supine
idealists were defeated by the practical realists, then the sloppy historians were
vanquished by the rigorous behaviourists and the discipline evolved into the hardheaded social scientific enterprise that exerts such power today. Or so the story
goes.
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The effects of this ‘story’ are real. The dominance of these traditions grounds
conventional understanding of rationality, knowledge, and ‘human nature.’ But, as both
Kuhn and Popper are able to show, the always-present ontological struggles demonstrate
that potentiality and change are at once immanent and possible. The task of the following
chapters is to show shifts in the traditional paradigm of security, using the issue of water
as the guiding signpost by which we might arrive at a more inclusive, communicative,
and cosmopolitan world.
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3

CHAPTER THREE: Water Wars and Environmental
Security

3.1

Introduction

Chapter two outlined the ways in which international relations as a discipline is wrought
with allegiances to traditional and totalizing discourses of security. It used immanent
critique to isolate the multiple contradictions of the subject of international relations and
argued that forms water security may be emblematic of paradigmatic change in the
discipline. This chapter expands on this critique by offering a literature review of
environmental security, and a tracing of the academic and popular fascination with the
“water wars” narrative. It argues that there is compelling evidence to support a nuanced
view of water as a driver of both conflict and cooperation. Despite this, water remains a
securitized resource, and water wars remain a hegemonic concept, used as a perpetuating
myth to service a broader vision of security as exclusion and enmity. These ideas, which
begin in this chapter as a literature review, are given further attention in the following
chapter, which examines ongoing securitizations of water in the Nile Basin during the
Anthropocene, a geologic epoch of human dominance and an age of constant
exception.
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It is impossible to overstate the importance of water. Beyond the biological and
ecological functions, it occupies a place of spiritual importance across religions.
Religious texts from all over the world isolate water as the pre-eminent physical and
symbolic matter by which all life can be accounted. As the Koran says, “by means of
water, we give life to everything.” The Sanskrit text Mahabharata (XII.83-4) describes
water’s central position: “The creator first produced water for the maintenance of life
among human beings. The Water enriches life and its absence destroys all creatures and
plant-life.”
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In Western thought, the four elements – fire, water, air and earth – have

played an intrinsic part in the development of philosophy since before Socrates, and in
the creation of Christian traditions. Further, water is used as potent symbol of distinct
qualities and powers in Christianity – as channels of purification, purgation, and
penalty.
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There can be no doubt that water is one of the central pillars upon which

human society is founded – both literally and symbolically. Taken together with the
centrality of water as the conduit of life-giving materials, we arrive at the conclusive
statement that water holds within it the entirety of existence. To say as much may appear
hyperbolic, but to acknowledge water’s supreme importance allows one to properly
account for the vast array of approaches that investigate its multiple purposes and
identities.
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One such approach is to locate issues of water within discussions of security. Doing so
has particular consequences that will be explored in this chapter and the next. The
potential inclusion of environmental issues in security studies has caused significant
debate within the discipline over the past three decades. The end stages of the Cold War
seemingly allowed for the opening up of security mindsets to engage with national
security threats stemming from elsewhere than the military buildup of Soviet forces. That
said, the broadening of included threats to be studied largely remained within a static
purview of state security. To this day there continues to exist significant support and
hesitation to place the broad category of the environment within the realm of security
studies. There are various fears that doing so may obfuscate the logical clarity and policy
relevance of a rigidly defined discipline, or that it may lead to erroneously and
dangerously placing the environment along a military-security axis that causes more
harm than good. These hesitations are disparate in reasoning but they are representative
of a particular understanding of what security means and how it is used.
If the security analyst focuses on water as a driver of violent conflict – as a “threat
multiplier” – then the concept of security is left relatively unchanged. The central
dependent variable remains violent conflict and the implications lead to securitization.
However, if the analyst works from a broader understanding of ecological security, then
environmental stress is most important in terms of its human and ecological impacts. The
implications are significant; they compel a reordering of the “modus operandi” in water
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policies, and it becomes possible to include sustainable water management as a security
imperative.
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This fundamental point is reinforced here in this thesis. If our understanding of security
starts from a place of contingency then it becomes impossible, indeed imperative, to
pursue an emancipatory vision that promotes ethical and effective policies of water
management.
The next section proceeds with an appreciation of the contingent nature of security by
undertaking a brief genealogy of environmental security, suggesting that environmental
security can be radically altered depending on the context. The chapter concludes with an
investigation into the hegemonic concept of water wars.

3.2

The Four Phases of Environmental Security

It would prove to be an impossible task to adequately account for the story of
environmental security here in these few pages. It is more useful to briefly sketch the
general historical trajectory of understanding environmental security. It is also readily
acknowledged that historical “trajectories” are necessarily partial and can never truly
account for the wide range of approaches and analyses that have been produced that deal
with the subject. The literature review is a heuristic tool used to critically examine the
123

three broad stages of environmental security research that have existed to this point.
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3.2.1

The First Generation of Environmental Security

The first generation, arising in the final years of the Cold War, can be characterized by
Richard Ullman’s criticism of the narrowness of national security. In his article
“Redefining Security”, Ullman argued that “defining national security merely (or even
primarily) in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality…First, it causes
states to concentrate on military threats and to ignore other and perhaps even more
harmful dangers…And second, it contributes to a pervasive militarization of international
relations that in the long run can only reduce global security.”
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Other influential articles

included Jessica Tuchman Mathews’ “Redefining Security,”
126

“Environment and Security,”

125

Norman Myers’
127

Gwyn Prins’ “Politics and the Environment,”

Rowlands’ “The Security Challenges of Global Environmental Change.”

128

and Ian

This ‘stage’

made the case for placing the environment within the national (i.e. U.S.) security
discourse, arguing that wars over scarce resources and social breakdowns caused by
environmental decay were imminent. The most popular and influential of these narratives
was Robert Kaplan’s “Coming Anarchy” thesis, which was explicated in a number of
popular publications. It echoed the dangers posed by the confluence of environmental
collapse and the anarchic international system.
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Policymakers followed up these warnings about the dangers posed by environmental
scarcity by academics during the end of the Cold War. The 1987 Brundtland Commission
formally named the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED)
published its final report, “Our Common Future” in 1987. The report explicitly defined
“sustainable development”, providing its base as an important and frequently used
concept in subsequent environmental analyses. Mikhail Gorbachev took a lead role in
isolating the environmental as a matter of high politics. His famous speech to the 43rd
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1988 named environmental protection as too
important to place within a rigid ideological interpretation, a repetition of previous
proposals produced by think tanks such as the Worldwatch Institute.
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The first phase of

environmental security held the nation-state as its ultimate referent object, and was
primarily concerned with the protection of the state from the dangers of a newly-broad set
of threats emerging at the end of the Cold War.

3.2.2

The Second Generation of Environmental Security

The second phase of environmental research arose in the early 1990s principally from
Thomas Homer-Dixon, and his “Toronto Group.”
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They sought to provide an empirical

research agenda that deviated from the first generation of environmental scholars, which
was criticized for too often engaging in polemics at the expense of falsifiable findings.
The two questions Homer-Dixon sought to answer were: 1) does environmental scarcity
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contribute to violence in developing countries? And 2) if so, how?
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He concluded that

environmental scarcity did indeed lead to violent conflict. This conflict tended to be
persistent, diffuse, and sub-national. Finally, conflict over resource scarcity would likely
increase sharply in the following decades.
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A Swiss group of researchers led by Günther

Bächler also produced studies on environmental conflict. These empirical investigations
argued that environmental conflicts had a high potential of occurrence, though they might
come in different forms (ethnopolitical, demographically-caused migration, international
water-related, and global conflicts) and were dependent upon multiple factors
(discrimination against actors in vulnerable areas who have a high level of capital
dependence on the natural environment.)
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The Swiss studies differentiated from

Homer-Dixon and his Canadian researchers by focusing not simply on scarcity,
135

environmental stress, and conflict, but also on the conflict resolution outcomes.

Eventually these arguments began to be adopted into the national security agenda, and
were echoed by the writings of prominent journalists and academics that emphasized the
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seemingly stark possibilities that resource scarcity and environmental stress would
threaten the sovereignty of the state.

3.2.3

136

The Third Generation of Environmental Security

The third generation of environmental security research emerged in the mid-to-late 1990s
partly in response to the explicitly causal links between resource scarcity and conflict
137

138

139

highlighted in the earlier phases. Scholars such as Gleditsch , Levy , Wolf ,
Dimitrov, and Dalby all sought to broaden the scope of independent variables beyond
simply resource scarcity, and to include a bigger-picture approach that took stock of a
number of sociological, psychological, and political factors. They also left open the
dependent variables – violent conflict or cooperation. Research projects were pursued
primarily in Europe and North America. These included The Global Environmental
Change and Human Security (GEHS) project; the Swiss project on Research Partnerships
for Mitigating Syndromes of Conflict Change; The Scientific Advisory Council on
Global Environmental Issues of the German Government; and The Transboundary
Freshwater Dispute Database created by Aaron Wolf at Oregon State University. The
policy community also began to more vigorously examine the role of the environment in
conflict situations. In 1999, a NATO (Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society

136

Robert Kaplan. “The Coming Anarchy.” Atlantic Monthly, 273:2 (1994): 44-76; Starr. “Water Wars”;
Peter H. Gleick. “Water and Conflict: Freshwater Resources and International Security.” International
Security 18.1 (1993), 79-112.
137

Nils Petter Gleditsch. “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature.” Journal of
Peace Research 35.3 (1998): 381-400.
138

Marc A. Levy. “Is the Environment a National Security Threat?” International Security 20.2. (1995):
35-62.
139

Aaron T. Wolf. “Conflict and Cooperation Along International Waterways.” Water Policy 1.2. (1998):
251-262.

68

(CCMS)) project jointly undertaken by the US Department of Defence and the German
Ministry of the Environment concentrated on the issue of environmental security within
NATO countries.
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Since then, NATO’s Science for Peace and Security division has

continued to sponsor selected projects examining “other threats to security”, including
natural disasters, manmade pollution and ecoterrorism, protecting fragile ecosystems,
141

water resources management, and energy-related research and development.

In addition, individual scholars such as Aaron Wolf, Geoffrey Dabelko, and Radoslav
Dimitrov examined the tendency to associate environmental stress with inter-state and
intra-state conflict. Wolf wrote in 1998 that, “The patterns described…suggest that the
more valuable lesson of international water is, as a resource whose characteristics tend to
induce cooperation and incite violence only in the exception.”
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Jon Barnett argued that

in previous examinations the environment becomes little more than another avenue of
distrust and violence between state actors, driven by the imperatives of the anarchic
global system.
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He wrote “in short, in describing a world of ‘coming anarchy’, the

environment–conflict literature prepares for the reification of this possible world. In this
respect the environment–conflict thesis is notable both for the way it justifies the defence
of northern interests, and for the way it obscures northern complicity in the generation of
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the very environmental problems scripted as threats.”

144

Writing in 2002, Radoslav

Dimitrov looked at how the construction of security can impact the way in which water is
managed. Dimitrov begins with the qualifying statement that, “the way we think affects
what we do, and ideas condition behaviour,” and he argued for a deeper interrogation of
how the multiple meanings of environmental security impacts our management of
water.
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For Dimitrov, the “failure to recognize the multiplicity of competing notions of

security, precludes proper analysis of the dissimilar goals of water management that each
discourse precipitates.”
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This was an important insight because it allowed for an

appreciation of the power the concept of water security holds in creating the policy
outcomes that are so important for alleviating suffering and conflict. Thus, for Dimitrov,
it is possible “to analyze the changes in ‘water security’ policies and institutions that can
be expected from embracing a certain conception of environmental security and from
147

positioning ‘water’ within it.”

In contrast to this manuscript’s relatively hopeful

outlook, Dimitrov concluded on a skeptical note. For him, the different forms of water
security emanating from different understandings of the security problematique are often
contradictory and incompatible. ”The mere possibility that different dimensions of
security are mutually incompatible and that pursuing them simultaneously is impossible
bodes ill for human society.” This conclusion belies some important theoretical
developments in the fields of environmental security over the last decade since the
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publication of the article, and an increasing knowledge of the global geophysical
connections that bind human actions together in the Anthropocene, the geologic era of
human dominance.
However, Dimitrov’s social-discursive model of security showed how the operational
concepts of water are conditioned by the practices that they themselves guide. In contrast
to the prevailing two phases of environmental security scholars, Barnett, Dabelko, Wolf,
and Dimitrov focused extensively on re-situating the environment-conflict nexus. Wolf
studied the links between water stress and conflict and concluded that the hype
surrounding “water wars” is unfounded; that there is a prevailing “myth” of ever-future,
over-the-horizon conflict over dwindling resources, which is simply not borne
empirically.
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Rather the opposite is true: water has the potential to bridge divides

amongst disparate riparian owners, across regions, and borders.
The third phase of environmental research represented a significant progression in terms
of opening the literature to a diversity of approaches and methods. Prof. Simon Dalby et
al write that “what emerged in this debate…was a recognition that environmental change
and resource scarcity and degradation was less likely to lead to international war than had
been supposed in the first phase.”
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exhibited a remarkable diversity, at least in comparison to earlier stages. The three
editions of the World Water Development Report, released by UNESCO in 2003 (“Water
for People, Water for Life”), 2006 (“Water: A Shared Responsibility”), and 2009 (“Water
in a Changing World), displayed a novel appreciation of the potential for cooperative
resource and conflict management that hitherto had been marginalized in policy circles to
accounts of transboundary dangers and potential water conflict.
The third phase was a shift from the first two phases of literature that emphasized
environmental scarcity and degradation as a likely cause of national insecurity in the
waning years of the Cold War and in its immediate aftermath. In the late 1990s and into
the first decade of the twenty first century, the subject opened to allow for a diversity of
150

approaches that included analyses from geography.

Notions of environmental security

were no longer restricted to state collapse or national conflict over scarce resources. Of
course, while discussions of national security remained important, there began to emerge
a new appreciation of the social effects of environmental change and the policy dilemmas
that emerge in their wake. In terms of water security these new changes in thinking
allowed for broader discussions away from more traditional preoccupations, such as how
to avert water wars and ensure water scarcity would not lead to violent conflict. Instead a
plurality of studies emerged that focused on the wide range of causes of insecurity and
violence as well as the wide effects of water scarcity. More broadly, during the third
phase there were attempts to broaden the notions of environmental security, away from
the simplistic potential for conflict over dwindling resources. While overall, there
remained an analytical commitment to the nation-state as the ultimate referent of study,
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some studies argued for taking a human security approach to the environment, arguing
for greater attention to the effects of water security on individuals, and the need for
“environmental diplomacy.”
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This was clearly connected to the growing popularity of

the human security concept during the late 1990s.

3.2.4

A Fourth Phase of Environmental Security?

Influential water conflict studies such as The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute
Database have been instrumental in producing new ways of thinking about water security
in particular and have helped some to argue we are currently witnessing the beginnings of
a fourth phase of environmental security literature. Spring, Brauch, and Dalby argue that
this new phase should encompass much more than previous stages, and seek to include
human, environmental, and gender-related security, as well as peace research. They write,
This phase, we argue, needs to build on the first three phases of environmental
security research…It requires distancing security analysis from some of
traditional assumptions in international relations thinking and focusing more
explicitly on the specific contexts where people, especially socially vulnerable
groups and their social networks, are insecure.

152

The call by Spring, Brauch, and Dalby for a widening and deepening of the referent
object of security in the fourth phase of the environmental security literature is a theme
that echoes throughout this dissertation. While their reliance on securitization as a
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normative concept to be pursued may be questioned, the authors nonetheless have
isolated some key components that can better inform contemporary environmental
security analyses. They believe that new environmental security studies should include
societal, human, and gender-related accounts. As well, new sectoral approaches that
incorporate water, food, health, and livelihood security are seen to be more helpful to the
deep range of environmental concerns within a unified framework of study. To pursue
each sector without an appreciation of the interconnections that define them would leave
environmental security studies insufficiently nuanced and help condition responses
unable to cope with the scope and scale of global environmental change. The fourth
phase aims to widen its understanding of security beyond a narrow focus on the nationstate and include global, regional, societal, community, family, and human levels of
organization. What is sought, essentially, is an appreciation of the environment as a
holistic and inclusive factor in human affairs. In sum, if a fourth generation fully emerges
it will be normatively and analytically strengthened if it offers more inclusive, and
expansive understandings of the relationship between the environment, security, and
individuals. This means contributing deeper knowledge of the deep and complex
interconnections associated with the emerging “Anthropocene,” where conceptual
separation between humans and the environment is incoherent and ineffective. It is hoped
that the continued evolution of scholarship will produce multiple visions of
environmental security that can help provide us with the “shared contexts of our
insecurities.”
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3.3

Water Wars

If we are to utilize the organizing benefits of isolating four phases of environmental
security literature, (given this thesis’ critical analysis of mythmaking in IR, this may in
fact be troublesome), we should understand that water security itself has existed as a
corollary subset within each phase. For instance, Dimitrov’s social-discursive model
discussed earlier showed how the different ways in which security is understood has a
direct impact on the ways in which water is framed and how policies are developed in
response. To date there has been a dominant (though not exhaustive) conceptual
allegiance to traditional forms of security, which focuses on states, national security, and
violent conflict. The dominant construction has been to view water either as a potential
cause of future wars, or at the very least, a “threat multiplier” by adding stress to already
vulnerable and volatile situations. This is most ably shown in the “water wars” narrative.
A wide and still-growing literature on “water wars” has sought to examine the causal
relationship between environmental stress and armed conflict. This has been an extension
of earlier analyses that first sought to examine how resource limits influence political
decision-making. The first issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution, published in 1957,
contained an article by Sprout and Sprout that examined the various ways in which the
environment influenced political behaviour. Sprout and Sprout presented a rather
compelling argument that “environmental factors become related to the attitudes and
decisions which comprise a state’s foreign policy only by being perceived and taken into
account in the policy-forming process…In policy-making, as we have stressed before,
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what matters is how the policy-maker imagines the milieu to be, not how it actually is.

Thus, while they qualify the content effects that the environment may have on the
decision-making process, there is no doubt that environment itself helps compel the
decisions in the first place. Sprout and Sprout’s behaviouralist analysis is certainly a
product of its intellectual era, but their conclusions can be seen as the precursor to much
of the environmental security literature produced since the end of the Cold War. When
they conclude “the ecological viewpoint and frame of reference…provide a fruitful
approach to the analysis of foreign policy and the estimation of state capabilities,” it is
not a far stretch to see the intellectual connections with modern environmental security as
155

it is most often understood.

In this sense, ecological processes, combined with

behavioural and other approaches to decision-making, help students and analysts better
comprehend the perception of capability and necessity in state decisions.
The tracing of contemporary environmental security through four broad phases, and back
to authors such as Wittfogel and Sprout and Sprout is useful in confirming the intellectual
hegemony that state-centrism has enjoyed when it comes to analyzing environmental
processes. The literature on water corresponds in a relatively similar fashion to broader
analyses of environmental security. The most pressing concern within water security
literature and the broader public discourse have been how shared water might lead
directly to wars between states. This seems to have begun in the mid 1980s, when a range
of new publications began to emerge. These works initiated a still-running debate
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whether a causal link can be drawn between water scarcity and water wars. It is an
overstatement to point to one particular source as inspiring the debate, but the publication
in 1984 of Naff and Mason’s edited volume Water in the Middle East: Conflict or
Cooperation? was highly influential in creating the narrative for the next decade on
water’s potential for sparking interstate war. Their case studies of the Jordan, Litani,
Euphrates, Shatt al-Arab, Orontes, and Nile rivers found that international conflict over
water was frequent in the Middle East. They state in their introduction:
Water in the Middle East is also a conflict-laden determinant of both the domestic
and external policies of the region’s principal actors. As water shortages occur
and full utilization is reached these policies tend to be framed more and more in
zero-sum terms, adding to the probability of discord.
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For them the Jordan River system was historically the most prominent flashpoint for
conflict. It had seen more severe international conflict over water than any other river
system in the Middle East. Along with the Jordan though, the Euphrates and the Nile
were also seen as open to conflict. They felt that the fundamental reasons for such
conflict were two-fold: 1) the already-present high levels of international tension and
hostility in the region; 2) the progressively deteriorating water situation. Because of these
two reasons, there was little “slack” in the system and water resources had become
157

increasingly zero-sum and important strategically.

The conclusions they reach, that

water has “been seen as the primary strategic factor behind the political and military
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maneuvering in the Middle East,” led the intellectual charge throughout the 1980s – the
decade designated by the UN as the “Water Decade.”
Following Naff and Mason a plethora of new investigations began to repeat, if not
confirm, the link between resource scarcity and violent conflict. Some of the most
158

influential water wars literature include John K. Cooley’s 1984 Foreign Policy article ,
159

160

Joyce Starr’s 1991 article in Foreign Policy , Starr and Stoll’s 1988 book , Bulloch
161

and Darwish’s 1993 book on looming water wars in the Middle East , Biswas’ 1994
162

book on Middle Eastern water politics , Remans 1995 article “Water and War,”

163

and

164

article and a book from Soffer , and Amery’s 2003 article in Geographical Journal on
165

wars over water in the Middle East context.

It is worth noting that each source listed

here writes extensively of war over water in the context of the Middle East. In particular,
wars involving Israel and its neighbours are returned to again and again as representative
of the causal link between water and war. In Westings’ 1986 edited volume, various
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authors point to water as the causal factor in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and Israel’s 1982
invasion of Lebanon.

166

Indeed, the idea that control over dwindling water resources was

the primary motivator for Israeli military actions between 1967-1982 was developed
167

during the 1980s both in academic literature and the popular press.

Others have also

added their voices to the crises associated with water scarcity, though they often take a
broader definition of what is meant by “war,” than some of the more extreme warnings.
168

169

170

Authors as diverse as Marc De Villiers , Vandana Shiva , Diane Raines Ward , and
Peter Annin

171

all have authored books provocatively titled after ‘water wars.’

The causal link between water and war was generally left unchallenged for much of this
phase of water security literature. Instead of questioning the basic assumptions propelling
their analyses, authors continued to sound ominous warnings about the perilous state of
water resources and their potential for igniting armed interstate war. The end of the Cold
War and the broadening of security threats helped sustain the narrative, which advanced
only in the sophistication of their empirical studies. Falkenmark’s 1989 article on
dwindling water resources in Africa is emblematic of the trend to fix empirical limits
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illustrating different stages of water scarcity and their associated dangers. Her influential
water stress index sought to answer just how many people a flow unit of water could
sustain. This Malthusian analysis supposed that as populations increase and their
standards of living improve, the available amount of renewable water inevitably
decreases.

The index she produced concluded that a country is said to be “water

stressed” if it experiences less than ca 1,700 cubic metres (m3) per capita/year; when the
figure is less than ca 1,000 m3 per capita/year, a country experiences “water scarcity”;
3
and when a country experiences per capita availability below 500 m per capita/year, it is

past “the water poverty line” or “beyond the water barrier.”

172

While Falkenmark is more

concerned with the dwindling water availability for vulnerable populations and the
effects on socioeconomic development than in the prospect of water wars, her indices
have been frequently used to gauge the likelihood of conflict in areas experiencing acute
water shortages. Sandra Postel’s seminal 1992 work, Last Oasis published by the
173

Worldwatch Institute , and Tom Gardner-Outlaw and Robert Engelman’s 1997 report
for Population Action International

174

both explicitly rely on the water stress index, as do

other works. As Leif Ohlsson writes, “this kind of index is foundational to the common
alarms of risks for water wars. Since the available amount of renewable water is fixed,
the conclusion is almost inevitable: As populations grow and per capita demands grow
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even faster, states will be forced into a logic of fighting for more water.”

175

And indeed

these types of conclusions seem to have been the norm when examining the first
generation of water security literature, just as this was the norm in the broader
environmental security literature.
The Malthusian approaches to water security adopted by many authors necessarily draw
an upsetting picture of resource scarcity leading to war. Many authors propounding water
wars theses derived their logic from Thomas Malthus’ Essay on the Principle of
Population (1798), which stated that resource scarcity resulting from demographic
increases inevitably lead to famine or conflict. One of the most widely cited examinations
of resource scarcity and international conflict, Arthur Westing’s 1986 volume Global
Resource and International Conflict, already briefly discussed, propagates the Malthusian
view of resource scarcity and war. He writes, “Demands on the land, fresh waters, and
other natural resources of the earth are growing rapidly owing to the rapid increases in
human aspirations…This dilemma suggests that natural resources have the potential for
playing an even more important role as a cause of war in the future than they have in the
176

past. ” Joyce Starr best articulated the classic Malthusian case for water wars in 1991.
More nuanced (what Martin Kipping calls Neo-Malthusian) analyses still link water
scarcity with conflict but as an indirect cause via its socio-economic consequences like
decreasing agricultural productivity or overall economic decline. The work of Thomas
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Homer-Dixon can be regarded as Neo-Malthusian.

Nils Petter Gleditsch described the

basic causal chain for Malthusian analyses as:
Population growth/high resource consumption per capita deteriorated
environmental conditions increasing resource scarcity harsher resource
competition greater risk of violence

178

There may be disagreement over the number of causal mechanisms and their basic order,
but these analyses remain beholden to an instrumental logic that restricts the potential for
alternatives to war and conflict. The ultimate attachment to Malthusian concerns lays the
groundwork for predictions about conflict, though rarely have these predictions been
derived from convincing empirical data demonstrating the causal factor of the
environment in past wars and interstate conflicts. It is safe to conclude that water
security literature in the 1980s and early 1990s, following the first two generations of the
broader environmental security literature, was strongly pessimistic.
Literature critical of these approaches to environmental security began to emerge in
response. These criticisms principally arose with skepticism about the integration of the
environment with security, displaying a naivety about the scale of environmental
destruction and its effects. The general trend in critique was that the widening of security
to include the environment would dilute the cohesion of studies on security and was more
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the result of environmentalist rhetoric than of demonstrable links. Daniel Deudney
echoed many other traditional security analysts when he argued that expanding national
security to include the environment was inappropriate and misleading. In his 1991 article,
“The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,” he writes
that combining national security and environmental risks would create “a conceptual
muddle, rather than a paradigm or world-view shift – a de-definition rather than a redefinition of security. If we begin to speak about all the forces and events that threaten
life, property, and well being (on a large scale) as threats to our national security, we
shall soon drain the term of any meaning.

179

However, while Deudney initially appears to

fall into a traditional security regression of isolating the state as the referent object of
security, he does in fact adopt a more nuanced approach. He believes that linking the
environment within national security would deprive the potential for thinking
alternatively about the creative and interdependent responses necessary for positive
solutions to a global problem. He writes,
If in fact resolution of the global environmental problem, and particularly the
global climate change problem, requires great, even unprecedented, types of
international cooperation, then nationalist sentiment and identification is a barrier
to overcome. Thus thinking of national security as an environmental problem
risks undercutting both the globalist and common fate understanding of the
situation and the sense of world community that may be necessary to solve the
problem.
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Along with Daniel Deudney, Marc Levy also produced one of the earliest critical
reactions to linking the environment with security concerns. In his 1995 article, “Is the
Environment a National Security Issue?” he writes “the political threat from
environmental degradation (involving environmental refugees, resource wars, and so on)
is at once both the weakest substantive threat to U.S. security and the strongest
intellectual challenge to the field of security challenges.”

181

Levy thinks that instead of

attempting to stretch environmental concerns into the realm of high politics, it would be
better for environmentalists to gain support for their cause by engaging with
environmental degradation on the level of low politics. Levy’s article has not fared well
with age. His contention that the links between environmental and security values are
simply rhetorical acts by environmentalists, and that the optimal response to the dangers
of environmental degradation would be a combination of “prevention, adaptation, and
‘letting nature take its course,’” exhibits a striking naivety. While he does carve some
space for climate change to be included in security discourse, he does so only because of
its potential economic effects and the potential loss of American lives.
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Considering that

in 2007 the UN Security Council, under the leadership of the United Kingdom, affirmed
that climate change is one of the most significant threats to humankind, Levy’s separation
of the environment from traditional security seems wholly lost from the reality of the past
twenty years.
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With that, the security literature emerging in critical response to the Malthusian warnings
of environmental security was astute in casting a critical eye to the more dire warnings
concerning threats of state collapse and international war and conflict. Deudney’s
Cornucopian approach, which emphasized human inventiveness, the economic
diversification of states away from resource dependency, and falling commodity prices,
presented a compelling counter to the Malthusian analyses of environmental security like
Thomas Homer-Dixon, Joyce Starr, and Richard Ullman.

184

The problem with such

accounts was that they failed to critically analyze a number of disparate variables that
influence the way security is thought of in the first place. That the first two generations
(and many of their critics) largely ignored contextual analysis of specific political,
economic, cultural, and gender issues left open only the continued reification of statecentric security, generally built upon realist assumptions and a rigid adherence to
empiricist methodology. Nils Petter Gleditsch’s comprehensive literature review, written
in 1998, reflected on the broad literature produced to that point, indicating nine common
problems. The isolated problems that Gleditsch focused on relate to an overall absence of
solid evidence and a lack of systemic research on the effect of resource or environmental
factors on armed conflict.
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Despite Gleditsch producing a significant and useful

summation of environmental security to that point, he failed to engage the parameters by
which we view security itself. His critique never broached the subject of security, for
whom, by whom? His final call – for a Correlates of War project for the environment – is
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a strikingly uncritical approach to viewing the environment and security. However, as the
literature progressed into a new, third, phase, the conditions by which security and the
environment were viewed expanded, indicating a departure from the first two stages,
which tried to empirically demonstrate the connections (or lack thereof) between the
environment and conflict.
The third phase, discussed briefly already, includes a number of different approaches to
environmental security. According to Dalby, Brauch, and Spring, it included analyses of
global change that are more closely linked to larger concerns of human security.

186

Water

security analyses arising in the late 1990s reflect this trend, and they began to incorporate
broader frames of reference, specifically focusing on cooperative management of water
resources. In particular, the work of Aaron Wolf, Director of the Program in Water
Conflict Management and Transformation and the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute
Database, has been a catalyst for shifting the analytical focus away from Malthusian
concerns of over-the-horizon conflict. His extensive work, investigating the reality of
historic water conflict, shows empirically that only a handful of minor skirmishes
occurred over water in the twentieth century, and that no war over water has ever
occurred in history. Instead, cooperation over shared waterways is closer to the norm. His
conclusions are that along shared waterways, cooperative interests consistently outweigh
conflict. In the end, war over water is “neither strategically rational, hydrographically
effective, nor economically viable.”
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Wolf’s findings, while unique in their
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completeness and methodological vigor, have been confirmed in other analyses,
188

including works by Jerome Delli Priscoli,
Giordano,

190

Yoffe, Wolf, and Giordano,

191

Undula Alam,
192

and Yoffe et al.

189

Wolf, Yoffe, and

The findings stand in direct

contrast to the first generations of environmental security and water security. The water
wars rationale, almost always focusing on the region of the Middle East, argues that
given water’s critical importance to a country’s survival, if there is scarcity amidst a
wider conflict and if enemy states rely upon shared water resources, each country will
seek to ensure that it retains adequate access, even resorting to armed conflict. In other
respects, the desire to maintain control over dwindling water resources may well compel
states to act aggressively in maintenance of that strategic upper hand. It seems logical and
highly plausible to many that each country’s water supply is so important that it would be
willing to wage war to safeguard its supply.
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The Malthusian logic that permeates such analyses is clear. When demand outstrips
supply, states will go to war with their competitors to ensure sufficient access to a vital
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resource such as water. One should understand water wars as international wars that are
fought for reasons related to access to water. This separates water wars from mere waterrelated conflicts within countries and the use/denial of water as a weapon of war.
The water wars narrative has been invoked numerous times, though it was proclaimed
194

most often in academic, policy, and journalistic circles in the 1980s and 1990s.

During

this time, many studies on water and specifically the region of the Middle East based
their evidence on future predictions of impending water wars, due to occur because of
urbanization, industrialization, population growth, consumerist economic development,
195

and increased agricultural irrigation.

The “hydraulic imperative” theory of water being

the motivating factor for Middle Eastern conflict was proclaimed often and repeated in
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both academic and popular presses. Authors as diverse as Thomas Homer-Dixon ,
197

Sandra Postel , and Peter Gleick

198

have all (to varying degrees) proclaimed the

likelihood of future conflicts being fought over water. Though Homer-Dixon and Gleick
did in fact argue for a tempered outlook on the prospect of future water wars, they still
managed to situate water resources as a site of future contestation, especially in
vulnerable areas. Gleick wrote that
Tensions appear likely in parts of southern and central Asia, central Europe, and the
Middle East…in certain regions of the world…water is a scarce resource that has
become increasingly important for economic and agricultural development. In these
regions, water is evolving into an issue of “high politics,” and the probability of
water-related violence is increasing.

199

Citing Falkenmark, he argued that if water provides a source of economic or political
strength then (much like other resources like oil and other minerals) ensuring access to it
provides a justification for going to war, and supply systems can become a goal of
military conquest.

200

Gleick was careful to not explicitly predict ‘water wars’ between

state actors. However, his analyses consistently signaled out water as a source to be
fought over at various levels, including local, subnational, and international levels.
Writing in 2005, Gleick argued that, “Where water is scarce, competition for limited
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supplies can lead communities, economic groups and even nations to see access to water
as a matter of political concern. Conflict can easily arise because political borders rarely
coincide with watershed boundaries.”

201

Gleick’s prolific scholarly output and

authoritative knowledge of transboundary water issues marks him as one of the foremost
experts on the subject of water and conflict. Yet often he falls back upon what are by now
the familiar clichés of impending water conflict. Even when qualified by less alarmist
rhetoric, this furthers perceptions that water primarily exists as an international security
issue as a “threat multiplier,” because it either exacerbates simmering tensions between
homogenous states or because it will be used as a weapon of war.
The problem, as Aaron Wolf has pointed out, is a lack of evidence. Libiszewski and Wolf
have both produced extensive studies that conclude water scarcity has never been a cause
of any Arab-Israeli war.

202

A critical review of the water wars literature reveals that many

of the studies are actually more acutely tied to “political tensions or stability rather than
about warfare, or about water as a tool, target, or victim of armed conflict – all important
issues, just not the same as “water wars.”
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It would be an overstatement to say whether there is one conclusive answer to the
“debate” over the likelihood of water wars. Yet it is possible to conclude that there is
indeed a burgeoning literature that examines water from an altogether different
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perspective from past interpretations. “Water peace” literature has grown in recent years,
and encompasses a major academic sub-field of water security. In what has grown to
become a landmark study, Wolf’s 1998 article, “Conflict and Cooperation Along
International Waterways”, found that there have been hardly any water wars in all of
human history. In findings derived from Oregon State University’s Transboundary
Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD), Wolf explained that a systematic study of the
interstate interactions over water reveals a history more replete with cooperation than
conflict. Wolf, and his team of researchers, using a comprehensive dataset that identified
412 crises for the period 1912-1994, found only four disputes where water was partially a
cause. They broadened the scope to include a total of seven “incidents” where water may
have been an independent variable influencing armed aggression, only to find that in
three of these incidents no shots were fired. Wolf concluded that “As near as we can find,
204

there has never been a single war over water.”

Instead of the interstate violence that

has been consistently forecasted, the study, building upon earlier evidence compiled by
Wolf
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206

and Hamner and Wolf , found that cooperation along shared waterways is

historically far more common. This has again been confirmed in subsequent findings by
Wolf and others.
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Instead of wars over water, which are not “strategically rational,
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hydrographically effective, or economically viable,” states have endeavored to find
common ground when it comes to shared waterways. Wolf’s team identified 3,600
treaties that have been signed over different aspects of international water (400 in the
twentieth century alone.) This stands in stark contrast to the water wars literature that
was commonplace in the early 1990s.
The data produced by TFDD has had a major impact on how water can be seen
alternative to the prevailing discourses that place water scarcity in the context of war and
violent conflict. Indeed, Phillips et al. write that: “It is rare that findings within social
science produce instant paradigm shifts. However, with the surprising results from The
Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database disclosing that there have hardly been any
‘water wars’ in human history, the tables were turned almost overnight.”
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New emphasis on the potential for water to bridge political and psychological divides has
recently emerged in the wake of the quantitative studies produced by Wolf and others.
Many studies produced in the last decade have emphasized the cooperative side of water
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politics.

A few authors point to “discourses of cooperation”

benevolent relations”

211

210

and “rising spirals of

instead of once-familiar discourses of conflict or spirals of

insecurity. They contend that conflict over water – whether violent or not – is a rarity at
the shared basin level. This new emphasis on the counter-hypothesis – that water scarcity
can lead people to cooperate – is representative of a larger trend within environmental
security studies. As chapter one of this dissertation showed, it is not without significance
that the UN has declared 2013 the International Year of Water Cooperation.
The speculative theorizing often at the root of early forms of environmental security has
become less commonplace – at least when it comes to predicting future water wars.
Instead, a teleological approach to the environment and cooperation has assumed a much
more prominent place in academic studies. This approach has emphasized the discourse
of cooperation and challenged sovereignty and the privileging of independent national
development priorities.
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This has contributed to the emergent fourth phase of

environmental security literature, discussed earlier in this chapter, which links together
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human, environmental, and gender security and peace research.

213

Some, such as Spring,

Brauch, and Dalby are hopeful that this new phase in the literature will be more
comprehensive, and better integrate physical and human sciences in ways that “neither
focus on states on the one hand, or environmental causes as a simple variable on the
other.” This new type of ecological thinking should focus on adaptability, resilience, and
interconnection: “understanding security in contrast to earlier formulations assuming
214

central control and violence as the essence of security.”

Many of these authors are careful to temper any undue enthusiasm for water to act as a
magical panacea, curing international conflict. The intent is rather to present a fuller
picture of the complex interactions that surround shared management of water resources.
It is clear that water contains the potential to destabilize international relations, but it
seems far more appropriate to speak of the consequences related to its unequal access,
rather than competition over water resources.
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The authors writing on water as part of

the new phases of environmental literature are more reluctant to produce extensive
conclusions about either the inevitability of conflict or the likelihood of cooperation. It is
clear that expanding the scope of analysis beyond conflict and war and including
cooperation and negotiation has allowed for a wider range of approaches to water
security. These new approaches often incorporate different facets of the relationship
between water, conflict, and cooperation. Recent studies have highlighted the role of
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water regimes in facilitating hydrosolidarity , the potential for spillover effects of water
217

cooperation , the role of the poor and the implications for water management
218

institutions in future water related conflict , and the coexistence of conflict and
219

cooperation in transboundary water interaction.

This is only a small sampling to

demonstrate the diversity of the latest stage of water security literature. As was discussed
at some length in the previous chapter, the reduction of a whole scope of environmental
security studies to singular paradigms is a misleading discursive tactic that obscures a
consistently complex literature. Nevertheless there is some value in producing some
synthesis of the literature because it can shed some light on the new approaches that have
arisen in response to previous empirical findings and theoretical advancements. It is clear
that there exists a highly complex and diverse literature investigating the myriad political
and environmental issues associated with the management of water. The debate over
whether water wars will occur seems to have muted in recent years (at least in academic
circles), with a larger focus on how states cooperate over shared water resources. And
while it is accepted that states often cooperate in the field of water resource management,
we should heed various warnings that there still remains rapidly increasing demands for
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strategic access to water by certain co-riparian states, which is caution against
complacency.

220

What the debate over water wars shows is that in academic circles there currently exists a
high degree of skepticism over the potential of water to act as a primary causal variable
driving states to war. Yet there still remains a popular discursive reliance on the familiar
perceptions of future water conflict. Most academic studies dismiss the notion that wars
over water will dot the geopolitical landscape of the twenty-first century. Yet, we are
often reminded by journalists and policymakers to expect increasing conflict in response
to rising demand and dwindling resources. The nexus between water and impending
conflict, drawn from Malthusian assumptions, is repeated and reiterated in the popular
media. A Google search of “Water Wars” typically returns over 213,000,000 hits.
Further, the message being constructed and conveyed in many analyses and statements by
international experts is that the world is on the verge of a major water quantity and
quality crisis. Arising from these truly dire warnings are a number of predictions from
influential individuals that the world could experience future conflicts over water. As
mentioned earlier, the last three UN Secretary Generals have all warned of water wars.
The most provocative, and widely cited warning comes from Ismail Serageldin, former
Vice President of the World Bank, who stated in 1995 that, “if the wars of the Twentieth
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Century were fought over oil, the wars of this century will be fought over water.”
Phillip Stucki writes:

The new perspectives on the nexus between water scarcity and potential conflicts
(also called ‘water peace’ literature) were very successful in academic circles, and
can be said to currently represent an epistemic consensus. However, not much has
changed outside of the scientific debate. In March 2001, UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan still warned of future water wars. In the media, the fear of water wars
is still expressed regularly, and little can be found concerning the cooperative
potentials in dealing with water scarcity.

222

That the popular discourse is still flooded with warnings about water wars, despite the
shift in academic circles towards a more holistic, integrative, approach towards water and
security, points to the resiliency of hegemonic concepts. It seems safe to conclude that
following the findings of the TFDD and subsequent analyses trumpeting water as a path
to peace, the academic “debate” is no longer entirely relevant. However, articles still
appear regularly in reputable news organizations proclaiming the need to develop
coherent responses to water and resource scarcity, lest it push states or groups to violent
conflict, or worse, war.
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Thus, given this apparent disconnect between solid academic

consensus against the likelihood of water wars and popular retention of the water war
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narrative it is useful to briefly make mention of the coercive power that the concept
maintains.
Julie Trottier first applied (without explicitly defining) the idea of hegemonic concepts to
water wars in a 2003 article commissioned by UNESCO. Trottier explained that the best
way to understand the continued application of discursive concepts such as “water wars”
(and conversely “water peace”) is to return to Gramsci’s idea of hegemony. Hegemony
might be understood as a consensual form of power. Thus, power in a hegemonic form
marginalizes coercive forms of power that are applied to historically specific social
classes. This opens up the role for new social bases of power, principally civil society.
Gramsci believed that a fuller notion of the state was required to fully comprehend its
administrative, executive, and coercive apparatuses. This enlarged definition of the state
included the hegemonic structures of civil society, which helped establish limits of
political action. Dominant social groupings arranged in the church, the educational
system, the press, and other institutions, established these limits of acceptable political
action in historical terms. Robert Cox explains that these social groups must be
considered as part of the state, and should be used for the purpose of evaluating its broad
political structure, extending into the powerful realm of ideas.
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Certainly Gramsci

himself clarified how the modern “night-watchman state” blends civil society with
political society through the diffusion of hegemonic persuasion. He wrote, “Certain
elements that fall under the general notion of the state must be restored to the notion of
civil society (in the sense, one might say, that state = political society + civil society, that
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is, hegemony protected by the armour of coercion).”

225

The implication here is that the

state is able to function as an image of the non-state, by relying upon the expressions of
civil society to peacefully coerce men and women to accept its laws.
The intellectual stratum that carries forward hegemonic ideas often does so by picking up
226

ideas that originate from prior eras and revolutions.

Various members of national and

international society carry these ideas, once held as self-evident, forward in new patterns
of emulation. The diffusion of norms is one of the primary processes through which
hegemony operates. For its purposes here, the concept of water as a causal variable
affecting war and/or conflict seems to remain a “hegemonic concept” in that it retains
vitality in popular discourse, despite being largely proven false or misleading. While
academic consensus will always (and should always) remain elusive, there is little debate
anymore on the validity of future water wars, at least conventionally understood. Instead,
concerns are more likely to be voiced over the “water riots,”
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the use of water for

facilitating cooperation, human water security (and water rights), and other forms of
“new security thinking” in inter-state and intra-state water relations.

228

225

Antonio Gramsci. Prison Notebooks Vol III. Edited and Translated by Josephy A. Buttieg. (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2007): 75.
226
227
228

Cox, 170.
Boeson, and Ravnborg.

Jan Selby. “’New Security Thinking’ In Israeli-Palestinian Water Relations.” Facing Global
Environmental Change: Environmental, Energy, Food, Health, and Water Security Concepts Eds. Hans
Günter Brauch, Hans Günter Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, John Grin, Czeslaw Mesjasz, Patricia KameriMbote, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir Chourou, Heinz Krummenacher. (Berlin: Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2009): 623-631.

99

3.4

Conclusion

Much of the popular literature exploring water and security approaches the problem
strategically; the debate centres on the nature of the looming threat of water scarcity and
how states should best respond. This dissertation moves elsewhere, not strictly
concerning itself with strategy but rather with how the securitization of water itself might
engender policies that view water scarcity as a potential threat to states. It thus
problematizes the prevailing statist ontology that underpins the majority of security
studies. It is a critique that extends beyond just empirical studies of water conflict or
water war. It is important to explore not only the historical and contemporary political
terrain of water security, but also the conceptual sites in which the production of the
possibility of “security” occurs. This chapter presented a brief overview of the various
stages of environmental security literature, including the shift in academic thinking
towards water as an instrument compelling negotiation and cooperation, while dually
containing the power to facilitate conflict. It ended with a brief look at the power of water
wars as a hegemonic concept, existing independently within popular discourse due to a
normative appeal for engagement with water scarcity through the lenses of traditional
security. While this chapter has avoided producing an overtly critical appeal, it has
sought to provide the foundation for a deeper line of critique that questions statist
political ontology and the obstacles that are posed by its conceptions and representations
of sovereignty, and identity – the holders of life seemingly pre-existent and requiring
security.
To re-state the implications of this analysis more clearly, all this means that the rearticulation of security as a performative act laden with power can help us understand that
water scarcity exists within a normalizing discourse allowing for extraordinary modes of
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control and exclusion. To extend this control over a fundamental human right such as
water - one that holds both ecological and spiritual importance - poses significant
obstacles to peace and development.

The next chapter seeks to build upon this

conceptual history and examine how ongoing water securitizations require the
realignment of water security theory away from enmity, exclusion, and exception.
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4

CHAPTER FOUR: Water Securitization in the Anthropocene

4.1

Introduction

This chapter confronts the concept of water securitization in the Anthropocene. The
Anthropocene is the contemporary geologic epoch, which is defined by humanity’s
impacts on the earth’s systems.

229

The chapter acknowledges that while the securitization

approach has generated important and wide-ranging insights into the problems of water
and environmental security, it never truly excavates the traditional, Schmittian-inspired,
logic of security that define it in terms of exclusion and distrust. In analytical terms,
securitization is useful in explaining how water becomes defined in terms of security.
However, the concept rigidly adheres to a static, statist notion of security, which is
particularly problematic in an age of global change caused by human actions.
Given that the concept of securitization represents a zenith of constructivist security
insight, it is important to question its adherence to an unchanging form of security. Thus,
this chapter reviews the basics of the Copenhagen School approach before turning its
attention to the case of the Nile River basin, one of the most successfully securitized
water regions in the world. The Nile River basin is the site of historical and ongoing
securitizations, despite periods of both conflict and cooperation. As it stands today, the
region is consistently framed as the site of future water wars, which works to obscure the
emancipatory potential latent in complex water relationships. It is argued that
securitization is insufficient for understanding the multifaceted realities and possibilities
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that water (and the wider environment) provides because it relies upon the singular
security concept that privileges the preservation of the territory and sovereignty of the
nation-state from militaristic threats, to the detriment of alternative readings of security
that seek to create the conditions for the emancipation of individuals from structural
oppressions. This argument represents an attempt to begin relocating security to the realm
of individuals and their natural environments, which is beneficial for broadly
comprehending the complex relationships between water, human, and non-human life,
and which will be explored at greater length in the chapters to follow.

4.2
Securitization: Speech acts and the construction of
security
By labeling something a security issue, it becomes one. This is the heart of securitization.
Since its most thorough explication by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde in 1998, the
concept of securitization has received significant attention within security studies. In the
same way that constructivism has proven to be an attractive “middle-ground” for security
scholars, securitization approaches are able to utilize insights from critical approaches
like post-structuralism as well as from more traditional security areas, such as neorealism. Indeed, the connection between constructivism and the concept of securitization
is fairly explicit; Buzan and Waever have said so themselves: “Our securitization
230

approach is radically constructivist regarding security.”
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The following section lays out the “Copenhagen School” approach and argues that a
critical security of water stands to benefit conceptually from its varied insights. In
particular, it can help in understanding the process of broadening security, and the ways
in which issues (if not the concept of security itself) become intersubjectively defined as
security issues in speech and practice. However, as will be made clear, the Copenhagen
School essentializes security as state-centric focusing almost exclusively on threats to and
defence of the state. It thereby fails at the task of deepening security, which the
emancipatory approach attempts. As a result, while securitization is a process that
remains analytically important, its normative deficiencies are significant enough to
warrant caution and reflection.
The name “Copenhagen School” was coined by Bill McSweeney in a 1996 critical essay
titled “Identity and Security: Buzan and The Copenhagen school.”
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To use the moniker

is to refer to a broad program of study that is built around three main ideas: 1)
securitization 2) sectors and 3) regional security complexes. In general, securitization is
the most important of the three ideas, as it forms the meta-theoretical framework of the
232

School.

The academics belonging to the Copenhagen school of security studies such as Barry
Buzan and Ole Wæver have been credited with forming the concept of securitization.
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While its ideas bounced around in numerous precursory publications

233

The Copenhagen

school of security studies is most coherently articulated in Security: A New Framework
for Analysis, written by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde in 1998. In it, the
authors spend significant time defining and marking securitization as an important form
of rhetorical structure and practice. They begin with the constructivist insight that,
“Security can never be based on the objective reference that something is in and of itself
234

a security problem. That quality is always given to it in human communication.”

Securitization is defined as the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with
a saliency that is judged to have substantial political effects.
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They write that to

securitize an issue takes the politics of it beyond the established rules of the game and
frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. When an issue is
securitized it is “presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and
justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.”
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The process of securitization, or bringing an issue into the security framework, requires a
level of state mobilization that would otherwise not be called upon to address the issue.
As such, the state plays a central role. It addresses the identified threats by eliminating
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the chance that such threats would successfully overthrow the state and its apparatuses. It
legitimizes the use of force and opens the way for the state to mobilize or take special
power – e.g. using conscription, secrecy, and other means only legitimate when dealing
with ‘security matters’.
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Securitization scholars look to discourse to understand how certain issues become
238

security issues. In essence, securitization is a speech act.

By exploring the discursive

nature of the object in relation to conflict through analyses of particularly employed
rhetorical and semiotic structures, one may determine what allows intended audiences to
tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have been obeyed.

239

It must be noted

that, echoing trends in social science towards a “linguistic turn” this baseline assumption
relies upon a performative understanding of discourse, instead of a representational view.
By saying the words of security something is done. It is clear that a sentence like “Water
is a major security problem in our country’ does not have the same effect as a sentence
like, “An apple falls from the tree.” The former sentence has a performative force.
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Uttering security is an act itself. Securitization does not point to an object that is real;
rather it actually performs to make an object an existential threat.
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This is a clear,

Buzan et al, 24.
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constructivist reading of security, one that consciously avoids an objectivist account of
security threats. For the Copenhagen school, security is dependent on its successful
construction in discourse.

242

At its most fundamental, securitization is the process by which something becomes
designated in security language. The designation of the threat determines how we think.
And, as Simon Dalby has argued, how we think, “leads not only to how we act
politically, but also to our understandings of who we are, what we value, and what we are
243

prepared to countenance to protect our self-preferred identity.”

For scholars of the

Copenhagen school, the articulation of threat and security structures the social practices
that follow.

244

According to the Copenhagen school, these issues/threats are not objective. Rather,
245

“security is what states make of it.”

The task is “not to assess some objective threats

that ‘really’ endanger some object, rather it is to understand the process of constructing
and designating a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively
246

responded to as a threat.”

What is most telling for securitization theorists is how some
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things are (or are not) designated as a “threat.” And while it seems as though
concentrating on the designation of threats creates an open view of security – allowing
for a substantial widening of security – the Copenhagen school is in fact able to limit the
widening of security. It is able to do so because it identifies the most common
securitizing actors as “political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and
pressure groups.”

247

Securitization is limited to the construction of the threat and thus the

holders of security are those who are placed in a privileged position of construction: The
securitizing actors are the ones with the power and capacity to declare a referent object as
existentially threatened. The objects in question, determined by the securitizing actor, are
unsurprisingly middle-range (state-based), or macro (structural), that affect the
248

international system.

The authors claim that security is socially constructed becomes

reduced to the Schmittian logic of executive unilateralism, which focuses on the actions
of leaders placing themselves and their actions above the law, as part of the exception
necessary for emergency politics. The result of this is to reaffirm the status quo of
security despite the Copenhagen school’s novel commitment to a non-objectivist view of
security through “speech acts.” The logic here is built on the assumption that there are
reasonable and knowable ideas of “normal” politics and security in the first place. Given
the speed and rate of environmental change in the Anthropocene, the effects of a global
“War on Terror” now well into its second decade, and the spread of political upheaval
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across the globe, it may be more apt to view the modern age as one of constant
exception.

249

It seems insufficient then to limit to security to such a reductionist framework, where
non-state actors are given short shrift in terms of their material power to securitize (a
reasonable claim), but more importantly, where states themselves are the moral arbiters
of security based upon their abilities to enact emergency politics. From a normative
position, the Copenhagen school contributes to the perpetuation of a security logic built
upon a static, objectivist understanding of security as state-led and maintained. If, as earth
systems approaches remind us, “nonlinearities are the rule not the exception…in the
Anthropocene Era,” then it becomes illogical to rely upon the Schmittian logic at its
heart.
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Schmitt’s seemingly prescient adage, “Sovereign is he who decides upon the

exception,” may no longer apply.

4.3

251

The Securitization of Water
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In the context of securitization the water wars hypothesis can offer a robust picture of the
development, perpetuation, and the limitations of linking water and security. The
remainder of this chapter offers a view of water securitization in the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) region and concludes by critiquing the Copenhagen School
approach and paving the way for the emancipatory theory of water advanced in the next
chapter.
Water crosses national boundaries, its uses are diverse, measurements are unreliable, and
it lacks definitive legal generalizations. Adding to the complexity is the tripartite process
of increasing water demand, decreasing water supply, and deteriorating water quality.
Collectively these problems have led to an increased desire to tie water with security. In
effect, water is experiencing ongoing processes of securitization.
The Copenhagen school is careful to point out that securitization works differently in
252

different sectors (politics, religion, health, the environment) and across different scales.

However, there are three constant aspects of the securitizing speech act: a securitizing
actor, a referent object to be securitized, and an audience that accepts (or rejects) the
securitizing move.

253

The outcome of securitization – whether successful or not – depends

on the acceptance or rejection of the speech act by an audience. In the case of water,
successful securitization has occurred primarily through various interpretations of the
water wars hypothesis, perpetuated by political elites and reported by the media. The
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most prevalent understanding of the hypothesis is that states will do anything, even wage
war, to secure access to, or preserve, dwindling water supplies. A “hydrological
imperative” compels states that suffer from water shortages to act aggressively against
neighbouring countries. A milder form of this thesis, put forth by academics like Thomas
Homer-Dixon and Peter Gleick, posits that while water alone is unlikely to serve as a
casus belli between nations it may strain existing tensions through multiplier effects, like
increasing competition for arable land, displacing drought-affected rural populations, and
creating environmental refugees.

254

Numerous high-level reports from state agencies and intergovernmental organizations
have highlighted the security implications brought by environmental issues, and water in
particular. In 2012, The US National Intelligence Council’s National Intelligence
Estimate, which is a high-level intelligence product, released “Global Water Security,” a
detailed assessment of how water and sanitation might impact US security interests. It
concluded that over the next decade, while water-related state-on-state conflict is
unlikely, “water problems will contribute to instability in states important to US national
security interests.”
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Likewise, the United Nations frequently warns that countries

experiencing acute water shortages are threats to the international system because of the
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undue social stresses they create. Former UN Secretary Generals have in the past
proclaimed the high potential for water violence. Boutros Boutros Ghali told the US
256

Congress that, “the next war in the Middle East will be fought over water, not politics.”

Kofi Annan suggested that “fierce competition for freshwater may well become a source
of conflict and war in the future.”

257

Current UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has also

highlighted reports that environmental changes, including droughts “are likely to become
a major driver of war and conflict.”

258

These conclusions voiced by high-ranking public

officials and state administrations contribute to the widespread belief - prevalent in public
discourse - that water scarcity will lead to an increase of violent conflict, of “water wars.”
Support for the water wars thesis is infrequent in academia, but government officials,
business leaders, and the media often repeat its warnings.
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Past heads of state like

Anwar Sadat of Egypt, King Hussein of Jordan, and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
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have all warned about the likelihood of water wars.

260

In March 2012, the UK Secretary

of State for Energy and Climate Change alerted a conference of high ranking politicians
and diplomats that, “Countries have not tended to go to war over water, but I have a fear
for the world that climate instability drives political instability…The pressure of that
261

makes conflict more likely.”

He continued, “Where the risk of conflict already burns

brightly, it will focus the flame.”

262

These interpretations offer similar conclusions: water

could be an important variable in historical cases of conflict. As its strategic value rises
with its scarcity, the world is likely to see an increase in water-related conflict.

4.4
Water Securitization in the MENA Region: The Nile
River Basin

Unsurprisingly, the most resilient and successful examples of water securitization are
found in the MENA region. The focus on water security in the MENA region is
intrinsically tied up with the reality of demographic changes and economic development,
together with continued political tension and absolute water stress. The Nile River Basin
offers a fairly succinct example of the processes and effects of water securitization in the
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region. It can also demonstrate how the concept of securitization faithfully recreates the
story of security as being defined by enmity, competition, and perpetual threat of conflict.
The Nile River Basin (See figure 1), covering 10 percent of the African continent, has
always been an important artery for the lifeblood of the region. The Nile is the longest
263

river in the world at 6850 km , but its overall volume is incredibly small. Its annual
discharge is only 6 percent of that of the Congo. It has two main tributaries: the White
Nile, originating from Lake Victoria in east central Africa, and the Blue Nile, sourced
from the highlands of Ethiopia. From their confluence, the river flows northwards into
Egypt and out into the Mediterranean Sea. Because of the length of the river, regional
climatic changes and developmental disparities are significant. The tributaries begin in
264

humid conditions, in areas with annual rainfalls of 1200-1500 mm.

However, the

downstream portion of the river flows northward through the Sahara desert. Thus, for half
of its journey, the Nile travels through countries that have effectively no rainfall and
close to 80 million people in the downstream areas depend exclusively on the Nile for
their water supply.
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There is some disagreement from some Brazilian researchers who claim the Amazon is longer.
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le Basin
Figure 1: The Nile
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The world’s first civilizations grew out of the Nile River Basin over 4 millennia ago, and
it continues today to drive the social, political and, economic identities of its inhabitants.
Eleven countries share the basin with 200 million people inhabiting th
thee Nile Basin itself
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and 370 million living in the countries that share it.

This represents almost 40 percent

of Africa’s population. Overall, the region is one of the poorest in the world,
characterized by weak institutions, armed strife, and political instability. All of this is
268

intensified by a population growth projected to be between 61-82 percent by 2030.

The

disparities among the social and environmental geographies contribute to the overall
stress placed on this crucial waterway. The downstream riparians, because their societies
have used the Nile for thousands of years, have “developed a sense of entitlement and
have adopted the principle of ‘prior utilization’, which gives the right of use to the first
user.”
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Two countries – Egypt and Sudan – comprise 98.7 percent of the basin’s

irrigated lands.

270

Adding to the complexity is the fact that the Nile Basin is home to

some of the poorest countries in the world. Taking out Egypt and Kenya, the remaining 9
basin countries are classified by the United Nations as “least developed.” Almost 100
million residents live on less than a dollar a day. The humanitarian crises created by the
HIV/AIDS epidemic, severe waterborne diseases and malaria, as well as violent interstate
and intrastate conflict further compound this debilitating poverty.
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The deep complexities of the Nile River Basin – power and geographic asymmetries,
variability caused by climate change, competing water uses, pervasive poverty and
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underdevelopment, institutional inefficiency and corruption, infrastructure deficiencies,
and political and ethnic volatility – contribute to its persistent characterization as a likely
site for future water wars. Authors like Bulloch and Darwish, Waterbury and
Whittington, Klare, and Shiva, have all used the Nile Basin to further the narrative that
water wars will break out over use of the Nile.

272

UNESCO’s former Director-General

Federico Mayor, directly referred to the Nile when he claimed that “More than petrol and
273

land, it is over water that the most bitter conflicts of the near future may be fought.”

The whole Nile Basin is securitized, though it is most formally oriented around Egypt
and Sudan, which together use 94 percent of the river’s water. Because of Egypt’s
geographical deficiencies (it is 97 percent desert), it is forced to into an extreme reliance
upon the waters of the Nile. Essentially, all of its domestic food, water, and power come
from the Nile. Thanks to a generous allotment of water from the 1959 Nile Waters
Agreement between Egypt and Sudan, Egypt has been able to maintain a hegemonic
position in the region and thrive in the absence of anything close to native water
abundance. However, the overall water picture remains difficult for Egypt. Its current
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renewable water resources stand at 706 m3 per capita, leaving the country classified as
“water poor”

274

Sudan, the largest country in Africa, is also highly dependent upon the Nile. Its average
annual rainfall is 416 mm, but this number obscures the high variance in geographical
climate. Its north is essentially bone-dry with an average annual rainfall of 25 mm, while
the tropical rain forests of the south accumulate 1,600 mm per year. The erratic nature of
rainfall means that Sudan is highly dependent upon the Nile. Total water withdrawal is
estimated at 37 km3, with the country being allocated 18.5 km3/year from the 1959 Nile
Waters Agreement. Of the 37 km3 withdrawn, 36 km3 is used by agriculture, which
contributes 90 percent of the country’s non-oil export earnings.
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It is clear that the Nile

River Basin is of existential importance to the peoples of Sudan and Egypt.
It is rather remarkable that the creeping securitization of the Nile River Basin, especially
in the context of Egypt and Sudan, has occurred in a period when relationships among
276

Nile Basin countries have transitioned from “competition to cooperation.”

The period

immediately after the signing of the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement was defined by a new
post-colonial reality. British colonialism in the region brought with it an attempt to exert
hegemonic control over the basin, and ensure uninterrupted downstream flow. As the
colonial period faded, riparian countries were mostly preoccupied with state-level
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struggles for self-determination. The colonial legacy has loomed large over negotiations
of the Nile ever since. Most countries in the basin did not win their independence until
the 1960s, leaving them absent from the initial allocation discussions. This has led to
some countries, like Ethiopia arguing for a new treaty to replace the Nile Waters
Agreement, because it was never party to it. Indeed, “riparian cooperation in the Nile
basin is essentially a post-colonial phenomenon, enormously influenced and somehow
predetermined by the hydrological and hydro-political legacies of the colonial era.” The
period between 1959 and 1999 was generally defined by competition and little
cooperation over the Nile Basin. Mekonnen argues that, “hegemonic control and
competition, which constituted the central preoccupation of the colonial powers,” was
replicated by the newly independent riparians, which were distrustful of one another,
lacked integrative activities, and demonstrated highly disparate interests.
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The generally competitive nature of riparian relationships lasted until 1999 when a new
cooperative venture, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), was launched. Until then there had
278

been no joint management, or coordinated planning and development of the Nile.

However, with the creation of the NBI, it was hoped that a new era would emerge. In
some respects, it has led to a shift in the tone and the substance of state-to-state
relationships along the Nile. Officially designed to, “achieve sustainable socio-economic
development through the equitable utilization of and benefit from the common Nile Basin
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water resources,”

279

the NBI now comprises all eleven countries in the Nile Basin.

Perhaps its most lasting impact will be encouraging the active inclusion and participation
of Ethiopia, which until then had been long been resentful of its lack of involvement in
decision-making and the small percentage of its water use, despite 85 percent of the
Nile’s water originating there. All the key actors are engaged in the NBI, and the
initiative is careful to facilitate both technical and political dimensions of the Basin’s
management. Its central element, the Strategic Action Program (SAP), is made up of two
complementary programs, the Shared Vision Program, and the Subsidiary Action
Program. The SVP, supported by UNDP, was completed in 2009 and was comprised of
eight basin-wide programs to build trust, confidence, and capacity building. The
Subsidiary Action Program is more investment-oriented, encouraging projects that are
trans-boundary and that contribute to poverty alleviation, reverse environmental
degradation, and promote socio-economic growth in the riparian countries.
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It continues

today.
Since its inception in 1999 the NBI has always been viewed as a transitional mechanism,
working as a capacity-builder towards a more comprehensive water management regime,
one that would replace the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement. Until that time comes, the NBI
has made substantial progress in promoting dialogue, cooperation, and opportunities for
management. It has implemented eight major projects with a total value of $900 million,
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and has 13 projects under preparation, with a projected value of $7-11 billion.

All told,

the NBI has been a hopeful sign that potential volatilities over shared water resources
could be transformed through stakeholder involvement into a catalyst for cooperation.
The Nile Basin Initiative demonstrates some innovative solutions that promote good
stewardship and fair allocation, and there has been no outbreak of armed conflict between
riparians. However, despite this, the NBI has not been successful in preventing the
continued securitization of the Nile. In this respect it offers a helpful explication of the
potential and limits of securitization theory in a water context. Despite the goodwill
sought by the NBI, water relationships between its members continue to be strained and
antagonistic. This antagonism is reflected by the processes of water securitization
undertaken by important actors in the region. Indeed, the specific security rhetoric
employed by the region’s leaders highlights the state’s existential survival, priority of
action, and urgency, and often works to obscure some of the (albeit minor) progress
towards cooperation in the water politics of the region.
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One of the principle catalysts sustaining the securitization of water in the Nile Basin
region was the decision by a breakaway group of Nile Basin countries (Ethiopia,
Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania) to sign a new water distribution framework
agreement to replace the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement. The 2010 Entebbe Agreement
prevents countries from using the Nile in ways that would harm downstream states, but
does so in a way that removes Egypt’s absolute veto over upstream projects. It reflects
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the relative economic and political stability experienced by upstream riparians, which is
now being used to challenge the historical hydro-hegemony of Egypt and Sudan.
Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi in a combative interview with Reuters, demonstrated
this growing confidence, declaring that, ““I am not worried that the Egyptians will
suddenly invade Ethiopia. Nobody who has tried that has lived to tell the story. I don’t
283

think the Egyptians will be any different and I think they know that.”

Unsurprisingly

the Entebbe Agreement led to strong condemnations from Egypt, Sudan, and South
Sudan. When Ethiopia signaled its intention to pursue the Entebbe Agreement, the
Egyptian water minister, Mahmoud Abu-Zeid described it as an “act of war.”
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The

Sudanese water minister, Kamal Ali Mohamed, said his country would stop co-operating
with the NBI. "We are freezing activities regarding the NBI until these issues, these legal
implications, are resolved."

285

To date, the Entebbe Agreement has remained a divisive

thorn in the side of the hegemonic downstream riparians. Adding to the new volatility of
the Nile Basin, have been the regional upheavals emanating from the Arab Spring and the
overthrow of the Mubarak regime in Egypt. This has seemingly weakened the Egyptian
position in the region, and created significant challenges for the health of the NBI. While
it still meets regularly, and it recently agreed on a new five-year plan, the prospects for a
comprehensive agreement suitable for all countries in the Nile Basin seems far off.
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The Nile Basin is one of the preeminent case studies of water securitization in the world.
While no overt water wars have occurred, government officials, along with regional and
international media, have contributed to a consistent perception of emergency. The
rhetoric employed has frequently invoked security as the primary motivator and concern
of the state actors in the region. The statement by the ancient historian Herodotus that
“Egypt is the Nile and the Nile is Egypt,”
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is indicative of the popular perception that

still exists in that country. It is not surprising then that the Egyptian government has often
characterized upstream development of the Nile’s water as a substantial national security
threat, and it has consistently threatened to go to war to protect its hegemonic control of
the water.
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In 1979, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat proclaimed that, “water was the
288

only matter that could take Egypt to war again.“

In 1991, President Hosni Mubarak

declared to both Ethiopia and Sudan he was ready to use force to protect Egypt’s access
to the Nile’s water.
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The Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi responded to these

threats with assurances that, “there is no earthly force that can stop Ethiopia from
benefiting from the Nile” and that, “We [Ethiopia] will use the Nile waters within our
290

territory. We will not go to war unless they [Egypt] prevent us from using it.”

Even

relations amongst the dominant regional riparians, Egypt and Sudan have been volatile.
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There are reports that in 1994, Egypt devised plans (later aborted) to deploy fighter jets to
bomb Khartoum, where a dam was being built.
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These examples follow the basic logic

of exceptionality contained in the Copenhagen school’s conception of security. Executive
unilateralism proclaims the urgency of the situation and is often powerful enough to be
reported and repeated and, in the case of the Nile region, it becomes accepted by the
audience.
Another potent factor contributing to securitization in the region is the recent decision by
Ethiopia to construct the largest dam in Africa. “The Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam,”
(GERD) at a cost of 4.5 billion dollars (all supplied by the Ethiopian government), will
primarily be used for hydropower, producing 15,000 GWh annually by mid-2017.
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It

will also create the largest water-body in Ethiopia, twice the size of its largest natural
lake, Lake Tana.
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of the Blue Nile.

The created reservoir will have a volume of 1.3 times the annual flow
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The Ethiopian government has offered assurances the mega-project

will benefit the wider region: it claims it will be able to produce clean and cheaper energy
for export and it will be able to better manage water flow season-to-season, thereby
295

reducing the threat of flooding, especially in Sudan.
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Unsurprisingly, the decision to construct the dam has been met with skepticism and fear,
particularly by the traditionally dominant upstream hegemons and their allies. In a
February 2013 meeting of the Arab Water Council, the Saudi Arabian Deputy Defence
Minister, Prince Khalid Bin Sultan, argued that attempts by Nile basin countries to
reallocate Nile water shares via the GERD were “a real threat” to Egyptian and Sudanese
national security. He claimed that if the dam collapsed, “Khartoum would be drowned
completely and the impact will even reach the Aswan Dam.” He speculated that the
decision to build the dam so close to the Sudanese border (12 km away) “is for political
plotting rather than economic gain.” Ratcheting up the rhetoric beyond the level of
national security, the Prince accused the Ethiopian government of wanting to harm all
Arab peoples: “There are fingers messing with water resources of Sudan and Egypt
which are rooted in the mind and body of Ethiopia. They do not forsake an opportunity to
harm Arabs without taking advantage of it." Concluding, he declared “The establishment
of the dam means full Ethiopian control of every drop of water… The information is
alarming and it is important that we do not underestimate the danger at the moment and
its repercussions in the future.”
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A few months prior to the Prince’s enflaming rhetoric, unverified reports emerged that
Egypt and Sudan may have agreed to build an Egyptian airbase in Darfur, which would
be used to strike Ethiopia and the GERD if diplomatic negotiations broke down over fair
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use of the Nile.

297

The report was officially denied by Cairo, and Nairobi sought to defuse

tensions by refusing to comment. Adding fuel to the tensions, in June 2013, Egyptian
politicians were caught on live TV discussing various strategies that would aggressively
thwart Ethiopia’s continued development of the GERD. The strategies, aired across the
region and reported in international news outlets, included backing Ethiopian rebels or
using its intelligence services to destroy the dam (or at least giving the impression they
298

were willing to).

The continued expression of highly volatile rhetoric in the context of

shifting regional power dynamics has led to the evolution of a highly securitized space.
Egyptian officials have even recently used the technique of narrative counter-factual in
the service of securitization. After Ethiopia announced its plans for the GERD, shortly
after the Egyptian revolution in 2011, an unnamed international official proclaimed that
“If Mubarak was still in power today, it would have been the beginning of a water war.”
This was duly reported in the Financial Times, which, after describing the various
cooperative mechanisms in place along the Nile River, ended its story on the heightened
tensions in an all-too-familiar tone: “The Nile’s water wars may merely be on hold.”
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The threat of overt violence is indeed real. Thomas Homer-Dixon pointed to the Nile as
one of the few cases in the world where the necessary conditions exist for water wars to
break out. He wrote,
In reality, wars over river water between upstream and downstream neighbors are
likely only in a narrow set of circumstances: the downstream country must be
highly dependent on the water for its national well-being; the up-stream country
must be threatening to restrict substantially the river’s flow; there must be a
history of antagonism between the two countries; and, most importantly, the
downstream country must believe it is militarily stronger than the upstream
country.

The Nile is an obvious example that fulfills these conditions. And “sure enough,” from
Anwar Sadat, to Boutros-Boutros Ghali, to Mubarak, to Zenawi, to Kamal Ali Mohamed,
the placement of water at the centerpiece of national security has been a consistent theme.
Securitization theory offers important insight into the security dynamics of the Nile
Basin, and into the politics of water more generally. Remembering that the central
concern for securitization theorists is to illustrate the performative power of speech acts,
it is able to show how the complex web of historical relationships between state actors in
the Nile region has come to be dominantly defined by specific security logic. The act of
labeling control of the Nile and its acceptance by a significant audience (both internal and
external to the region) has allowed for water to become defined as an existential threat to
the state. The performative power of the speech acts, the speech act as event, has been
enough to move the issue from the realm of ‘normal politics’ to a politics of
extraordinary measures, in this case through threats and preparations for war. The
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resonance of these securitized speech acts has coincided with shifts in the traditional
power relations that have characterized the region since the original 1959 Nile Waters
Agreement. Egypt has been weakened by the Arab Spring revolution. Sudan, under
constant international pressure and the weight of economic sanctions, was unable to
prevent the secession of its southern half into the newly formed country of South Sudan.
In comparison, the countries of the Entebbe Agreement, in particular, Ethiopia, have
experienced economic growth and relative stability. This has contributed to new
initiatives that challenge the traditional downstream hydro-hegemony and basin-wide
securitization.

The case of water securitization along the Nile Basin provides a concrete example of the
multi-layered ways in which water becomes designated and framed in a particular
security language. It seems that the historical experience has been for the hydrohegemonic powers in the region (Egypt and Sudan) to consistently securitize the issue of
the Nile in order to assert their dominance and preserve the favourable status quo. By
directly framing any changes that would alter the dominant power imbalance in the
region as an existential threat, they are able to justify aggressive, confrontational rhetoric
and action as necessary reaction in the face of such “emergencies.” The result then is that
the issue of water security in the Nile basin region becomes one marked by
exceptionality, a particularly realist proposition, and one which seemingly avoids the
reality that the securitization of the Nile has been ongoing for decades, and is therefore
not really “exceptional” at all. Despite all the goodwill and hope that followed the
creation of the cooperation-focused Nile Basin Initiative, relations between states over
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water remain largely securitized, displaying a familiar pattern of threats, distrust,
emergency planning, and fiery rhetoric. Is the response then to argue for
“desecuritization” – a de-escalation of the issue, so that it may be tackled by normal
300

political negotiations? Many authors believe so.

Such moves may indeed prove

analytically useful, but as the next section will argue, it is more likely to reaffirm a
particularly negative reading of security: whereby security becomes something to be
avoided. The politics of securitization that are embedded in this context constrain the
possibility for transcendence. Because securitization remains largely ambivalent about
the concept of security, limiting it to a static understanding of threats and defence,
securitization is an instrument of a political ethic, and therefore capable of
transformation.
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The question then is how might it be possible to envision and

understand water security along multiple axes?

4.5

Securitization and Desecuritization

When a securitization is successful, it means the audience has accepted it. Successful
securitization entails the suspension of the normal rules of the game, and the
implementation of emergency measures. Connecting the issue of water with this concept
of security is tempting because it can be an effective way to dramatize and mobilize
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action against environmental problems. The idea might well be to place water scarcity
and degradation on an appropriate level of importance, whereby it becomes an essential
pursuit. But as Ole Wæver rightly points out, “the practices resulting from the slogan
might lead to an inappropriate social construction of the environment as a threat/defense
problem.”
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The danger is that these states of exception may become commonplace or

even permanent. It is because of these associated dangers that the Copenhagen school so
often argues that securitization must be avoided and claims to security must be limited. In
its stead, they advocate for desecuritization. According to Wæver, desecuritization is a
process whereby issues lose their “securityness” and where issues no longer present a
threat to a particular actor.
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It is the fading away of one particular issue or actor. “At

some point, certain ‘threats’ might no longer exercise our minds and imaginations
304

sufficiently and are replaced with more powerful and stirring imageries.”

In effect, a

speaker suggests that a particular issue no longer constitutes a threat, or at least an
existential threat. Desecuritization moves issues downward from the realm of security
into the realm of public political discourse, and into normal modes of negotiation and
settlement.
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Wæver points out, “In some democratic perspective, ‘desecuritization’ is

probably the ideal, since it restores the possibility of exposing the issue to the normal
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haggling and questioning of politicization…”

306

In the context of the Nile Basin, the

attempts to renegotiate antagonistic water relationships via the NBI could be viewed as
attempts to desecuritize water.
The hope is that desecuritization can appease critics from both critical and traditional
security camps. On the one hand, it limits the scope of threats that should be tackled by
the state and its security apparatuses, thus placating traditionalists who wish to protect the
sanctity of their preferred vision of security as state security. On the other hand,
desecuritization shares with critical theorists an aversion to the militarization of issues,
and calls for problems to be dealt with through negotiation, compromise, and dialogue.
However, the Copenhagen school’s “preference”
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for desecuritization struggles to offer

a coherent alternative, nor a normatively superior position. Primarily this is because
desecuritization is built upon the same exceptional and exclusionary logic that underpins
securitization. It would be wrong then to assume that the Copenhagen school’s advocacy
for desecuritization can alleviate the many obvious problems of water securitization,
whether in the Nile Basin, or elsewhere.
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While the Copenhagen school’s desire to avoid militarizing issues is indeed compatible
with an emancipatory approach, it does not absolve it from the acute criticism leveled by
theorists like Ken Booth, who claim that that “the central themes of securitization and
desecuritization are state-centric, discourse-dominated, and conservative.”
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The

constructivist lens upon which the Copenhagen school relies does not adequately
interrogate how we might unmake ideas and practices of security, and take stock of ones
that create space for radically democratic and emancipatory approaches. In its desire to
remain simply an analytical tool, deprived of any political motives, the Copenhagen
school subordinates ethical/moral consequences in lieu of providing coherence to the
processes of speech acts and the series of extraordinary practices that accompany them.
310

Desecuritization, at least as envisioned by Wæver,

signals an attachment to a view of

security as resistance to a threatening other, which is reliant upon the same Schmittian
configuration of security as its securitization opposite and remains prevalent in traditional
security discourses. And as the CASE Collective has pointed out, the fact that
desecuritization seeks to retrieve the “normality of politics” implies quite enormous
assumptions about what can be thought of as the objective socio-political (presumably
liberal-democracy) order within which an issue should reside.
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By seeking a return to
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“normal politics,” the Copenhagen school retreats from actively interrogating the shifting
and context-driven spheres of exception and rule. Thus, despite being considered
revolutionary in its articulation of a constructivist logic of security threats – whereby
security is what we make of it – the Copenhagen school still relies upon a fixed,
traditional understanding of security. This (in part) fails to adequately match the
complexity of the social dynamics of security.
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else.”

313

These actors carry with them specific beliefs about the nature of security, ones

that delineate ethical boundaries of obligation and consideration. But these approaches
that tout a necessary opposition to a threatening other are not inevitable, as later chapters
will reveal.

4.6
Schmitt, Security, and the Exception in the
Anthropocene
Where the Copenhagen School falls noticeably flat is in its failure to deeply probe the
underlying construction of security itself. This obscures the inherent power dynamics that
comprise the political choices made in deeming an issue appropriate for securitization or
desecuritization. Beyond simply a novel way of theorizing the importance of how the
discourse of security matters, it involves a political reading of security itself. These
political choices according to the Copenhagen School revolve around a specific
314

understanding of security, itself representative of a specific understanding of identity.

The German political philosopher and jurist Carl Schmitt is instrumental to the political
readings of politics and security put forth by the Copenhagen School. Michael C.
Williams has addressed the Schmittian connection, describing the form of security put
forth by the Copenhagen School as one dependent upon politics of exclusion and
emergency. He writes that, “the identification of ‘security’ with a logic of existential
threat and extreme necessity” mirrors “the intense condition of existential division, of
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friendship and enmity, that constitutes Schmitt’s concept of the political.

315

According to

Schmitt’s philosophy of political realism, government action is grounded upon the
constitution of the political through the passage to the limit. In other words, governments
can derive order and authority through the specific techniques of securitization whereby
the fear of violent death and destruction become paramount. This reading of security has
dramatic implications. It identifies the distinction between friend and enemy, inside and
outside, as the fundamental principle that allows political authority to integrate otherwise
316

free individuals into a political community.

The repercussions of this matter

significantly because it attaches security practices to a rigid dichotomy of identity. This is
useful for Buzan, Wæver, and others subscribing to the Copenhagen School, because it
coincides with their desire to incorporate identity into security analyses – one of the more
important post-Cold War developments in security studies.

But this dichotomy is

problematic. The political identification used in securitization maintains a clear and
distinct dialectic between inside and outside, between friend and enemy. As Huysmans
writes,
Securitization here sets a dialectic of self and other at work, in which the other
transforms into an enemy defining the self and grounding the dialectic in
expectations of violence. In other words, the community of friends comes into
existence precisely as a reaction to the representation of an enemy. This
rationality of government subjugates the dynamics of association and
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disassociation among friends to the manufacturing and mediation of relations of
317

enmity and distrust.

For Schmitt, the “political” is “the most intense and extreme antagonism, and every
concrete antagonism becomes much more political the closer it approaches the most
extreme point, that of the friend-enemy grouping.”
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In essence, individuals only become

politicized once they are positioned within a friend-enemy dichotomy, with the survival
of the newly identified group at stake. The fundamental division provides the
Copenhagen School with the basis for viewing securitization as the decision to mobilize
political groupings over an issue with enough passion and intensity to act in exceptional,
often violent ways. The generally negative view of security that Schmitt held is clearly
visible in the Copenhagen School’s calls for desecuritization. They believe that security
is a dangerous concept, to be invoked only with care and restraint. In effect they are
arguing for a stable, tolerant, and negotiated settlement on issues, rather than emergency
measures that curtail individual political liberties. This is a particularly salient issue with
regards to the water sector because, as Buzan and Wæver are careful to point out,
securitizing the environment can have problematic side effects.
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But, as this dissertation shows, there is nothing inevitable about this particular reading of
security and human political identity. Examples of alternative conceptions of identity and
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security that emphasize inclusive, cooperative, and non-threatening relationships with
others abound. Emancipatory water security is committed to certain aspects of
desecuritization – negotiation, deliberation, communication, and an avoidance of threats
and violence. Beyond that, the two approaches remain largely disconnected, because
emancipation offers a more humble and critical approach to security that encourages the
continual pursuit of a positive form of security, rather than fight for its avoidance, as
desecuritization advocates. This will be further explicated in later discussions on the
embedded potential within water security to offer the hope of resistance to, and
emancipation from, limited understandings of security and identity traditionally seen as
narrow, fixed, timeless and apolitical. Though the Copenhagen School is able to offer
analytical guidance to the process of the designation as a security issue, it fails to
excavate the deeply-held attachment to an objective understanding of the concept of
security. Given its analytical focus and the lack of a critical investigation into the concept
of security, the Copenhagen School has been criticized for being distinctly divided from
emancipatory security, if not wholly incommensurable.
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The connections between water and conflict have been made so consistently, forcefully,
and authoritatively that an ongoing process of securitization is readily apparent. There is
no clearer example than in the Nile Basin. And as the resilience of the water wars thesis
in the region indicates, the prospects for desecuritization appear dim; water has
consistently been tied to a vision of security as exception. But if we are to take the
insights of earth system scientists seriously, then we need to better attach to security
theories and practices the idea we are living in an age of constant flux. It is incoherent to
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speak of our age absent exception. The scale of earthly human impacts is only now being
appreciably understood, and it is becoming clear that the effects are profound, pervasive,
and accelerating further change. The Nobel Prize winner Paul Crutzen and his colleague
Eugene Stoermer formally introduced the term “Anthropocene” in 2000, to describe the
growing impact of human activities on earth and atmosphere, at all scales, including the
global scale. They wrote, “it seems to us more than appropriate to emphasize the central
role of mankind in geology and ecology by proposing to use the term ‘Anthropocene’ for
the current geological epoch.
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The ramifications of this declaration are immense and are

only now being appreciably introduced into security studies. Simon Dalby is one security
theorist who has begun to think of what it means to think of security in the Anthropocene.
He writes,
The Anthropocene formulation makes it clear that humanity is now a major force
shaping the biosphere. It challenges the Malthusian formulation because it shows
the connections that cross boundaries while also showing that many of the poor
and marginal are made so by the environmental processes of the global economy.
Consequently

security

and

modern

identity

must

be

fundamentally

rethought…Putting people rather than states at the heart of the analysis is a
HUGE task, but one that is necessary to challenge attempts on the part of the
prosperous to maintain their privileges in the face of the needs of the poor.
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Dalby retains some faith in the securitization framework; in fact, he speculates that we
might be reaching the point where the environment should be securitized (in the short
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run), if only to set societies on a more sustainable path. In the Anthropocene, the
exception no longer holds. The binary logic that reduces water resources to
“threat/defence” or “secure/insecure” significantly obscures alternative articulations of
security, limiting the emancipatory potentials embedded within the complex social
relations that surround the issue of water scarcity.
It should be acknowledged that to focus on the content of security is helpful in many
respects. It allows issues that often exist outside the scope of traditional security analyses
to be brought under scrutiny. This can have tangible benefits in raising public awareness
into the myriad experiences of security, beyond simply traditional threats of armed
conflict. However, for all the benefits to be derived from securitization/desecuritization –
presenting limits to the “excessive widening” of security, the successful fusion of
neorealist and poststructuralist approaches to security, and its clear research program –
there are numerous and important limitations that limit its usefulness in developing an
emancipatory security of water. Using securitization to broaden our understandings of
security is to privilege the characterizations of people and environmental degradation (to
highlight only two examples) as threatening to traditional life. This does not get us closer
to solving the dilemmas of our common age, only reinforcing a status quo vision that
lacks a clear application for the most vulnerable of our common human society.
The process of securitization, and our understanding of it relies upon a static, unchanging
view of security – one that at its heart “finds something to do with defence and the
state.”
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Because the securitization thesis consistently focuses on the designation of

Wæver. “Securitization and Desecuritization,” 47.
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threat, there is a tendency to avoid examining the construction of security itself, and
therefore privileging the content of security, over its very meaning.

324

The securitization thesis tells us that the owners, or the agents, of “security” are almost
solely political leaders who speak fearfully of security to their domestic audience. To
raise an issue up to a level of existential importance requires a degree of mobilization
only held by those with significant authority and power. Situating acts of securitization in
the hands of leaders, bureaucracies, lobby groups, and pressure groups, can only help but
maintain a view of security that privileges notions of statism, survival, threats, and
defence as its guiding ontology. It leaves the audience passive in the construction of
security – active only in its acceptance (or rejection) of a threat, but not of security itself.
Furthermore, given the incredible discursive power available to those in positions of
authority, they often resort to utilizing language that place people (e.g. upstream waterseekers), organizations (e.g. stakeholders), or things (e.g. environment degradation) as
“threats” to be dealt with using existing security practices. Thus, rather than focusing on
those people who suffer the harshest consequences of securitizing moves (in this context
access to adequate water supplies), it is individuals or groups who are often reduced to
being designated as the threat itself.
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4.7

Conclusion

This chapter focused on the Copenhagen School approaches to security and their
relationship to water security. It described the ongoing process of securitization in the
MENA region, specifically in the volatile Nile Basin. Finally, it argued that these new
theoretical approaches have been important in showing how the concept of security can
be broadened in scope yet remains silent on the ethical-normative dimensions of the
construction of security as a concept. This has significant implications, because as the
CASE Collective reminds us, “How security is defined conditions what is considered as
insecurity (risk, threat).”

325

The securitization framework developed by Buzan and Wæver is useful for illuminating
the expressions of - and responses to - many varied issues, including water. It met one of
the key criticisms of post-Cold War security scholars by limiting the excessive widening
of security. And by its description of the intersubjective nature of the concept of security
it was able to introduce important theoretical tools to illuminate incidences of
securitization and desecuritization. Ultimately though, the Copenhagen School’s
understanding of security is based upon a particular tradition of international relations
and security that does not escape the logic of exclusion and an attachment to defining
security as “panic politics.”

326

It thus anchors itself to a particular interpretation of the

meaning of security, seemingly to avoid rendering the security concept incoherent. As Jef
Huysmans has written, “the rhetorical structure upon which the intelligibility of security
depends is the fixed point – the threats, the units, the agents fluctuate but the signification
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of security remains.”
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For the Copenhagen school, to speak security is to make security.

This approach fails to push deeper and excavate the security logic that is embedded in the
rhetorical structure – how and why the speaker and audience understand a language as
security language. The underlying logic of security is not an object of research for the
Copenhagen school.
This has particular consequences for responses to ongoing water insecurity in the
Anthropocene. It means the continuation of business-as-usual, offering little hope to
break out of contemporary traps of vulnerability. Acknowledging the power of the water
wars discourse, as the Copenhagen school does quite expertly, is only one aspect of the
overall picture; acknowledgment only gets us so far. To deny its ethical-normative
implications is to again cede the ontological vision of security as survival and exclusion.
To do so, “retrieves the ordering force of the fear of violent death by a mythical replay of
the variations of the Hobbesian state of nature.”
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A response to this, offered in the

following chapters, is to re-orient the conception of water security towards one that is
under continued dialogical critique, with an emphasis towards emancipatory goals. This
means that water security might be seen in conceptual and practical terms as something
shifting, context-dependent, and capable of producing emancipatory outcomes for those
most vulnerable to the vagaries of the international system of states. In contrast to
totalizing statist discourses, to provide a critical rendering of water security would be to,
as James Der Derian writes, “…reinterpret – and possibly reconstruct through the
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reinterpretation – a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centres, multiple
329

meanings, and fluid identities.”

Upcoming chapters attempt to build a critical-water security approach that can offer
continued, varied guidance toward a deeper understanding of the nature of the problem of
water insecurity. Such an approach may also help move toward the greater emancipation
of individuals and communities through a progressive security rather than avoiding it (as
the Copenhagen school would have us do through desecuritization) and relying upon its
strict definition as survival. The principal concern must be to examine who security is for,
and what does it do?
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5

CHAPTER FIVE: Toward an Emancipatory Security of
Water: Inclusion, Communication, and Cosmopolitanism

5.1

Introduction

As the last chapter showed, an ongoing process of water securitization is occurring in
many places around the world. There is a dominant view of water as a dwindling natural
resource that has the potential to act as a threat multiplier in the Anthropocene, an age of
constant climate insecurity and domestic upheaval in warming world. This view admits
that while it is difficult (perhaps impossible) to find a major conflict precipitated over
water resources, water is often an important variable in conflict and is emblematic of the
increasing importance of environmental factors going forward in the twenty-first century.
Against this background, the next two chapters sharply shift the trajectory of water
security towards a critical engagement with its emancipatory characteristics. It explores
the idea that water can act as a progressive site for the articulation of emancipatory
policies based upon cosmopolitan ethics. While a great number of analyses and policies
on water security utilize insights from traditional international security (either explicitly
or implicitly), none have yet actively demonstrated how the twin concepts of
emancipation and cosmopolitanism are immanent in global relations over water
resources. The succeeding chapter - chapter six - will more fully elucidate the
emancipatory interest in water security through a focus on the cosmopolitan ethics of
hydrosolidarity present in contemporary water practices. The current chapter seeks to
theoretically bind emancipation with water security. It does so by first providing the
conceptual foundations for re-orienting security along a critical theory axis. It then
examines emancipation as the unifying intent upon which all critical theories rely. There
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exist many variations of critical theory that illustrate significant differences among
authors. The commitment to emancipation is the single unifying factor between them.
While the first generation of Frankfurt School theorists grew increasingly pessimistic
about the possibilities for emancipatory social change, they also knew that enlightenment
contains within it the perpetual possibility of change. The analysis here draws from this
insight to pursue a vision of water security that does not seek to escape the concept of
security altogether, but to critique it, so as to reveal the progressive spirit of emancipation
immanent within discourse and practice. The chapter concludes by describing the varied
set of understandings employed by different actors in the construction of security over
water. This will act as a precursor to a longer discussion in the next chapter on the
relationships individuals and communities have over shared water - relationships which
empower security visions absent of the prevailing logic of exclusion and enmity.
The benefits of linking the concept of emancipation with water have already been
mentioned in earlier chapters. However, a more explicit attempt will be made here to
point to the important junctures where relationships over water display emancipatory
alternatives to traditional discourses of security. There are significant implications that
arise from this. By identifying the junctures where water coalesces with marginalized
individuals and communities to help articulate different interpretations of security, it
becomes possible to decentre the analytical and prescriptive situation of the state, thereby
suspending assumptions about traditional hierarchies of values and issues in international
security.
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This, it is argued, has both analytical and normative value. In terms of
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analytical benefit, the critical approach elaborates a wide range of relationships that
individuals and communities exhibit over shared waterways. This creates better analyses
of “water security” by making it clear that traditional approaches - with their focus on
state and system level interactions – are not sufficient for explaining the existing and
potential effects of freshwater scarcity on individuals and communities. Political
responses and approaches to the issue of water scarcity would indeed be well served to
take heed of the elaboration of critical water security found in this chapter. Given that
many new and innovative approaches to water management depend upon holistic values
and rely upon interdependent, cross-sectoral cooperation (Integrated Water Resources
Management – IWRM - being only one, albeit controversial example), the non-statist and
cosmopolitan ethics at the heart of critical security analyses seem exceedingly prescient
and appropriate for study.
As myriads of studies show, the global environmental situation in the early twenty-first
331

century displays crises on a scale not yet experienced in human history.

The

interrelated nature of the epochal, structural, and decisional crises, require new and
radical responses that push development of a world security. It is in such political
arrangements, underscored by ethical attachments, that we are best able to achieve
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‘security’ without depriving others of it.

A water security developed to meet both

human and environmental needs, through a form of cosmopolitan ethics, is one
component of a global response to shared threats and vulnerabilities. It adds to a growing
literature that seeks to identify alternatives to security characterized as statist, militaristic,
and exclusionary, and to shift dominant discourses and practices of security in
emancipatory directions. This chapter and the one that follows it contribute to these dual
aims by demonstrating that progressive change in water management policy must
consistently rely upon the opening up of dialogic space to include multiple actors
engaging and contesting the dominant values that privilege business-as-usual. It is
through this diffusion of power to marginalized individuals, so often left out of
discussions of security, that it becomes possible to remove the arbitrary, oppressive,
structural constraints that limit human potential and contribute to the processes of
environmental degradation.
The next section develops a three-pronged approach to emancipatory water security.
Inclusion, communication, and cosmopolitanism are isolated as the primary building
blocks for emancipatory water security. These three characteristics coalesce in various
forms in historical and contemporary water relations and show that water security can be
a positive force. Chapter six shows how hydrosolidarity has emerged in a variety of ways
to offset neo-Malthusian concerns about water scarcity and violence. But to understand
how and why these three characteristics produce emancipatory water security, it is
necessary to spend more time dissecting their constituent parts. Taken together, chapters
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five and six outline a framework for understanding how water can provide a unique and
compelling avenue for the emergence of progressive security discourses and practices.

5.2

Three Components of Emancipatory Water Security

Claiming emancipation as the core aim of water security is a difficult and confusing task,
but it is also one that can provide us with a more robust understanding of the politics of
security. Clearly, as has been carefully demonstrated, to view emancipation as a utopian
panacea for the ill effects related to environmental scarcity and security misses the point.
The reliance on emancipation here is meant to present a vision of transformative action
without necessarily producing a detailed moral/legal framework, which often overlooks
the constant flow and change of individual and group identities and the resulting social
norms. To present such a framework also runs the risk of imparting an external, idealized
333

vision of the world divorced from contemporary political and social contexts.

An

emancipatory security of water therefore cannot present a schematic design for better
water institutions or negotiations. What it can do is produce an understanding of the
possibilities for progressive change, a vision of normatively better linkages between
environmental scarcity and security that are inclusive, communicative, and cosmopolitan.
In this sense it does marry theory with action.
Matt McDonald has previously outlined the characteristics of generalized emancipatory
security as: concerned with overturning structures of oppression or exclusion; radically
cosmopolitan; predicated on the rights and needs of the most vulnerable; and ensuring
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that the means envisaged to achieve or preserve ‘security’ will not deprive others of it.
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McDonald’s characteristics are all compatible with the vision outlined here. But what
specifically does an emancipatory security of water look like? The rest of this chapter
will answer this question. There are unique qualities to water security that precipitate a
more refined vision of the ways in which emancipation can overcome the deficiencies of
other traditional and critical approaches. In essence, an emancipatory water security
consists of three interrelated central components: 1) It is inclusive. Traditional political
analyses and approaches to water security often view it as a site of timeless, conflictual,
and necessarily exclusionary relations, where individuals, groups, and most importantly,
states, battle over control of the dwindling resource. Such attitudes were clarified in
chapter three. Inclusion is meant to promote a model whereby excluded groups, such as
women, subordinated classes, racial, national, and ethnic minorities are incorporated into
discussions and decisions about water security. Of course a focus on inclusion does not
deny the existence of difference; rather it embraces it. The recognition of difference is
central to a permanent openness to dialogue, which connects us to the second component
of emancipatory water security.
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2) It is communicative. Drawing heavily from the

insights of Andrew Linklater, himself an intellectual devotee of Habermas, an
emancipatory water security relies upon a discourse theory of morality, whereby
individuals are granted the right to participate in decisions that may affect them
adversely. The basis for this morality comes from an understanding of the individual
subject as a social being who “gains self-understanding simultaneously with the

334
335

Mcdonald. Security, The Environment and Emancipation. 115

Andrew Linklater. “Dialogic Politics and the Civilizing Process.” Review of International Studies. 31.1
(2005): 144.

149

understanding of others through communicative practice.”
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A permanent openness to

dialogue is necessary for the equitable management of shared water resources, especially
as new and unexpected changes occur to available water sources (most notably from
climate change) and the political structures which currently manage them. By eliminating
the structural constraints that inhibit active participation in decision-making procedures,
progress is made towards the critical pursuit of the constant enlargement of freedom.
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3)

It is cosmopolitan. The necessary corollary to the first two components of emancipatory
water security is the expansion of the moral community of stakeholders. A view is taken
towards a post-sovereign understanding of political identity, whereby individual
allegiances and understandings are not reducible to a homogenous localism, but exhibit
cultural pluralism and heterogeneity. The focus on cosmopolitanism here as “interactive
universalism” entails a reconfiguration of political and ethical boundaries away from
established borders towards a more globally-oriented space where no clear lines can be
drawn between inside and outside, domestic and foreign. There is a universal recognition
of individuals to be consulted in the decisions which affect them. This allows for greater
inclusion and dialogue among human beings to express shared water concerns and
vulnerabilities. The normative requirement here is an epistemological shift towards an
understanding of shared reality, whereby individuals treat one another as equals, rather
than as competitors or threats. This undercuts the traditional focus on national selfinterest as the ordering dimension of environmental security.
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It is necessary to expand upon each characteristic to advance the argument that
emancipation best positions individuals to recover their voices as important stakeholders
in water security and creates the conditions for more harmonious and ethical relations
over water.

5.3

Inclusion

The issue of inclusion is a crucial component of any critical security, and it
remains essential to an emancipatory water security. It is the building block for a process338

based approach to water security that is communicative and cosmopolitan.

Inclusion

allows for a radical opening of the normative space of security by blurring the
distinctions between insider and outside, citizen and non-citizen, self and other. To reach
this opening critical water security must approach inclusion by way of a constitutiverelational theory of identity. Such a theory upsets the essentialized notions of identity that
lead to a dualistic logic of self/other, which confirms and replicates difference rather than
acceptance and understanding. A constitutive-relational theory of identity views self and
group identities as constituted by the multiple and overlapping social relations that make
up their experiences. Identity is relational rather than essential. By removing the false
dichotomies from identity we can move to an understanding of inclusion that promotes a
politics of recognition whereby all parties affected by water scarcity are provided with
339

fairness and political opportunity.

From this notion of inclusion stem the remaining
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components of emancipatory security – communication based on dialogical rationality
and cosmopolitanism. While the problems inherent in the self/other dichotomy have
already been discussed in earlier sections of this dissertation, we can see here how
impactful its collapse can be. In security terms it upsets prevailing security ethics that
rely upon exclusion and enmity, upon which the Westphalian system of states relies.
Acts of inclusion work in two central ways in the context of security. First, at the
individual level, they break down essentialized views of identity, so often the cause of
entrenched, intractable, and antagonistic differences. Secondly, at an international level
they blur the borders of inside/outside, that fundamental characteristic of the Westphalian
view. Together, both ways work to ensure inclusion is a concept necessary to overcome
the essential “otherness” emblematic of conventional approaches to water security. An
emancipatory water security relies upon a constitutive-relational theory of identity. It
highlights the constitutive nature of identities such as the self and the other. This can be
used to challenge the disciplining narrative of separation that comprises so many security
relations. The result is that individuals can and do see their own self-fulfillment in the
inclusion of others’ wants and desires. As critical philosopher Jacques Rancière reminds
us, the concept of emancipation does not mean a radical secession of marginalized groups
to form a counter-hegemonic bloc, but rather the recognition of marginalized groups as
members of a common world. He writes, “Self-emancipation is not secession, but selfaffirmation as a joint-sharer in a common world, with the assumption, appearances to the

1994): 25-75. Nancy Fraser, and Axel Honneth. Redistribution or Recognition: A political-philosophical
exchange. (London: Verso, 2003).
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contrary notwithstanding, that one can play the same game as the adversary.”

340

The

implication here is that individuals can pursue their full possibilities - can pursue
emancipation - by including others, even their adversaries.
The notion of inclusion here derives from a constitutive-relational theory of identity. In
this reading, identity is not so much the result of shared biological attributes from birth
and shared social understandings but is derived from experience. In other words, identity
is not something fixed by Mother Nature or a god, but is constituted by relationships with
others. According to Charles Taylor, identity is partly shaped by recognition, its absence,
or by the misrecognition, of others.
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The character and constitution of identity is

determined by the interactions between individuals and groups, the “stylized repetition of
342

acts,” as Judith Butler terms it.

Such a theory dismantles the separation between self
343

and other, seeing identities as socially situated and relationally constituted.

In their

interactions the self and other work to constitute each other’s reality, and thus determine
its ontological status. This contrasts the essentialized notion of identity, which holds that
344

individuals and groups demonstrate a unity of attributes.

The idea of an essentialized

identity is easily dismissed by the reality that all social groups include persons who defy
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or reject many of the attributes deemed essential for membership within a group. As Iris
Marion Young reminds us, “the attempt to define a common group identity tends to
normalize the experience and perspective of some of the group members while
marginalizing or silencing that of others.”
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In such a view there is a fundamental

acknowledgment of social difference even within defined groups, which, though it can
lead to more complexity and difficulty in reaching decisions, produces more equitable
political processes.
Acknowledging social differences creates an enlarged view of democratic discussion and
decision-making. The social differences pointed to here rely upon a conception of
identity that is constructed not on the basis of a substantial logic but through a relational
understanding with other individuals. This view rejects the idea of difference as a
manifestation of self-regarded interest. It entails a commitment to including voices in
security discourse from a wide range of actors to encourage a better understanding of the
multiple effects water scarcity has on communities and individuals. Including varied
perspectives on water from diverse social segments creates security dialogues that see
differences as socially situated and relationally constituted. This understanding can lead
to normatively and consequentially better policies of water governance so necessary for
emancipation and human possibility. The point is not necessarily to pursue formal
equality for members of a group or society in decision-making. Rather, inclusive
democracy means “explicitly acknowledging social differentiations and divisions and
encouraging differently situated groups to give voice to their needs, interests, and
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perspectives on the society in ways that meet conditionals of reasonableness and
346

publicity.”

Understanding the constitutive-relational aspects of identity can exert significant impacts
on the representations of inclusion and exclusion that lie at the heart of international
relations. On an international level, acts of inclusion uproot the traditional inside/outside
dichotomy cemented by the Westphalian system of states. The post-structuralist David
Campbell, in his pioneering study of U.S. foreign policy, Writing Security, has most ably
described the production and effects of security exclusions. In his book, Campbell
examines the dangerous political consequences of relying on difference as a basis for
exclusion. He writes that “the constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription
of boundaries that serve to demarcate an ‘inside’ from an ‘outside,’ a ‘self’ from an
‘other,’ a ‘domestic’ from a ‘foreign.’

347

The constitutive-relational components that

upset the notion of an essential and stable identity can carry over to categories such as
“nation” or “state.” If identity no longer remains a fixed concept then this opens the door
for the destabilization of the inside/outside boundaries that present untenable markers of
exclusion in international security. Indeed it opens the door for emancipatory practices of
inclusion. Such practices generally improve the quality of life and security of oncemarginalized individuals, specifically with regard to water access. This is not to deny the
very real power that “imagined communities” hold on people. But when it comes to
water, the idea is that the best way to secure it is to begin thinking and acting in ways that
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propel a more ethically just community of communities, rather than exclusionary, binary
terms like insider/outsider, friend/enemy, etc.
A focus on identity can be used to open up the number of voices seen as legitimate actors
in water security. By expanding the range of voices traditionally left outside of security
discourse, differences and similarities in language, everyday practices, and social,
political, and spiritual understanding can be observed and granted recognition. In this
regard water politics become a space for critical interaction between individuals, with
states no longer representing the necessary ethical arbiters of resource allocation. With
the erosion of essentialized identities, the state no longer maintains its position as the
only just guarantor of security. This does not result necessarily in the disintegration of
statist water politics, but it does open up new conditions of possibility, whereby water
security becomes characterized by the dialogical pursuit of emancipation. In fact, the
state itself can maintain a dominant position in negotiating allocation and distribution yet
still contend with a multiplicity of other actors pursuing alternative forms of security. An
emancipatory water security sees discussions over water as enlivened sites of democratic
practice when the focus shifts from a raw pursuit of state interest to the expansion of
jurisdictions for participation by oppressed and marginalized individuals. It engenders a
sense of recognition in the emancipatory vision.
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The inclusion of marginalized voices

of individuals is one of the paramount drivers of an ethical and acceptable negotiation of
shared water resources. All this is in conjunction with the central argument of enlivening
sites of water security with open possibilities of communication, towards a future where
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individuals are freed from arbitrary and oppressive forms of structural and physical
violence.
The pivotal question may be asked to what extent the inclusion of marginalized
individuals into security discussions opens up space for normatively progressive
approaches to managing water resources? In principle, pursuing inclusion is a necessary
first step that allows, “differently situated individuals” to understand,
They are nevertheless related in a world of interaction and internal effects that
affects them all, but differently. If they aim to solve their collective problems,
they must listen across their differences to understand how proposals and policies
affect others differently situated. They learn what takes place in different social
situations and how social processes appear to connect and conflict from different
points of view…Such an enlarged view better enables them to arrive at wise and
just solutions to collective problems to the extent they are committed to doing
349

so.

Developing out of a consciousness that accepts deep fissures in representation, the
emancipatory vision expressed here seeks to promote actions of water negotiation that
take seriously the wishes and concerns of marginalized populations. It is premised on an
observation that water scarcity and exposure to environmental harm are accessible points
of solidarity between differently situated individuals. Such an observation must then
translate into clear commitments to the pursuit of inclusion, premised upon a constitutiverelational understanding of identity. However, inclusion itself will not ensure
emancipatory visions of water security. Inclusion, in a critical theoretical understanding,
must reflect a commitment to communication, which, if it is to be conceptually coherent,

349

Young, 118.

157

is derived from a cosmopolitan ethical viewpoint. The institutional implications of all this
are difficult to assuage, but there are indications that some movement towards
institutionalized “hydrosolidarity” is achievable. The next chapter will formally discuss
this potential. The remaining sections of this chapter will clarify the remaining two
components of an emancipatory water security.

5.4

Communication (Dialogical Rationality)

The jump from inclusion to communication is not very great. Working to include all
voices within a discussion over shared water entails a commitment to dialogue that can
promote the greatest possible freedom for individuals. Such a commitment draws from a
deeper epistemological understanding that the mind plays a central role in the
construction of reality.
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A communicative rationality stands in opposition to the reliance

on scientific techniques or objective analyses of fact to discover the laws of society and
nature. Instead, what is sought through immanent critique is the space to collapse the
objective self/other distinction and reveal how the contemporary “realities” of
international security are mutable and subject to emancipatory change. It was Hegel, and
later Marx, who fervently argued that the lines of progress are not drawn by autonomous
accumulation of scientific knowledge, but reflect specific human interests and dominant
351

power relations.

In light of this, it is necessary to put forth ideas of communicative
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rationality and discourse ethics that produce an enlarged mentality that can be a model for
interaction with the other, a dialogue that is open to all and governed by principles of
equality. Such thinking allows for reflexive actors to engage with a multiplicity of
viewpoints, a variety of perspectives, and to acknowledge all the layers of meaning which
constitute a situation.
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In this view, emancipation remains the goal, but process becomes

the key. Processes that emphasize communication, dialogue, and conversation can
produce the moral framework for the third pillar of emancipatory water security –
cosmopolitanism – because they depend upon a universal principle of reciprocal
recognition.
Communication, with an emphasis on dialogue, must be used to overcome disputes and
lessen the potential for conflict over shared water. In this regard it is of equal importance
as the notions of inclusion and cosmopolitanism for an emancipatory water security. The
concept of communication used here is derivative of two central, interrelated ideas of
German philosopher Jürgen Habermas: his theory of communicative action, and his
moral theory, referred to as “discourse ethics.”

353

The two ideas combine to reinforce

emancipatory water security because they point to the necessity of communication and
dialogue and the right of all individuals to be understood. At the heart of this critique is
the understanding that identities and the views of reason that sustain them, are
intersubjective and subject to change.
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5.4.1

Strategic vs. Communicative Action:

Deciphering how exactly it is possible to construct non-coercive means of interaction
between water stakeholders requires a turn to Habermas. The eminent German
philosopher has spent a long lifetime developing a framework whereby actors are able to
engage in radically democratic communication, free of domination and force. Such an
ideal-type of interaction is crucial for the emancipatory interest forwarded here.
Interactions between individuals and groups are, according to Habermas, derived from
two central logics: A strategic logic and a communicative logic. The logic of social action
sought in emancipatory security is one based on communication, which differs in
important ways from strategic, rational-choice based logics that are beholden to
354

“consequentialism.”

These rational-choice approaches tend to view the interests and

preferences of actors as fixed during the communicative process, and base their decisions
for communication on the likely consequences to arise. In contrast, the logic of
communicative action emphasizes how actors reason through a collective communicative
process. In a strategic approach, the interests and preferences of actors are largely derived
from their given identities. Communicative approaches highlight how these interests and
preferences are intersubjectively created and thus open to dialogue and discursive
challenges. In other words, if reason itself is intersubjectively created, as is argued, then
the notion of community is also intersubjective. Actors relying on a communicative
rationality are not seeking to satisfy their fixed preferences and interests. They are

354

Thomas Risse, “”Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics” International Organization
54.1 (2000): 3.

160

challenging and justifying “the validity claims inherent in them.” As befits Habermas’
focus on reason, participants in a dialogue should be able to give a valid reason for their
beliefs. If they cannot, they should be capable of taking points of disagreement into
consideration and moving forward in the course of future interaction towards consensus
and understanding.

355

As the Habermasian IR scholar Thomas Risse explains, it becomes

possible for participants engaged in communicative action to “change their views of the
world or even their interests in light of the better argument.”

356

This is a significant

departure from rational-choice approaches because it emphasizes argumentation,
deliberation, and reason, rather than strategic emphases on compellance or deterrence.
While communicative action is as similarly goal-oriented as strategic action, the
attainment of a set of preferred interests is not the objective.
Such a viewpoint has significant implications that can open up space for persuasion and
consensus to be obtained through the use of the better argument. If reason, identity, and
community are intersubjectively created and sustained, then actors in communication can
be convinced that their positions and arguments are wrong, in the face of better, contrary
views. Because of the emphasis in communicative action on the tools of argumentation
and persuasion, the significant problems of legitimacy and capacity that continue to
plague water security perceptions and policies can be overcome. The tools provide the
moral and cognitive space for the inclusion of a diversity of viewpoints into discourses of
water security. Chapter six will show that in the field of water management, integrated

355

Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996): 18.
356

Risse, 7.

161

water resource management (IWRM), comes close to following the Habermasian
communicative rationality by bringing together the multiple actors in a hydrological unit
– such as a region, watershed, sub-watershed - to communicate and make decisions.

5.4.2

357

Communicative Rationality

Beginning in the 1970s, Habermas undertook a social and linguistic turn in critical theory
arguing that linguistic structures underpinned human actions and the desire for
understanding. Whereas the first generation of Frankfurt School scholars became entirely
circumspect of any emancipatory potential, Habermas took a more optimistic view that
human societies could faithfully pursue the emancipatory interest. According to first
generation critical theorists like Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, modernity, born
from the western Enlightenment, contained within it both the possibility for emancipation
and an instrumental rationality that would forever prevent it. The next generation of
Frankfurt school theorists, including Habermas, believed that this view lacks nuance and
empirical validity. For him, modernity contains within it the possibility for consensus,
itself a pre-requisite for what he believes is humanity’s emancipatory interest. In
particular, this is Habermas’ central deviation from earlier generations of critical theory.
He argues that language and communication have a liberating potential. In one of his
most notable passages Habermas writes, “What raises us out of nature is the only thing
we can know: language…Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of the
universal and unconstrained consensus.”
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Essentially, Habermas’ ideas on communicative rationality help show how modern actors
interact with the aim of mutual understanding. For him social interactions display the
universalizing norms of discourse, pointing to shared emancipatory interests. These
interests are expressed in the “ideal speech situation,” or “undistorted communication”
when individuals engage with one another absent exogenous factors in efforts to identify
the better argument. This type of communication comes by way of a vibrant dialogue
within an inclusive public sphere, ensuring that actors are able to satisfy their own needs
without inhibiting or damaging the abilities of other to do the same.
The most important point to emphasize is that the rational structure of communication is
principally focused on reaching common understanding - a “fusion of horizons
(Horizontverschmelzung)” – according to German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer.

359

This emphasizes an intersubjective relationship, where interests and identities are
formulated through interaction and dialogue. This directly opposes conventional security
approaches that assume an inevitable clash of interests between subjects - where both,
subjects and their interests are given.

360

The focus on communication and understanding

attempts to overcome the problems associated with asymmetries of power and authority
in a dyadic relationship of discourse by focusing on how in a process of emancipation
361

“there can be only participants.”

This also provides a way out from the pessimism of

the first generation of Frankfurt School critical theory, because it shows how

359

Hans-Georg Gadamer. Truth and Method. 2nd Rev Ed. Trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G.
Marshall. (London: Continuum, 2004).
360

Martin Weber, “The Critical social theory of the Frankfurt School and the ‘social turn’ in IR,” Review
of International Studies, 31.1 (2005): 197.
361

Habermas, Theory and Practice, trans. John Viertel, (Boston: Beacon, 1973): 40.

163

intersubjective relationships overcome instrumental tendencies of modernity, allowing
for a rational integration of speakers into communicative, and emancipatory relationships.
As Habermas himself explains, “Communication is not merely a matter of transmitting
information…but of establishing (or maintaining) a relationship with another person.”

362

This relationship helps determine the context in which information between subjects is
transferred and where particular meanings are created and understood.

363

Social

relationships are not predicated on a totalizing instrumentality, but upon a consensus
between all those involved in the communicative process to pursue the ultimate goal of
understanding. In such a way then, all knowledge is socialized. The ideal is a “social
intercourse free of coercion, in which the self-realization of one party does not have to be
bought with the mortification of the other.”

364

Acts of communication aim to produce understanding, which is a central component for
emancipation. Liberation will not come simply through the expansion of technological
rationality and the spread of productive forces; it emerges through a learning process
accumulated through communicative action. Habermas writes that “liberation from
hunger and misery does not necessarily converge with liberation from servitude and
degradation, for there is no automatic developmental relation between the two
dimensions…the self-formative process of spirit as well as our species essentially
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depends on that relation between labor and interaction.”

The central idea is that shared

understanding is the main desire of participants in a dialogue. Thus, whenever truth
claims are made, whether they are normative or empirical, the goal is mutual
understanding: “The goal of coming to an understanding is to bring about an agreement
that culminates in the intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal understanding, shared
knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one another.”

366

The larger critique evident here

relates to the failure of conventional social science (including international security
studies!) to fully acknowledge the learning potential that is culturally available.

367

To

summarize: communication and the inherent desire for understanding and consensus
through validity claims

368

demonstrates the emancipation potential immanent in

individual and social behavior.

5.4.3

Discourse Ethics

One of the principal tasks of an emancipatory security of water is to introduce moral
approaches to conventional forms of political action. Habermas’ ideas about
communicative action are a good start for understanding how there is an ever-present
unfulfilled potential for emancipation. The second component of communication that
must be discussed briefly is the idea of discourse ethics, which is pivotal in forming a
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coherent framework of emancipatory water security from the loose strands of a
communicative social theory.
It has been shown how communicative rationality - the desire for understanding and
consensus – is important for the emancipatory intent. Discourse ethics explains the
implications of communicative rationality. These implications are, generally speaking,
the creation of models of universal moral reasoning that promote equal conversation
between those who are affected by water security (that is to say everyone). The model
relied upon here is derivative of Seyla Benhabib’s model of moral reasoning through
conversation, “in which the capacity to reverse perspectives, that is, the willingness to
reason from the others’ point of view, and the sensitivity to hear their voice is
paramount.”

369

The goal of conversation in this regard is not consensus but the

“anticipated communication with others with whom I know I must finally come to some
agreement”

370

Such thinking requires a deep-rooted commitment to moral reasoning that

is both inclusive and universal.
The attention to morals is important because, as should be clear by now, none of
the pressing problems related to water management can be fully separated from deeper
moral questions. The deficiencies of contemporary water discourse, practices, and
institutions are moral dilemmas. While it is of course logical to argue for more efficient
technical arrangements and less bureaucratic institutional features that can alleviate water
stress/scarcity, it should be remembered that it is often the fundamental nature of
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technical arrangements and institutional features which are responsible for hindering the
realization of unconstrained communication, of emancipatory security. In this respect, an
emancipatory water security must focus on unsettling the preeminence of territoriallydefined national sovereignty as the organizing principle of water security towards a
broader consensus on sustainable water stewardship. The focus must be on identifying
the cleavages inherent within communicative relationships of water that can open space
for reaching an understanding on shared, intersubjectively-arrived at ideas of
emancipation. Such an endeavor can work by transforming attendant water security
concerns of individuals so that they also recognize the larger meaning; an attention to the
long-run, rather than short-term payoffs. Such thinking is beholden to an awareness of the
ontological underpinnings of human interaction. Habermas writes:
These problems can only be brought to a head by rethinking topics morally, by
universalizing interests in a more or less discursive form… It helps to perceive the
way one’s own interests are bound up with the interests of others. The moral or
ethical point of view makes us quicker to perceive the more far-reaching and
simultaneously less insistent and more fragile, ties that bind the fate of an
individual to that of every other, making even the most alien person a member of
one’s community.

371

The idea of discourse ethics sharpens the edge of emancipatory water security by
connecting communicative rationality with a universalizing ethical appeal. Discourse
ethics in this regard is helpful for delineating how conversations can create an “enlarged
thinking” that is necessary to overcome traditional impasses of divergent security
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interests. Such a conception is derived from Benhabib’s reformulation of what Habermas
termed the “ideal speech situation.” Benhabib does not disagree with Habermas on the
importance of ensuring that “the conflicting needs of all participants are given their due
and can be taken into consideration from the viewpoint of the participants themselves.”

372

However, she is careful to highlight how Habermas’ ideal speech situations do not only
recognize the rights of all beings capable of speech to participate in the moral
conversation. They also must stipulate how within such moral conversations each
participant is accorded the same symmetrical rights to various other speech acts, to
initiate new topics, to ask for reflection about the presuppositions of the conversation, etc.
373

She calls this the principle of egalitarian responsibility.

This implies that a normative

principle of universal moral respect ought be employed where individuals “treat each
other as concrete human beings whose capacity to express this standpoint we ought to
enhance by creating, whenever possible, social practices embodying the discursive
ideal.”

374

Benhabib augments Habermas’ discourse ethics by reconstructing it towards a
“historically self-conscious universalism” that is attendant to the social and individual
contexts which are in play during conversation. The main point of departure, and one that
is relevant to an emancipatory security of water, is that consensus itself does lead to truth
or even moral outcomes. What is important “is not that everybody could or would agree
to the same set of principles, but that these principles have been adopted as a result of a
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procedure…It is not the result of the process of moral judgment which plays a role in its
375

validity, and I would say, moral worth”

What is important is the process. And this

process must aim for reasonable understanding about deep moral principles via an openended conversation. This reworking of Habermas is useful for promoting a vision of
ethical relations that radically questions all procedures of justification including its own,
and thus, can create the conditions for a conversation that accepts differing points of
view. It is representative of the reflexive understanding of communicative rationality,
which, while certainly not politically “neutral,” encourages a plurality of life choices,
styles, and many different conceptions of the good.

376

The maintenance of the meta-

norms of universal respect and egalitarian reciprocity is the aim of a reflexive discourse,
one that fully acknowledges the “embedded, contingent, and finite aspects of human
beings.”

377

Such an approach is pivotal for maintaining open forms of dialogue, premised

upon recognition, inclusion, and universalism. This is the essence of the progressive
mentality that can lead to emancipatory water security.
If communicative rationality explains how understanding (through discourse) is
immanent in social relationships, then discourse ethics explains how such understanding
entails respect for one’s conversation partners. The argument of course still begs the
question as to who can be considered as a “conversation partner?” Certainly it is no
longer appropriate to limit the legitimacy of conversation to bounded communities of
states. With the growing acceptance of cosmopolitan norms as a consequence of the
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changes wrought by globalization, it becomes possible - perhaps likely - to envision the
spread of democratic agreements and laws over shared and unshared waters.

5.5

Cosmopolitanism

To satisfy the demands of the global problems of water security, to help satisfy the
emancipatory interest latent in every individual, a conception of cosmopolitan citizenship
must be employed. Otherwise one risks replicating the same harm that conventional
practices of global security have engendered to date. But on the other hand, by relying
upon a normative framework of cosmopolitanism, it becomes possible to tie concepts of
inclusion and communication together to form coherent schemata of emancipation and
water security. And as the debates on ethics in global politics continue to swirl, a critical
conception of cosmopolitanism can help tangibly alleviate suffering by facilitating the
emergence of decision-making processes over water that are inclusive and dialogical.
As the previous chapters demonstrate, it should come as no surprise that the blueprint for
a critical security of water focuses on the holistic, integrated nature of water vulnerability
on individuals and species around the world. In this regard, a cosmopolitanism ethical
framework helps highlight the universal dependencies of water by both the human and
non-human world.
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378

Of course this is not to say that vulnerabilities to water scarcity and

A caveat is in order here. The framework of emancipatory water security developed here does not wade
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quality are uniform; quite the opposite. Almost 66 percent of Africa is arid or semi-arid
and more than 300 of the 800 million people of Sub-Saharan Africa live in a water-scarce
environment, defined as having less than 3000 m³ per capita.

379

This is a stark contrast to

the experiences of water-rich areas, such as Canada, where total renewable water
resources are approximately 85,310 m³ per capita.

380

Cosmopolitanism is a contested term, with many variations. From a moral standpoint,
cosmopolitanism begins with the idea that individual loyalties be tied to a universal
human community, rather than strict allegiances only to local or national
identifications.

381

It both harkens back to ancient Greek philosophy and is representative

of modern phenomena of globalization. From a cosmopolitan outlook, boundaries,
including territorial state borders, require justification, which entails an endless and
382

critical moral conversation.

In terms of security thinking, cosmopolitanism holds that

peace is best achieved through the establishment of a transnational order built on shared
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moral, legal, and political understandings. It focuses on individuals as the primary unit of
moral concern, above states, and other political or ethnic communities. By virtue of their
humanity, individuals do share the same political community, in addition to all of the
other communities with which they may also identify.
When it comes to water, cosmopolitan ethics offers a conception of water security that
focuses on the interconnectedness of the problem and the fact that vulnerabilities and
opportunities are shared. It can do so while isolating shared universal interests such as the
sustainability of threatened water resources. The last section of this chapter will briefly
draw out the central characteristics of a critical cosmopolitanism that coincides with
inclusivity and communicative rationality.
There is no question that significant divergences exist across regions and peoples, over a
range of historical, political, and sociological factors. But while there exist multiple
affiliations individuals cling to, be they familial, religious, ethnic, or political, there are a
bundle of needs, desires, and anxieties that define us as common members of the human
species. When it comes to water, there are shared vulnerabilities and interests that present
a significant rejoinder to the idea of the other as a threatening menace intent on denying
the innate right of the self to pursue a secure existence. The self and the other have
already been seen as highly-problematic, constructed categories of identity.
Emancipatory processes of water security can draw upon the collapse of the self and the
other and tell different stories of the necessarily interconnected relations of water. Such
interconnections are manifested physically and normatively. Throughout the world there
are 263 international river basins shared by 145 countries, representing 45.3 percent of
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the Earth’s land surface.

383

Since 1820, more than 400 international water agreements

have been signed dealing with a range of issues related to water including its equitable
use as a limited and consumable resource.

384

It seems impossible to think of water in

splendid isolation, as something to be controlled independently of the needs and wishes
of other, cross-border riparian users. Yet, the state-centric, survivalist, ethics of
traditional security approaches consistently revert back to a myopic singularity that extols
the virtues of the bounded communities of nation-states. This type of thinking may well
be useful in organizing parsimonious accounts of the world, but it has little bearing on the
complex and urgent needs of the majority of people around the world. By viewing
security as the freeing of individuals from arbitrary constraints on their pursuit of a good
life, one seeks out the possibilities for the immanent possible transformations of
traditional ontologies of security. Central to these transformations is a re-orientation
towards a reflexive ethics that identifies the rights and aspirations of individuals rather
than relying solely on the idea of security as the pursuit of the national interest. In this
regard cosmopolitanism provides a necessary ethical approach, one that is already
embedded in current societal developments over water. As Chris Rumford writes,
Cosmopolitanism requires us to recognize that we are all positioned
simultaneously as outsiders and insiders, as individuals and group members, as
Self and Other, as local and global. Cosmopolitanism is about relativizing our
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place within the global frame, positioning ourselves in relation to multiple
communities, crossing and re-crossing territorial and community borders’.”

385

Unsurprisingly there are many variations of cosmopolitanism, each offering a unique
perspective on how to best consider the rights individuals share by virtue of being human.
The first usage of the term probably comes from ancient Greek and Roman philosophers.
The first utterance of a cosmopolitan viewpoint may have come from Diogenes the
Cynic, who, when asked where he came from, replied, “I am a citizen of the world
[kosmopolitês]”

386

Moving forward, many Enlightenment thinkers in the eighteenth

century referred to conditions and commitments of cosmopolitanism. Immanuel Kant is
perhaps best known for his articulation of the principle of “Cosmopolitan Right,” the
third article in his Definitive Articles outlined in Perpetual Peace. Others who thought of
cosmopolitan either as a normative ideal, or an empirical development through the
enlightenment and after include, Jeremy Bentham, Thomas Paine, John Stuart Mill and
Karl Marx. Clearly it is an old and well-worn path.
Contemporary forms of cosmopolitanism are diverse and can sometimes emphasize
competing visions of ethics and political projects. Despite the many different avenues to
take in getting to something called cosmopolitanism, all of them are derived from a
central concern with the avoidance of unnecessary suffering and projecting visions of
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institutions that allow for the realization of freedom.

Some, like Martha Nussbaum,

approach cosmopolitanism on moral grounds, refusing to place love of one’s country
above love of mankind. Others, such as Jeremy Waldron emphasize how national
communities, and communities based on ethnic primordialism fail to capture the
complexities of human allegiances.

388

Such allegiances may be difficult to pin down, but

by focusing on the spread of more mundane cosmopolitan norms already existing
throughout the world, on matters like currency, banking, aviation, and time zones, one
gets the sense that “as lives lived in the world, the interaction of people and peoples on
the face of the earth is not an anarchy.”
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Further still, one may divide contemporary
390

cosmopolitans along a variety of conceptual fault lines, including duty-based,
391

utilitarian-consequentialist,

rights-based,

392

and contractarian.
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emphasize different aspects of the cosmopolitan idea (moral, political, cultural), offering
unique justifications and conditions to build a more coherent cosmopolitan vision.
The vision of cosmopolitanism articulated here is one indebted to the spirit of critical
theory already so thoroughly discussed. It is one that seeks to accept cosmopolitanism as
a process, (instead of an end outcome or project) oriented towards the construction of
new ways of thinking and acting.

394

Such a vision can make room for different

approaches to water management while still acknowledging the deep unity of purpose
needed to ethically evaluate security practices. There are many authors who have already
undertaken to expand the ideas of cosmopolitanism by drawing from the insights of
critical theory.

395

David Held, though not a critical theorist, has provided a definition of

“layered cosmopolitanism” that is a useful as a starting point. He writes that
cosmopolitanism is,
An ethical approach to political life which champions self-determination and
freedom from domination and arbitrary power. Its principles and standards,
embedded in democratic public law, provide a framework for cultural diversity
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and individual difference to flourish in a public life marked by deliberation and
argument, bounded by legitimate rules and mechanisms of conflict resolution.

396

The central precepts of this definition are useful for an emancipatory security of water. It
must, at the outset recognize that: 1) all people are morally equal; 2) that arbitrary forms
of power/domination are to be avoided and; 3) the necessity of dialogue and inclusion
over matters of public importance. The remaining section will build upon these three
features of critical cosmopolitanism to build an applicable model suitable for better
informing international security discourse and practice over water.

5.5.1

All people are morally equal.
The topic of morality in global security is generally avoided. It is often seen as a

dangerous catalyst for projects of imperial intervention or for perpetuating a sense of
liberal exceptionalism that is blind to non-western forms of justice (e.g. the “White
Man’s Burden”). When morality is spoken of in security discourse, it is often in terms of
the “Just War” tradition, intent on finding moral justification for armed intervention and
conflict.
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A critical cosmopolitanism is able to bring in deeper questions about morality

into discussions of security by highlighting how ethical approaches must shift the unit of
concern from states or other particular forms of human association to individuals. This
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entails a commitment to equal moral concern for all human beings, by virtue of their
398

humanness, rather than some other abstract quality.

It provides the moral basis for

shifting the referent object of security away from states to individuals. Such a basis
entails a double move. On the one hand it deepens the object of security, down to the
individual level. On the other hand, by moving to the level of the individual, one must
also broaden the scope to include all humans.
From a water security perspective, enshrining the rights of every individual may entail
wading into the difficult and complex questions of whether water itself is a human right.
The human right to water was recently affirmed by the United Nations General
Assembly, which on 28 July, 2010, voted 122-0 (with 41 abstentions) in favour of
declaring “the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that
399

is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights.”

It seems intuitive to

declare that water is a human right; it is one of (along with air) the most essential
components to life itself. It would thus seem to fall directly under Article 3 of the UN
Declaration of Human Rights, which affirms, “Every person has the right to life, liberty,
and security of person.”
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The Human Rights Council of the UN adopted a resolution on

30 September 2010, affirming that water is a human right, derived from the right to an
adequate standard of living, already defined in numerous international human rights
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treaties.

401

On a national scale, many states are now revising their laws and constitutions

to explicitly include the right to water.
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Despite this progressive legal shift to declare the universal human right to water and
sanitation, the debate continues to rage whether it is appropriate in practical terms to
speak of water as a human right. Most of the arguments against declaring the human right
to water stem from a belief that it would distort the free markets’ abilities to accurately
price water; that full market valuation and “cost recovery” is the best method to conserve
and distribute water.
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For these proponents, water services and access are best improved

not through the discourse of rights, but through economic development. The argument in
favour of the human right to water claims water is much more than an economic good; it
is a public trust and part of the global commons. Beyond that, it holds significant spiritual
and cultural importance that cannot have an appropriate economic value attached to it. On
a practical level, there are deep concerns that pricing water will prevent the poorest
404

segments of the population from sufficient access.
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What the debate over the human right to water demonstrates is a competition over how to
adequately define basic rights and what are the proper underlying meanings and values
when it comes to water. Pradhan and Meinzen-Dick point out that,
The concept of water rights…does not refer to a single and unitary right but to
bundles of rights that vary across property regimes, legal orders, and cultures.
Moreover, the bundles of rights are not static, but complex, dynamic, flexible, and
subject to change because of ecological, livelihood, knowledge, and social and
political uncertainties.
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Pradhan and Menzie-Dick illustrate that the contestation over the right to water is multifaceted and complex. At the heart of the debate is not whether individuals should have
access to a sufficient amount of water for their general health and well being, regardless
of their ability to pay for it. This is a given that even the staunchest defender of the free
market would agree. It is a debate on whether or not the language of rights is the best
means by which this base amount is secured. In emancipatory terms, the debate is
obscurant because it overlooks the broadly held consensus that water is essential for all
humankind, let alone other life forms. A very wide range of international law and
government and community practices already explicitly and implicitly support the human
right to water for individual needs.
The human right to water is an integral aspect of an emancipatory security of water
because it focuses on the individual, as a distinct unit of concern, cutting into deeper and
more primordial categories of being than contingent political, ethnic, gender, economic,

405

Rajendra Pradhan, and Ruth Meinzen-Dick, “Which Rights Are Right? Water Rights, Culture and
Underlying Values,” Water Ethics: Foundational Readings for Students and Professionals. Eds. Peter G.
Brown, and Jeremy J. Schmidt. (Washington D.C.: Island Press, 2010): 43-44.

180

or religious affiliations that individuals themselves may hold. In this regard, the
individual remains the central vessel through which ethics, rights and obligations must
travel. Security becomes predicated on the successful fulfillment of the rights embedded
in individuals, by virtue of their humanness. This distinguishes emancipatory security
from other, more traditional interpretations of security that codify multiple objects for
ethics in the quest for an elusive, abstract, and artificial “security.” This is most ably
displayed in the tensions surrounding the two key pillars of the United Nations
progressive rights architecture: the UN Charter, which enshrines the right of state
sovereignty, and the UN Declaration of Human Rights, which focuses on the rights of
individuals. Often these two visions are incommensurate with one another, with the
security of the individual generally subsumed under the weight of statist security
discourse.
The focus on the individual for water security accentuates the significant threats people
experience on a daily basis from lack of access to clean and sufficient supplies of water.
It overrides the continued predominance of water wars discourse that mistakenly sees
water as a strategic resource that will inevitably propel states and intra-state groups to
conflict. Switching to the individual as the subject of water security means a radical break
from traditional security concerns focused on the state. To pursue emancipation as the
goal of security means to focus on the emancipation of individuals.
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5.5.2

The avoidance of arbitrary forms of violence/domination (Water as
a lever of peace)

Water security is one of the defining global challenges of the twenty-first century. It
impacts the lives of billions of people daily. Aaron Wolf writes succinctly that, “Water
management is conflict management.”
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But incidences of violent confrontation between

states or groups directly attributable to water scarcity are few and far between. In this
regard it is more appropriate to depend upon a broader vision of cosmopolitanism that is
less deeply connected to the original Kantian model, which was primarily premised on
avoiding war. The wider global problems existing in today’s globalized world extend
beyond war and conflict and include such diverse issues as economic inequality, poverty,
disease, human rights abuses, and of course environmental degradation. Water intersects
with many of these compelling notions of a broad understanding of security.
Cosmopolitan theorizing can provide the ethical foundation upon which emancipatory
water security flourishes. It can do so by producing a holistic awareness of the embedded
connections that all individuals share with water sources in particular, and broader
ecological processes in general. Beyond that, it is able to connect people across space and
time over environmental resources. It is true that across most religions and cultures, there
exists an emerging ethical consistency that places water and environmental stewardship
as a pre-eminent concern. It is no stretch to place these types of emerging holistic beliefs
in the context of a broader cosmopolitan outlook.
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A critical cosmopolitan ethics can be the required shift that re-orients our conception of
water security towards individual emancipation and ecological sustainability. It can help
us consider how water management entails an ethical commitment that can assist
scientific and technological knowledge. Placing a cosmopolitan water ethos at the heart
of water security policy will help avoid the arbitrary domination of one group by another
- whether by violent or non-violent coercion. This will largely be achieved by relying
upon public domains of communication. Communication, the opening of discursive
space, allows for the flourishing of emancipation and the avoidance of imposing arbitrary
harm on vulnerable populations. This is something that will be turned to shortly.
Placing moral preeminence on a global polis, rather than on bounded communities also
helps move us away from modern societies’ “disconnect from nature’s web of life and
from water’s most fundamental role as the basis of that life.”
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It helps us realize that

water is tied together with all aspects of life on Earth. Water’s functions go beyond that
of other resources; it not only helps maintain the current (and unsustainable) luxuries of
modern societies, it also drives the interconnected ecological process of the planet’s
ecosphere. There is then a global responsibility to act to preserve these vital functions for
the sustainment of life on the planet. Given the global nature of the vulnerabilities and
opportunities for the alleviation of harm, it is no longer morally compelling to restrict our
collective responsibility to state-centric solutions.
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As Sandra Postel writes,

With freshwater life being extinguished at record rates, a more fundamental
change is needed. An ethical society can no longer ignore the fact that water-
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management decisions have life or death consequences for other species. An
ethically grounded water policy must begin with the premise that all people and
all living things be given access to enough water to secure their survival before
some get more than enough.

409

Avoiding violence and domination is crucial to achieving the emancipation of the
individual, which is the procedural goal of critical water security advanced here. It is also
one of the key pillars of a cosmopolitan position.

410

Experiences of physical violence, as

well as economic and social injustices, felt either through direct conflict or via structural
inequalities are the realities for a great many people across the world. Yet we know that
the connections between violence and water are tenuous. Water has been a far greater
driver of cooperation than conflict. Water may factor into inter-state and intra-state
conflicts, but the vast majority of interactions over water are mild and disputes are almost
411

always resolved peacefully.

Given this, it is more appropriate to shift attention to

alleviating existing day-to-day tensions over water, namely by improving access to safe
and clean water sources for individual human needs as well as for the sustainable
management of precious water sources.
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Because these are global problems, global

solutions are needed. A cosmopolitan ethics that emphasizes human interconnectedness is
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best suited for dealing with the myriad shortcomings of contemporary water security
policies. A critical security of water based upon such cosmopolitan understandings is able
to “scale up” from the minute experiences of individual relationships with water to
greater emotional identification with other persons, with the intent to limit the capacity to
cause violent and non-violent harm.
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While the potential for violent conflict between states remains remote, a significant
degree of harm is inflicted upon already vulnerable populations. The damaging effects of
chronic water shortages and compromised water resources are disproportionately felt in
low-income countries. It is the poorest who live in the areas of highest risk: the urban
414

slums, the rural hinterland and along the floodplains.

Water-related diseases remain a

major threat to human health and well being, responsible for the deaths of 3.575 million
people each year.

415

Every year 1.5 million children under the age of 5 die from

diarrhoeal diseases, largely from contaminated drinking water. All told, the Millennium
Development Goals, the major UN markers for social progress, state unsafe drinking
water represents one of the major threats to the world’s poor.
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As the fourth World

Water Development Report states, “In a global context, water contamination with

413

Andrew Linklater, “Human Interconnectedness,” International Relations 23(3), 2009, 487.

414

D. Garrick, R. Hope, et al, “Water Security, Risk and Society – Strategic Report on Research Findings,
Gaps, and Opportunities.” Submitted to the Economic and Social Research Council by Oxford University
Water Security Network, June 2012. Online. 24 November 2012. <http://www.water.ox.ac.uk>
415

Annette Prüss-Üstün, Robert Bos, Fiona Gore, Jamie Bartram. “Safer water, better health: costs,
benefits and sustainability of interventions to protect and promote health.” World Health Organization,
Geneva, 2008. Online. 24 November, 2012.
<http://www.who.int/quantifying_ehimpacts/publications/saferwater/en/index.html>
416

See :World Water Assessment Programme (WWAP). “The United Nations World Water Development
Report 4: Managing Water under Uncertainty and Risk.” (Paris: UNESCO, 2012.)

185

pathogenic substances is acknowledged as the most serious risk factor in relation to
human health.”

417

Degraded water quality - untreated wastewater and sewage,

contamination from hazardous chemicals like arsenic and pesticides - is responsible for
adversely affecting billions of people around the world. In some very real respects, water
quality is growing into a much greater concern than water quantity. Pressures on the
volume and the quality of water supplies combine to substantially alter the prospects for a
full life for an incredibly high number of people around the world.
The new types of threats posed by water scarcity and poor water quality are
representative of the widening of security in a rapidly changing world. Water security
encompasses a variety of risks including population displacement, human health,
ecosystem degradation, climate change, disease, poverty, and inequality. While there
have been no examples of overt warfare between states over water sources, significant
harm has been inflicted upon vulnerable populations via system-wide drivers like
population growth, urbanization, as well as industrial and agricultural production. All of
this suggests that an ethics based on cosmopolitan responsibility must be principally
concerned with ensuring vulnerable populations avoid arbitrary harm or domination
through processes of self-transformation, based upon continuous dialogue. As Pogge
writes, “the stringency of our most important negative duties does not vary with the
418

presence or absence of compatriotism.”

In fact, “all persons have a negative duty of

very high stringency toward every human being not to collaborate in imposing an unjust
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institutional order upon him or her.”

419

It means that new kinds of political and economic

‘violence’, rather than state-centric violent conflict, are the crucial context for a twentyfirst century connection between cosmopolitanism and water.

5.5.3

The necessity of dialogue and inclusion over matters of public
importance.

The last component of cosmopolitanism used here emphasizes the necessity of dialogue
and the inclusion of marginal voices in matters of water security. This key theme is
adapted to address the continued shortcomings of traditional approaches to water security
that have failed to incorporate the views and wishes of all water stakeholders in a truly
deliberative fashion. Cosmopolitan ethics that integrate deliberation and dialogue are able
to transform the realm of human interaction, with the aim of developing a holistic,
420

universal, communication community.

Those that are affected by decisions should have

an equal opportunity to shape those decisions in the first place. Such commitments will
foster greater a sense of solidarity amongst water users and create better conditions for
sustainable environmental policies.
Promoting a spirit of inclusion and non-coercive dialogue in communicative practices is a
key component of a critical cosmopolitanism. Creating spaces for communication over
matters of public importance is essential for unlocking what Bryan Turner has referred to
421

as a “cosmopolitan epistemology of a shared reality.”
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deliberative political community, individuals and groups can construct themselves as
active agents while also learning about the responsibility they hold to others. By actively
learning with and about the experiences of other water users, one of the effects may be to
release common understandings about shared vulnerabilities, which can be rectified
through democratic decision-making and the construction of inclusive social institutions.
Participation and deliberation can also allow for the transcendence of established
territorial and moral borders, as political communities reinvent themselves around shared
global ethics rather than around clearly demarcated lines of inside/outside. It pressures
the distinctions between fellow-citizens and aliens, the moral duties so unnecessary in an
422

age of increasing interdependence and shared vulnerabilities.

The idea is to capture the

immanent potentials for emancipation by configuring social relations around an inclusive,
open communicative space.
Deliberation and participation will not always lead to agreement and the cessation of
conflict; that is not the point. Consensus is often the exception rather than the norm. What
is at stake is ensuring that morally speaking, all stakeholders are given the opportunity to
participate and articulate their views from a position of non-coercion. The ideal speech
situation, according to Habermas, is one where each participant experiences equality and
freedom, so that they can express their own attitudes, desires, and needs. It is only when
both equal participation and freedom of expression are guaranteed that it is possible for a
morally legitimate decision to be reached. This ideal speech situation is one where equals
engage with one another to uncover the strength of the better argument. Communication
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has the dialectical aim of identifying strengths and weaknesses of “different positions and
of ensuring that the stress on differences does not eliminate the quest for actual or
potential points of convergence.”
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Without proper commitment to inclusive dialogue,

there is faint hope that entrenched differences over water will be overcome. Actors - from
states all the way down to individuals - will continue to rely upon unreflective strategies
that fail to sustainably manage precious water resources and deny a great many
individuals from experiencing full lives.
Critical cosmopolitan ethics can help overcome the significant challenges posed by
traditional thinking on water security. Using communicative rationality as the standpoint
for negotiating equitable and sustainable water policies entails engaging the other in an
effort to settle disagreements. Cosmopolitan interaction, premised upon integration and
acceptance of all stakeholders of water security, beyond simply nation-states and
powerful sub-groups, is one of the most significant foundations of an emancipatory
security of water. Interaction, based upon a positive recognition of the other, is not meant
to merely “accommodate” differing views, but is seen here as a fundamental component
of global transformation. The twentieth century sociologist Herbert Blumer is important
here. Blumer’s notion of symbolic interactionism helps us understand how inclusion and
interaction can lead to the transformation of social understandings and practices. Blumer
helped pioneer the central constructivist belief that the nature of an object consists of
what it means to the person for whom it is an object. This counters traditional social
science belief in the determining factors of psychological factors or social structures.
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Instead, meaning plays a central role in human actions. Meanings are derived principally
through social interaction, or “symbolic interactionism,” where common symbols and
common understanding construct both an individual’s and a culture’s self-identity.
According to Blumer, group members are trained through their interactions with one
another. These interactions are crucial in forming interpretations of the self and the other.
In other words, social life exists in action – it is made and remade constantly.
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Symbolic interactionism provides some clues into the immanent possibilities to overcome
predominant conceptions of water-security. It connects us with some of the claims made
earlier in the dissertation that the construction of the social world via human agency
simultaneously creates spaces for alternative theorizing beyond the status quo. George
Herbert Mead, the intellectual mentor to Blumer, wrote in 1934 that individuals are
members of a larger social community, always working to develop integrated social
relationships. Mead writes, “We are getting to realize more and more the whole society to
which we belong because the social organization is such that it brings out the response of
the other person to our own act not only in the other person but also in ourselves.”
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In

other terms, the recognition of the other is essential for constituting the identity of the
self. For Mead and Blumer, as interactions grow between cultures, an “internationalmindedness,” is likely to arise, whereby we can take the attitude of the other in various
life-processes. This has significant effects because it allows for the eventual realization of
global communication communities that share similar goals and aspirations. It is difficult
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to think of a goal quite as common or desirable as sustainable environmental practices.
Writing eighty years ago, Mead was able to presciently identify the changes that occur
cognitively from increased interaction: “A process of organization is going on underneath
our conscious experience, and the more this organization is carried out the closer we are
brought together. The more we do call out in ourselves the response which our gestures
426

call out in the other, the more we understand him.”

The purpose of highlighting the role of inclusion within a critical cosmopolitan ethics of
water security is three-fold. One the one hand, it promotes a vision of egalitarianism and
equality, which comports with the overall aim of emancipation. Ensuring that discussions
over water security include a wide range of actors – all actors who perceive they have
significant stake in the outcome of the discussion – creates legitimacy and is likely to
reduce the role of manipulation and coercion. Public participation in matters of water
security enlarges the democratic basis of decision-making. Secondly, at the risk of stating
the obvious, inclusion widens the range of voices at the table. The effect of this is to open
up the space for alternative points of view that are often marginalized beneath the weight
of dominant discourses, but yet can still offer much insight into the problems and
solutions of water security. Acknowledgement of and communication with individuals
and groups that experience most readily the damaging effects of conventional water
security policies - from indigenous tribes to rural women – may produce a better
awareness of the problems and open up more holistic sets of solutions. Thirdly, inclusion
increases the opportunities for learning and gradual transformation. As individuals share
experiences with water and debate the merits of their answers to water problems, the
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dominant political and ethical structures that entrench state-directed and utilitarian
management solutions might be radically altered, promising an open, collaborative, and
integrated response to the dilemmas of water security. As individuals and groups interact
with, and thus learn from one another, mutual identity formulations might emerge as the
basis for a cosmopolitan ethic of shared responsibility when it comes to protecting scarce
and vulnerable water resources and avoiding harm.
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Chapter six examines a number of

cosmopolitan appeals within contemporary water management, including hydrosolidarity.
Indeed, inclusion broadens the ethical horizons by opening up the space for legitimate
involvement. Inclusive communication, free from coercion and arbitrary domination, can
lead to collective learning, and effect cognitive shifts. This is no less true at the level of
global ethics. It may (though not necessarily) expose common concerns and values across
a range of issues, water being one. As Gerard Delanty writes,
The purpose of inter-cultural communication is not simply communication for its
own sake but has the deliberative objective of settling disagreements through
consensual communication rather than through force or manipulation. This does
not necessarily require consensus as the final outcome. It does however require
the acceptance of discursive procedures and the inclusion of as many people as
possible in the discursive process.
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It may be cliché to acknowledge how the spread of globalization has transformed the
boundaries of political communities beyond the nation-state, but it is no less true. The
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traditional lines of political and ethical separation between individuals, based upon rigid
statist ontology, are blurring amidst a rapid expansion of global activity. This has
important implications for water security. It increases the potential for a wider number of
actors to “speak security,” communicating their experiences with water and thereby
transforming the notion of security itself. Beyond that, the immanent possibilities for an
emancipatory security of water can be seen in the growing awareness of the integrated
nature of the problem and in the diverse range of responses. Water is increasingly seen as
an interconnected problem, one that cannot be disassociated from other problems like,
environmental degradation, poverty, weak political institutions, corruption, energy and
food. One can look no further than the latest unclassified U.S. National Intelligence
Council (NIC) report on water and security, produced in 2012, which highlights the
429

water-energy-food security nexus.

It is clear that single sector approaches to water

security are insufficient for adequately dealing with the impact it has across a wide range
of areas.

5.6

Conclusion

Water literally and metaphorically flows through everything; our struggle to properly
manage it shows us the deeply troubled relationships that we have with nature and with
each other. We cannot divorce water from issues like food production, population
growth, climate change, species extinction, urbanization, development, gender disparity,
social inequality, and a host of other social processes. Responding to these challenges
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requires an integrated and holistic approach that takes stock of the nature of the problems
as arising from, to paraphrase Adorno and Horkheimer, “the administered totality of
modernity.” Critical theory can in this regard, contribute an awareness of the self as an
active recipient and participant in the replication of a modern world dependent upon an
instrumental logic of reason and the commodity form.
The growing global water crisis creates enormous problems and important opportunities.
Up to eighty percent of the global human population faces a high risk to water security.
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That staggering number should give us long pause and compel us to construct alternative
theories that can make better sense of the problem and begin to act in ways that comport
with ethically valid principles and do so in a sustainable fashion. The aim of this chapter
has been to do just that. By pursuing emancipation as the ultimate goal of security, it
coincides with a young but growing tradition in security studies. Emancipation frees us to
think about security away from traditional exclusionary means of enmity and conflict. It
is argued here (and elsewhere) that the concept of emancipation offers humanity a means
by which we might pursue a practical commitment to ensuring that life on this planet not
only continues, but that it gets better. Roy Bhaskar may have put it best when he wrote
that emancipation is “a special qualitative kind of becoming free that consists in the selfdirected transformation from an unwanted and unneeded to a wanted and needed source
of determination.”
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In the context of water security, emancipation helps to bind our
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knowledge of the interconnected nature of the problems with a theoretical commitment to
432

“reimagining the future in genuinely liberating ways.”

This chapter constructed a vision of an emancipatory security of water by focusing on
three components that could shift traditional water security towards ethical and holistic
means. It identified inclusion, communication, and cosmopolitanism, as the central
foundations of what could become an emancipatory theory of water security. Each
component is able to offer specific insights into the various deficiencies of approaching
water security along traditional, business-as-usual lines. Focusing on inclusion creates
new possibilities for marginalized water stakeholders to voice their own concerns and
wishes in a manner that respects the unique experiences of water insecurity. It also
presents a multifaceted view of water security, critically upsetting the prevailing narrative
of most water management strategies that hold an instrumentalist view of nature, and a
statist understanding of international security. Focusing on inclusion in critical water
security also requires us to adopt a constitutive-relational understanding of identity that
avoids essentialized notions of the self and other so as to pave the road for free and openended forms of communication.
This leads to the second component of an emancipatory security of water that highlights
the important role that communicative rationality plays in ensuring that alternative voices
are engaged in open-ended discussions. While consensus may or may not be reached, the
important thing to highlight is that the process of communication – the reflexive use of
communicative rationality – encourages the creation of deliberative spaces whereby a
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broader range of actors, including the most marginalized members of society, are given
enhanced access. This has important effects on realizing the potential emancipation of
individuals and encourages a more sustainable use of world water resources.
The last component necessary for building an emancipatory security of water is a
commitment to cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism signals a commitment to a universal
scope of moral concern, so that all individuals across the world share equal moral
worth.

433

Three main ideas were developed to construct a critical theory of

cosmopolitanism useful for the pursuit of emancipation in water security. They
highlighted that, 1) all people are morally equal; 2) arbitrary forms of power/domination
are unjust and must be avoided and; 3) dialogue and inclusion over matters of public
importance are crucial. Combined, all three ideas formed to create critical cosmopolitan
imaginings that can propel water security towards new horizons that emphasize shared
vulnerabilities and opportunities for integrated approaches that equitably and sustainably
manage scarce water resources. There are signs layered in contemporary water
approaches that signal such cosmopolitan possibilities. It is these possibilities that the
next chapter examines.
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6

Chapter Six: Hydrosolidarity: The Ethics of Water Security
6.1

Introduction: The 2012 World Water Forum

Since 1997, the World Water Council (WWC), a loose coalition of governments, IGOs,
private corporations and civil society groups, has organized a tri-annual World Water
Forum, the largest international event in the field of water.
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The 2012 Forum, held in

March in Marseilles, France, was convened under the theme “Solutions for Water,” with
over 35,000 participants taking part in 250 workshop sessions (critics dispute this official
number, claiming attendance was significantly down from previous years.) In June 2012,
a few months following the completion of the Forum, the WWC produced its final
document, entitled Global Water Framework, which summarized discussions held during
the preparatory meetings and the forum sessions. The document reported the diversity of
opinions in relation to the three strategic directions of the Forum’s approaches to modern
water management:
1. Ensuring everyone’s well-being (social aspirations)
a. 1.5 – Contribute to cooperation and peace through water
2. Contribute to economic development (economic dimension)
3. Keep the planet blue (environment)
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The 2012 Global Water Framework is representative of the type of grand narrative that
accompanies environmental mega-conferences, such as the World Water Forum. These
international meetings, centred around an overarching title and theme are meant to bring
together the widest array of actors involved in a particular issue and offer large-scale
proclamations about the need for increased awareness and concrete actions to be taken.
The 2012 Forum was organized under the banner “Time for Solutions,” with the
expressed desire to “be the birthplace of strong commitments and partnerships aimed at
the introduction and scaling up of promising solutions by all the stakeholders from the
different regions: elected representatives, decision-makers, civil society, financial
partners and experts.”
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The Forum was designed to provide policymakers and water

management practitioners with strategies to better realize the UN Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), to prepare for the post-MDG world after 2015, and to lead
discussions in preparation for the Rio+20 Summit that took place in June 2012.
Both the World Water Forum and the World Water Council are hugely influential and
important actors in international field of water but they also face intense criticism from
environmental activists convinced that they are representative of the narrow interests of
the private sector and because they have continuously failed to affirm that water is a
human right. The Sixth World Water Forum was no different.
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Over 2,000 individuals
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and 150 organizations, including trade unions, environmental, humanitarian, and
alterglobalization associations and NGOs, gathered in Marseilles, France at the same time
as the WWF for the Alternative World Water Forum (the acronym FAME was used,
reflecting the French translation - Forum Alternatif Mondial de l'Eau). The objective of
FAME was to “create a concrete alternative to the Sixth World Water Forum,” and to
“amplify the water movement by:
•

Creating and promoting an alternative vision of water management which is
based on ecological and democratic values

•

Continuing research to find solutions to the worldwide water crisis

•

Making the water movement structure sustainable.”
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Activist groups participating in FAME criticized the Ministerial Declaration of the Sixth
WWF for failing to explicitly acknowledge the human right to water, which is recognized
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by the UN General Assembly,
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Assembly.

Instead of re-affirming the human right to water as specified in the

resolutions the final Ministerial Declaration of the WWF instead called on signatories to
“commit to accelerate the full implementation of the human rights obligations relating to
access to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation…” Yet notably, ambiguous nature
of the language stirred significant controversy among civil society groups during the
Forum. While the declaration is not legally binding, the fact that the largest water forum
continuously failed to affirm a human right to water was cause for concern for many
critics for two reasons: first, it represents a failed opportunity to further the integration of
water management discourse with the language of human rights. Secondly, it potentially
provides a convenient way out for states to sidestep legal and financial obligations and
pursue less stringent water strategies. According to the NGO, WASH United, “The
language leaves room for States to individually determine whether their human rights
obligations require them to realize the right to safe drinking water and sanitation for
441

all.”

In contrast, the final “Declaration of the Participants at the Alternative World Water
Forum” presents a radically different vision of water and its role in the social and
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ecological fabric of the world. It upholds water as “a fundamental and inalienable human
right;” argues “solidarity between present and future generations be guaranteed;” rejects
“all forms of privatization of water;” and calls for the UN General Assembly to organize
a “Democratic Summit on Water” that would replace the corporate-led World Water
Forums as the legitimate voice for the global water movement.
The presence of a dynamic alternative forum arising in opposition to the World Water
Forum indicates the struggle over the future of water is ongoing. This struggle continues
despite the spread over the past three decades of decentralization management practices,
and increasing commitments to sustainability. The divisiveness between the official
WWF and the groups that supported the counter-Forum FAME is representative of a
continued divide on issues of water. Those on the streets of Marseilles continue to feel
that the WWF acts as a mouthpiece for corporatist agendas that seek privatized control
over water. One of the most vocal groups campaigning at FAME against the WWF was
the Council of Canadians, which characterized it as “the Davos of Water…a nondemocratic forum run by multinational water corporations.”
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Official representatives of

the WWF offered their own criticisms of the alternative forum. Loic Fauchon, the head of
the World Water Council labeled FAME as “insignificant at best and harmful at worst.”
What was needed, according to Fauchon, was to move beyond debate, towards
“practicable solutions” – out of respect for those waiting for essential services.
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However, as the Guardian makes clear, while significant differences separate the water
visions of WWF and FAME, there are examples that throw into question the prevalent
cynicism that paralyzes progress. Individuals around the world do not seem to be
“waiting” for water security to be “achieved”. Alternative models of water security,
dependent upon ethical notions of hydrosolidarity, and pursued by a variety of water
stakeholders may in fact demonstrate the immanent processes of reconstruction that offer
emancipatory alternatives to the dominant discourses of water in particular and to
security in general.
The divide at the Sixth World Water Forum showed a deep level of contestation over the
ethics of water. The divide between government and business officials on the one hand
and environmental activists on the other has been a fixture of modern global ecopolitics
for decades. The question asked here is whether or not critical alternatives exist within
contemporary discourse over water security – whether the potential exists for
emancipatory security practices. Such practices would integrate a variety of viewpoints,
from all sectors of society, with a particular emphasis on the most vulnerable and
marginalized populations. In particular this chapter applies the framework developed in
chapter five to examine the idea of hydrosolidarity as a potentially emancipatory
alternative to traditional, and dominant views of water security. It will show that the
principles of hydrosolidarity - as presently laid out by a variety of authors and
practitioners – are beginning to meet the water security needs of the most vulnerable
populations globally, while also promoting equality and sustainable management of water
resources for future generations and the earth itself. As it is with most things, there are no
panaceas for the global water crisis (despite a high degree of optimism in techniques of
desalination), and something as obscure or malleable as “hydrosolidarity” will not rid the
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world of water scarcity. But where it may succeed is in opening up the discursive space
for water security to accommodate ethical principles of cosmopolitan solidarity, in line
with emancipatory aims advanced in previous chapters of this dissertation. That means
that hydrosolidarity, as expressed both in contemporary practice and in future
potentialities, may indeed be a crucial development that expresses critical alternatives to
traditional approaches to security.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first details the historical development of
the concept of hydrosolidarity. The ethics involved in hydrosolidarity have always been a
part of human interactions over water, but in terms of its modern manifestation in water
security discourse the concept has been developing only since the end of the 1990s. In
this regard it is a relatively new concept, one that is still emerging so as to guide water
management. The second section of this chapter examines the relationship between
hydrosolidarity and the dominant water management paradigm, integrated water
resources management (IWRM). IWRM is an approach that links the water crisis with
other vital resources, seeking to coordinate a holistic, integrated, and equitable response.
IWRM does not view water as a resource in isolation, but as part of an interconnected
web of environmental and human-led processes. This means that a diverse range of actors
and disciplines are consulted to provide a wider, more efficient, and sustainable approach
to water management. The third and final section of this chapter examines recent political
proclamations by a number of states, international organizations, private companies, and
civil society groups to pursue policies of “Global Water Solidarity” (GWS). GWS is
meant to develop, replicate, and scale up existing “decentralized solidarity mechanisms”
(DSM) in water and sanitation. GWS and DSM were the subjects of numerous World
Water Forum panels in 2012 and were targeted throughout the WWF6 final report as a
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hopeful solution for facilitating international cooperation and sharing technical expertise.
Funded by the Swiss and French governments, as well as the UN Development
Programme (UNDP), GWS is guided by principles of “universality, subsidiary,
additionality, leverage and institutional, environmental, and financial sustainability.”
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GWS reflects in many ways the evolving realization that ethics must play a larger role in
water management. It may be too soon to fully judge the outcomes of GWS, but at the
outset of its institutionalization, it may demonstrate alternative, emancipatory trends in
water security. Together, the three sections comprise a detailed look into the role and
place of ethics and emancipatory practices in contemporary water security. It argues that
hydrosolidarity, manifested in numerous state and non-state actions, questions the
prevailing wisdom that water’s place in international security discourse should be
confined to warnings of violence and conflict over dwindling resources.

6.2

The Roots of Hydrosolidarity

Hydrosolidarity emerged in the 1990s as a conceptual marker used to overcome
prevailing water management practices that emphasized “hydroegoism.” Hydroegoism is
the belief that individual, competing, interests guide water allocation decisions, with
conflict frequently resulting from the interactions by diverse stakeholders. In response to
growing dissatisfaction with hydroegoism, a number of junior water professionals in
Sweden convened seminars at the 1998 Stockholm Water Symposium to present
alternative voices that promoted a new twenty-first century water management ethics
built on justice, equality, and cooperation. Following these discussions and the published
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report from the Stockholm Water Symposium, famed Swedish hydrologist Malin
Falkenmark became one of the first to use the term “hydrosolidarity” in her October 1998
445

Volvo Environment Prize acceptance speech in Brussels, Belgium.

In her speech,

Falkenmark highlighted how,
Much stress is presently being put on human rights to water; what is tacitly being
referred to is not water as such, but the provision of safe household water. The
fundamental importance for humanity's future, of finding ways for peaceful
sharing of the precipitation falling over a joint river basin, between those living
upstream and those living downstream, however, suggests that there is a need for
human "water solidarity." Human water obligations have to be given equal weight
to the human right to safe household water. Given a situation where upstream and
downstream countries have problems in agreeing on issues relating to the sharing
of transboundary water systems indicates the need to seek support from religious
and philosophical circles in the search for a water ethics.
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Falkenmark and her colleagues at the Swedish International Water Institute (SIWI), one
of the world’s leading water think tanks, began to promote the integration of ethics and
human rights into what had until then had been mostly technical variables of water
management. Seminars on hydrosolidarity were organized during World Water Weeks in
the early 2000s and a special session devoted to hydrosolidarity was a part of the 2003
World Water Forum in Kyoto, Japan. A few special issues of academic journals were
organized around the role of hydrosolidarity and ethics in water. Perhaps the foremost
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journal to engage with the concept of hydrosolidarity has been Water International. It
published a whole issue in 2000 dealing with the subject as its central theme.
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In 2003

(the International Year of Freshwater) Falkenmark edited a special issue of the science
journal Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society (B) that “assessed the current
status and knowledge of the freshwater dimension in our biosphere and its relationship to
human welfare.”
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The issue now reads as one of the more comprehensive attempts to

produce a more formalized understanding of what hydrosolidarity entails, besides just an
aversion to hydroegoism. Carl Folke, a professor at Stockholm University and a frequent
collaborator with Falkenmark, attempted to provide a foundation for hydrosolidarity in
his article “Freshwater for Resilience: A Shift in Thinking.” Folke concluded that
hydrosolidarity was the necessary forward path for future water security because we are
living in an age where change is the rule rather than the exception. As a result, “resilience
has been eroded and the challenge facing humanity is to try to sustain desirable pathways
for development in the face of change.” For Folke, and the early adopters of
hydrosolidarity, resilience entails setting up the socio-ecological systems to cope with
449

and live with change, uncertainty, and surprise.

Folke concluded that effective

management of freshwater supplies in a dynamic system requires an awareness of the
social dimensions in developing adaptive co-management strategies. For him, the
complex interrelationships between hydrological, ecological, and social issues requires a
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Society (B) 358, 2003: 2027. Other authors in the special journal issue also made use of the “bloodstream”
metaphor for water. See Wilhelm Ripl, “Water: The Bloodstream of the Biosphere,” Philosophical
Traditions of the Royal Society (B) 358, 2003: 1921-1934.

206

much broader vision of water security that can acknowledge that water is the
“bloodstream of the biosphere’s capacity.”

450

Folke concluded the article by writing,

Stewardships of freshwater in dynamic landscapes to secure and enhance social
and economic development will no doubt be a central issue in the near future. It
requires a shift in thinking and management of freshwater as merely a resource to
freshwater as the breath of the Earth. It also requires a shift from trying to control
and allocate freshwater flows in an optimal manner for various human uses to
recognition of the necessity to actively manage the essential role of freshwater in
dynamic landscapes faced with uncertainty and surprise. It will require that those
involved with freshwater management foster a worldview and vision of
stewardship of freshwater as the bloodstream of the biosphere. This broader view
of freshwater provides the foundation for hydrosolidarity.
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The first articles on hydrosolidarity focused on constructing a water ethics that
emphasized the resource’s interconnected properties and processes. In these articles,
water was seen as the linchpin linking numerous global crises. “The crises related to land
degradation, food security, water quality degradation, ecosystem decline, water
insecurity, poverty, and economic losses from extreme hydrologic events are all
interlinked, the root causes stem from government policy failures, and both the North and
the South have much work to do to address the issues.”
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The central focus was to take

knowledge gained from a number of river basins to address the connected issues of land
use, water use, energy, and the protection of ecosystems while also dealing with
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empirical cases of national upstream-downstream conflicts of interest. The intention of
the first articles dealing with hydrosolidarity was to build awareness that water issues are
interconnected; that water basins need to be managed with integrative approaches; and
that engaging a diverse group of stakeholders was necessary to ensure efficient, equitable,
and sustainable water management.
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In the first years of its usage, hydrosolidarity was

meant to encourage cooperation based on an appreciation of these interconnections.
Solidarity in decision-making in a river basin – between upstream and downstream, rural
and urban, human and environmental needs – was the essential component that would
foster stability and responsible stewardship of precious water resources.
Since the first years, hydrosolidarity has evolved to encompass a range of approaches that
incorporates aspects of ethics into water security. For instance, Falkenmark and Folke
have used the concept of hydrosolidarity to argue that previous water management
strategies failed to adequately account for the dynamic, complex, and inter-linked
biological and social systems. Beginning from the starting point that humans both shape
the processes of the biosphere and are simultaneously dependent on its proper
functioning, they recently modified the original hydrosolidarity term and replaced it with
ecohydrosolidarity. While still upholding the original intention of relying on basic
principles of solidarity for balancing seemingly incompatible interests in a basin, the new
term is meant to make note of smaller-scale catchment areas. Thinking in these terms
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involves acknowledging that rainwater catchments are “interdependent social-ecological
systems with institutions and multigovernance systems” that should develop adaptive
management approaches in order to create ecohydrosolidarity within and between regions
and nations.
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An article written in 2011 by Andrea Gerlak and her colleagues produced probably the
most comprehensive study of the concept of hydrosolidarity. In the article published in
Water International titled, “Hydrosolidarity and beyond: can ethics and equity find a
place in today’s water management?” Gerlak et al provided an overview of its short
intellectual history and its evolving application, arguing that it has “emerged as a
mechanism to inject issues of social justice and human rights into a discussion about
water that had been largely driven by technical and political variables that influence
water management, especially in the international arena.”
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According to the authors,

hydrosolidarity’s most valuable contribution is its continued use as a synonym for
ethically based behaviour.
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The integration of hydrosolidarity as a discursive marker for ethical behaviour in water
security is meant to embolden alternative approaches to “business as usual” models in
water security that continue to exploit water resources for strategic gain, with too little
attention paid to sustainability, environmental consequences, or human suffering. By
incorporating a sense of ethical understanding into what had largely been only
technically-driven solutions, hydrosolidarity means to encourage a framework that
respects common human values. As William J. Cosgrove, the former President of the
World Water Council, wrote in 2003, “Respect for shared human values will eventually
prove to be the key to sound management of the world’s water resources in the
sustainable service of human development.”
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The fact that the head of the largest

governing body of water organizations and professionals adamantly declared the
necessity of using ethical considerations in managing increasing water stress is an
important indication that hydrosolidarity is an attractive and useful component of twentyfirst water security.
Some of the expansive effects that hydrosolidarity provide are helpful in formulating
alternative security practices related to conflict management. It may not allow us to fully
formulate what all emancipatory visions of security might look like, but it gets us closer
to understanding the potential for emancipatory intent inherent within water and
environmental security. The next section will examine whether the predominant
management strategy of integrated water resources management (IWRM) can adequately
operationalize emancipatory ethics into water security.
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6.3
6.3.1

The Promise and Peril of IWRM
Defining IWRM

Hydrosolidarity encompasses a wide range of processes that broadly encourages
incorporating ethical considerations into more technical, scientific, environmental
planning. It can now be seen as the primary ethical component upon which the dominant
paradigms of complex water management strategies could be built. In particular, it is
been increasingly associated with the strategies of integrated water resources
management,

though

often

such

ethical

considerations

are avoided

or left

unacknowledged. This section will define IWRM, delineate its key features and historical
progress, and summarize the main criticisms of IWRM. It will conclude by offsetting a
measured degree of support for IWRM with calls for much further ethical engagement. It
leads into the final section of the chapter, which provides promising emancipatory
alternatives to IWRM embedded in contemporary water discourse.
IWRM is best defined as a “process that promotes the coordinated development and
management of water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant
economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the
sustainability of vital ecosystems."
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IWRM begins by stipulating that water needs to be

treated as a single environmental resource, allocated to the main societal water users:
industry, agriculture, and individual households. According to IWRM frameworks, this
allocation is most efficient and sustainable when participatory public policy frameworks
are used involving all affected stakeholders. In this regard, IWRM incorporates social
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factors into analyses while also taking stock of the interconnected physical attributes of
surface water, groundwater and the ecosystems through which they flow. The idea of
integration extends through the physical management of water resources as well as the
wider social context through the pursuit of consensus building with the input of
459

stakeholders from all levels.

There is no precise blueprint for implementing IWRM. It is better seen as a set of
principles from which best practices, sensitive to specific contexts, can be implemented.
IWRM has been formulated to combat a host of problems related to water governance –
problems related to conflict, cooperation, distribution, protection, and sustainability of
water resources. It would not make sense to construct a rigid set of guidelines that would
work around the world, in every case. Instead national and regional institutions are urged
to develop their own types of IWRM practices engaging collaboratively with those who
would be affected as well as engaging with the emerging global consensus on the
necessarily broad parameters of achieving sustainable and equitable resource security. In
particular IWRM recognizes the importance of water quality issues which leads it to pay
special attention to the poor; to the role, skills and needs of women; and to vulnerable
460

areas such as small island states, landlocked countries, and desertified areas.
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IWRM has gained significant attention since it was first circulated as a broad idea at the
461

1992 Earth Summit in Rio.

The Global Water Partnership (GWP), created in 1996 by

the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, and the Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency, has facilitated its growing role in water
governance. In 2000 GWP produced the first authoritative definition of IWRM. No
unambiguous definition had been created up to that point and no answer to how its
principles might be put into practice had been devised. GWP sought to correct this and it
defined IWRM as a holistic approach that understands managing water demand is as
important as managing its supply. In so doing it linked together wider social, economic,
environmental, and technical dimensions of water management. The justification for
these linkages is based upon a belief, to put it simply, that humans and the decisions they
make determine how water is used or misused. Thus there must be an integrated policymaking process that involves all the various concerned stakeholders. Because
stakeholders often hold conflicting interests and their objectives concerning water
resources management may be oppositional, negotiations organized with IWRM
principles develop operational tools for conflict management and resolution. The
important objective in preparing appropriate conflict resolution tools is to “identify and
designate water resources management functions according to their lowest appropriate
level of implementation; at each level the relevant stakeholders need to be identified and
462

mobilized.”
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See World Bank. Water Resources Management. Washingtond D.C. World Bank, 1993. This policy
paper reflected an emerging consensus that water management should be based upon the Dublin Principles.
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GWP, 2000, 29
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IWRM is the most popular approach to water management today.

463

The 2012 UN-Water

assessment survey found that since 1992, 80 percent of countries around the world had
464

implemented some level of integrated water resources management strategy. As an
attempt to integrate previously wide-ranging and isolated water management practices
into one holistic framework, it has become remarkably popular. The overriding criterion
that propels IWRM is interconnectedness, between economic, social, and environmental
conditions. IWRM approaches to water management require adherence to the conditions
of economic efficiency in water use, social equity, and environmental and ecological
sustainability (emphasis in original). These three pillars buttress the three central
elements needed for successful implementation: enabling environments (e.g. creating a
general framework of rules, laws, legislation, information), and institutional roles (e.g.
delineating precise roles for stakeholders), and managing instruments (e.g. providing
operational tools for effective implementation, regulation, monitoring and enforcement of
agreed upon rules).
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6.3.2

The History of IWRM

The roots of IWRM extend as far back as the 1960s, when river basin management
466

strategies were first implemented.

However it was not until the 1977 UN-led

Conference on Water in Mar del Plata, Argentina when IWRM began to develop into
something wider and more holistic. At that conference, the first coordinated IWRM plan
was introduced. The Mar del Plata Action Plan stands as one of the signposts of modern
water management. It signaled a broad international consensus that the best way to
approach water management was to link a range of formerly separate analyses including
assessments of water use, efficiency, health and pollution control, policy planning and
management, public information, and regional cooperation.

467

Today’s iterations of IWRM are principally derived from the Dublin Principles, adopted
in Ireland at the 1992 International Conference on Water and the Environment held in
Dublin, Ireland five months prior to the Rio Summit. The four Dublin Principles are:
1. Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life,
development, and the environment
2. Water development and management should be based on a participatory
approach, involving users, planners, and policy-makers at all levels.
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3. Women play a central part in the provision, management, and
safeguarding of water
4. Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be
recognized as an economic good.

468

These broad principles were intended to act as guidelines for action at all levels of water
management. The Dublin conference was not without controversy: the fourth Dublin
Principle was singled out for criticism from representatives from the developing world,
who felt that water development could never be sustainable without adequate attention to
questions of equality and poverty. Other criticisms of the Dublin Principles were that they
were elite-led, lacked third world representation, and failed to indicate just how the
principles could be operationalized in the context of complex water management
schemes, especially in developing countries.

469

Despite these criticisms, the Dublin Principles have been hugely influential. They were
adopted into Agenda 21, the main substantive outcome of the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio
de Janeiro. Agenda 21 was a monumental blueprint for global action to combat
environmental destruction and promote sustainable development. Chapter eighteen of
Agenda 21 specifically dealt with water quality and freshwater supply. It was also the
first instance that IWRM was explicitly mentioned as a necessary component to future
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water management strategies. The box below details the specific clauses that incorporate
IWRM in Agenda 21:

217

Table 1: IWRM in Agenda 21
18.8. Integrated water resources management is based on the perception of water as an
integral part of the ecosystem, a natural resource, and a social and economic good, whose
quantity and quality determine the nature of its utilization. To this end, water resources
have to be protected, taking into account the functioning of aquatic ecosystems and the
perenniality of the resource, in order to satisfy and reconcile needs for water in human
activities. In developing and using water resources, priority has to be given to the
satisfaction of basic needs and the safeguarding of ecosystems. Beyond these
requirements, however, water users should be charged appropriately.

18.9. Integrated water resources management, including the integration of land- and
water-related aspects, should be carried out at the level of the catchment basin or subbasin. Four principal objectives should be pursued, as follows:
a. To promote a dynamic, interactive, iterative and multisectoral approach to
water resources management, including the identification and protection of
potential sources of freshwater supply, that integrates technological, socioeconomic, environmental and human health considerations;
b. To plan for the sustainable and rational utilization, protection, conservation
and management of water resources based on community needs and priorities
within the framework of national economic development policy;
c. To design, implement and evaluate projects and programmes that are both
economically efficient and socially appropriate within clearly defined
strategies, based on an approach of full public participation, including that of
women, youth, indigenous people and local communities in water management
policy-making and decision-making
d. To identify and strengthen or develop, as required, in particular in developing
countries, the appropriate institutional, legal and financial mechanisms to
ensure that water policy and its implementation are a catalyst for sustainable
social progress and economic growth. countries, the appropriate institutional,
legal and financial mechanisms to ensure that water policy and its
implementation are a catalyst for sustainable social progress and economic
growth.
UNCED, Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 1992. Web. 28 September, 2012.
<http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/Agenda21.pdf>
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Further development of IWRM came during the Second World Water Forum in The
Hague, in 2000, where the Global Water Partnership offered the first definition of
IWRM. During the Hague meetings, IWRM grew in prominence and was firmly
enshrined as a necessary water management strategy in the Forum’s Ministerial
Declaration. The final document proclaimed that IWRM was the pivotal component for
meeting the challenges of twenty-first century water management. In two of its eleven
points of emphasis, IWRM was singled out:
5. The actions advocated here are based on integrated water resources
management, that includes the planning and management of water resources, both
conventional and non-conventional, and land. This takes account of social,
economic and environmental factors and integrates surface water, groundwater
and the ecosystems through which they flow. It recognizes the importance of
water quality issues. In this, special attention should be paid to the poor; to the
role, skills and needs of women; and to vulnerable areas such as small island
states, landlocked countries, and desertified areas.
6. Integrated water resources management depends on collaboration and
partnerships at all levels, from individual citizens to international organizations,
based on a political commitment to, and wider societal awareness of, the need for
water security and the sustainable management of water resources. To achieve
integrated water resources management, there is a need for coherent national and,
where appropriate, regional and international policies to overcome fragmentation,
470

and for transparent and accountable institutions at all levels.
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World Water Council, Ministerial Declaration of The Hague on Water Security in the 21st Century,
2000. Online 29 October 2012.
<http://www.idhc.org/esp/documents/Agua/Second_World_Water_Forum%5B1%5D.pdf >
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The combination of the first comprehensive definition by GWP and the explicit mention
of IWRM in the 2000 Ministerial Declaration of the Second World Water Forum marked
a significant progression by IWRM into mainstream discourses on water policy. It laid
the groundwork for IWRM being adopted at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable
Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, South Africa. By then, IWRM was seen as the
future foundation for water governance systems and part of a broader package of
471

international strategies for achieving the Millennium Development Goals.

The WSSD

Plan of Implementation laid out a comprehensive set of roles for IWRM to act as the
primary conduit for future water policies. IWRM was to be used to coordinate
national/regional strategies for river basins, to improve the efficient and equitable sharing
of water resources and to help establish public/private partnerships and other types of
472

partnerships that give priority to the poor.

It also singled out IWRM as a necessary

element for achieving the goal to halve, by the year 2015, the proportion of people that
are unable to reach or afford safe drinking water, and the proportion of people without
access to basic sanitation. In March 2012, UNICEF and the WHO declared that the MDG
target was indeed reached, three years ahead of schedule.

473

With the publication of the WSSD Implementation Plan, IWRM was cemented as the
pre-eminent guide for water management. Over the succeeding decade its principles have
been repeated almost as a mantra in large environmental mega-conferences. The GWP
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and the World Bank now consistently stress integrated approaches that take into account
the downstream social and ecological costs of building dams, irrigation schemes, and
other forms of water management. Every World Water Forum, every UN World Water
Development Report, every World Water Week, points to IWRM as a set of necessary
guiding principles.

6.3.3

Critiques of IWRM:

IWRM is not universally supported. It has received a fair amount of criticism that will
likely not dislodge its position as pre-eminent water strategy, but does indicate significant
dissension among water scholars and practitioners. The criticisms have been varied.
Some offer pointed and specific critiques of IWRM, while broadly agreeing with its
general framework. Biswas argues that its definition is amorphous, which can lead to
474

difficulty in actually implementing most of its components.

He also maintains that

what works for one area cannot prima facie be expected to work for another, where
different institutions, with different stakeholders, and interests exist. He writes, “Water
management must be responsive to the needs and demands of a growing diversity of
central, state and municipal institutions, user groups, private sector, NGOs, and other
appropriate bodies. Concentration of authorities into one or fewer institutions could
475

increase biases, reduce transparency, and proper scrutiny of their activities.”

Kirshen et

al. argue that IWRM needs to better account for hydraulic uncertainties that will arise as
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a result of climate change.

476

Jonch-Clausen and Fugl lament that IWRM has

"degenerated into one of those buzzwords that everybody uses but that mean different
things to different people."

477

Deeper critiques have also been levelled that question the underlying philosophy behind
IWRM. Many point to the tendency among IWRM proponents to ignore social aspects of
water management in favour of technical solutions that appease growing water demand.
Many of these deeper critiques are in essence an attack on the dominance of instrumental
rationality at the expense of politically sensitive assessments that acknowledge
alternatives to traditional state-led management processes. Allan makes the case that
IWRM policy makers do not realize that cultural, spiritual, and economic factors are as
important as sustainability in managing water. For him, the political nature of IWRM
needs to be better acknowledged.

478

McDonnell argues against the dominance of narrow,
479

positivist, and techno-scientific frameworks integrated in IWRM analyses.

Rahaman

and Varis extend this critique against IWRM's belief that privatizing the marketable
aspects of water will result in single-purpose planning and management. For them, this
approach ignores the ethical and practical difficulties in implementing planning strategies
uniformly around the world. The differences between regions means full-cost recovery
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may not be possible in great areas of the global south where infrastructure is deficient or
incomplete.

480

As might be expected, the participants at Alternative World Water Forums have also put
forth significant criticisms of IWRM. The Bradford Centre for International
Development, an organizer of the 2003 Alternative World Water Forum, argued the
global water consensus, is, “narrowly underpinned by neo-liberal principles, dominated
by technical and managerial concerns and informed by limited methodologies and
empirical data. NGOs and campaigning groups have questioned the pro-privatization
focus of the consensus, the neglect of environmental and ecological concerns and equity
481

issues.”

These deeper criticisms argue against instrumental rationality that canonizes impartial
data collection and the innate good will of partners, essentially ignoring the deeply
political processes at work. As has been repeated throughout this manuscript, such
approaches are, at best, insufficient for alleviating complex and political water problems,
and, at worst, culpable in their continuation. In making oblique reference to IWRM as
evidence of a holistic approach to individual water securing, various constituents may
only be providing smokescreens to further their own entrenched interests, confirming
business-as-usual policies. The outcome, according to these critics is that entrenched
power asymmetries are replicated, with the state acting as the sole and necessary entity to
produce effective water security. As François Molle puts it, "the entire process appears to
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be naturally steered by the state...with a consequent high likelihood of reproducing
paternalistic, technocratic, and bureaucratic and top-down conventional approaches,
modified only by whatever degree of participation is allowed."

6.3.4

482

The Promise and Peril of IWRM

IWRM compels planners and practitioners to assess the wide confluence of factors that
are necessary to adequately manage water resources. In this sense IWRM represents a
more holistic approach to water security. It promotes multiple connections – connections
in ecology by mixing water, land, and related resources; connections in economics by
promoting efficiency and equality; connections in politics by promoting institutionbuilding, institutional resilience, and coordinating often competitive and segmented intra
and inter government departments; and finally it promotes connections in society by
encouraging the inclusion and participation of different stakeholders in water policy
planning, and by acknowledging the specific gendered effects that water places on
women. However, does IWRM truly exemplify emancipatory water security? Does it
bring us closer to an ontology of security with individuals and their well being at its core?
IWRM does represent certain emancipatory understandings of human security. It
promotes inclusion, pursues the peaceful and efficient allocation of water across borders
and along shared waterways, and it is claimed to be built upon a foundational ethics of
hydrosolidarity that propounds the value of discussion, negotiation, and deliberation
amongst different stakeholders. The components of inclusion, dialogue, and
cosmopolitanism were drawn out in detail in chapter five as the most coherent path to
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critical water security, and to varying degrees they are acknowledged in IWRM
processes.
However, to see IWRM as a wholly emancipatory alternative would be overstating its
value and purpose for a variety of reasons, even though its constituent parts do point to a
progressive re-ordering of water security, which was argued for in previous chapters.
Primarily, IWRM remains at its core a statist, technically-driven platform that is designed
and implemented from the top-down. And while such strategies may be useful for making
large-scale policy decisions and consolidating disparate planning strategies, it too often
results in the continuation of instrumentalist conceptions of water security, that fail to
account for the ethical underpinnings of water management in different contexts.
It is still possible to point to the emancipatory potentials embedded within various IWRM
projects, particularly its commitment to rectifying historically fragmented and
competitive management of shared water resources. But IWRM cannot, at least on its
own, be viewed as illustrative of a sufficiently emancipatory alternative. The scientific
and technical rationality at its heart is overemphasized at the expense of normative
judgments. IWRM may reflect a growing awareness amongst water professionals and
policy makers for the need for more holistic thinking in water management and security,
but it pays little overt attention to the ethics involved in managing water security. Every
decision that is taken with regards to water has embedded within it an ethical component
– this is one of the key insights that critical theory teaches. To ignore that is to cede
ground to dominant paradigms of instrumentalist control, which are so problematic in
security contexts.
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6.4
Global Water Solidarity: emancipatory water security or
chimera?
The terms of IWRM represent multiple progressive steps but they are only one partially
realized example of the emancipatory potential in water security. While it has largely
reflected a technical, managerialist outlook on water, at the expense of developing a
larger, progressive ethical foundation, IWRM is not the only arbiter of global water
relations; there are other expressed forms of hydrosolidarity that can be seen in
contemporary global water relations.
One new development signals an awareness of the progressive appeal of water security
that has arisen since 2010, receiving its most explicit formulation during the 2012 World
Water Forum, in Marseilles, France. “Global Water Solidarity” (GWS) is a worldwide
initiative that aims to bridge the multiple levels of water stakeholders in order to advance
cooperative ties. GWS has been established to replicate highly successful development
efforts called “decentralized solidarity mechanisms (DSMs).” Rather, GWS seeks to
engage the multiple levels of governance that is required to manage water resources,
especially in vulnerable areas of the world. By placing importance on multiple actors
across space and scale, GWS should be seen as an innovative response to the deficiencies
of modern water security. It is defined as a, “coalition of local, regional and national
governments public and private institutions and civil society organizations from Europe,
Asia, and Africa.”
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It works in a variety of ways to demonstrate an embedded

emancipatory alternative to competitive water scenarios. Principally, by focusing on the
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the Promotion of Decentralized Solidarity Mechanisms.

226

nascent level of cooperation, ethical responsibility, and local participation amongst water
users across varying degrees of distance it exemplifies the inclusive, dialogic, and
cosmopolitan nature of emancipatory water security. The next section will explicate the
origins of Global Water Solidarity and Decentralized Solidarity Mechanisms, and focus
on the bridges they create towards more holistic and progressive approaches to water
security.

6.4.1

The History of Global Water Solidarity

Originally, the GWS initiative was first proposed by the UN Development Programme
(UNDP) in late 2010 to mobilize technical and financial resources to support local
governments from the developing world in their efforts to meet MDG 7C, which seeks
the reduction by half of the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe
drinking and basic sanitation. It was thought that by upscaling the already existing and
successful policies of DSMs, it would be possible to harness the existing political will to
combat water scarcity and improve sanitation conditions for vulnerable populations in the
developing world, with a special focus on Asia-Pacific and Africa. The impetus behind
the upward shift from decentralized solidarity mechanisms to global water solidarity was
a belief that it was politically feasible, technically achievable, and ethically desirable.
Since DSMs were originally set up as a way to further the progress in achieving the UN’s
MDGs

484

484

related to water (specifically Target 7c), they should be seen as a success story.

The framework for DSM is based on multiple existing UN Resolutions, including: Millennium
Declaration (A/55/L.2), United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/64/292, Human Rights
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In March 2012, just before the opening of the Sixth World Water Forum, UNICEF and
the WHO declared that the MDG target for drinking water had been reached, well ahead
of the 2015 deadline.

485

This was one of the first MDG targets to be met, and was hailed

as a significant achievement. Unsurprisingly, significant challenges remain, including the
fact that 11 percent of the world’s population (783 million) still lacks access to improved
drinking water. There have also been some that questioned whether the collected data
was in fact accurate. A Dutch NGO, International Water and Sanitation Centre (IRC),
pointed out that water quality was not measured in the MDG report, and the reporters also
failed to look into whether water supplies worked or were reliable.

486

The lesson to take

away is that while DSMs have been one of the most successful tools used in getting
closer to the water MDG, there is still much improvement to be made across the world.
The formal creation of DSMs was based upon earlier pioneering initiatives including the
Oudin-Santini law in France, the ‘Koppejan’ law in the Netherlands, the Platform
Solidarit’eau in Switzerland, the Flemish Partnership Water for Development in Belgium
and the ‘L’Acqua è di tutti’ fund in Italy.

487

The initiatives helped build voluntary
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cooperative networks across Europe that put a portion of the water and sanitation budget
aside to assist water projects in developing countries. In France alone, where participation
is voluntary, the Oudin-Santini Law raised about 24 million Euros in 2010, and has to
488

date assisted 600 projects in 17 countries.

One estimate from Jean-Phillipe Bayon, a

senior water expert at UNDP put the potential European-wide mobilization of financial
489

resources for GWS at €4 billion.

Following the success of these early initiatives, at the end of 2010, the UNDP Hub for
Innovative Partnerships began mobilizing new technical and financial resources from
decentralized cooperation in order to support local governments from developing
countries in their efforts to achieve Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 7C. The
‘triggering point’ was the possibility of scaling up at the European level a voluntary levy
of 1 percent on water and sanitation services already functional in certain countries and
notably in France.
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The next section will detail how DSMs work and explain the rationale behind upscaling
to Global Water Solidarity.
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In early 2012, the GWS Steering Committee, made up of representatives from local,
regional and national authorities, international and multilateral organizations, water
operators, NGOs, private organizations and prominent public figures, focused its efforts
on specifying the best ways to use small-scale DSMs in achieving the MDGs. At this
time, DSMs were essentially a bundle of policies adopted at sub-national levels that
harnessed financial resources, and promoted local capacity building and technology
transfer in support of sub-national institutions’ efforts to establish water and sanitation
services.

491

All of these policies were pursued on a voluntary basis and as a sign of

solidarity.
During the last decade, DSMs have been a successful and resilient approach to human
water security. They have been designed specifically to address the obstacles that subnational institutions faced in developing countries. As such, they reflect a broader
understanding of the need for inclusive participation in the management of water
resources. Their principal use has been to decrease human vulnerabilities by improving
the availability of clean water sources and improving sanitation, the roots of individual
health and wellbeing. Their impact has been significant and it is clear that with the
pursuit of Global Water Solidarity, the benefits resulting from DSM have been far from
negligible.
The MDG goal of safe drinking water has been one of only three MDG targets achieved
to date (together with targets to reduce slums and extreme poverty), and it was met three
years ahead of the 2015 deadline. The proportion of people without sustainable access to
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safe drinking water was halved and the proportion of people using an improved source of
water (such as piped supplies and protected wells) rose from 76 percent in 1990 to 89
percent in 2010. The number of people using improved drinking water now stands at over
6.1 billion, an increase of over 2 billion from 1990, with increases in China and India
492

making the largest gains.

This is a measurable reflection of the positive effects that

have occurred from increased efforts to combat human water insecurity. Part of the
attainment of MDG Target 7c was made possible by the efforts of several European
countries that launched DSMs. By encouraging and promoting the role of local
authorities in water governance, DSMs operate with the understanding that water systems
have a distinct impact on local communities, and that these communities should have a
larger involvement in the planning and implementation of water policy.
Perhaps the most significant reflection of the ethical foundations of DSM/GWS comes
from its founding Charter of DSM. It provides three important acknowledgments. First, it
recognizes that, although national governments alone maintain the legal responsibility for
ensuring universal access to safe water and sanitation, it is also imperative that subnational groups must be fully involved. Secondly, it considers the fact that the continued
lack of water security (in the form of safe water and sanitation) is primarily the result of
economic constraints and institutional deficiencies, not due to limitations in physical
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resources. Thirdly, it puts special emphasis on the fact that the combined stress effects
493

on water affect the poorest and most vulnerable population groups most intensively.

Together, these acknowledgments are a manifestation of a progressively oriented
approach to water security and mark an important indicator of the sociopolitical drivers
of vulnerability. The commitment to act in ways that reduce harm for vulnerable
individuals and communities is based upon international and national dialogues that
acknowledge that ecological and geographical factors are not disconnected from the
494

social fabric and institutional context of societies.

The commitments of the DSM

Charter are fundamentally the product of deeper ethical thinking on the parts of the
drafters.
There are seven guiding principles of DSM, codified in its charter, that sustain its ethical
foundations. The first principle is universality. This guides policies that avoid
discrimination on any grounds, while concurrently promoting universal access by all
groups and individuals in situations of vulnerability. The second principle is subsidiary,
which reinforces democratic participatory planning at the least centralized competent
authority level. The third principle – additionality - encourages a vision of DSMs as
additions (not substitutions) to already existing Official Development Assistance (ODA)
and other existing mechanisms. The fourth principle – leverage - transforms larger
investments into a reduction of risk perception and reduces the transaction costs of loans.
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The fifth principle is sustainability (institutional level). This emphasizes the need for
good governance and capacity building by existing and future organizing institutions. The
sixth principle is sustainability (environmental level). Proper environmental stewardship
via IWRM and prevention and adaptation measures to natural disaster and climate change
is required to fulfill the goals of DSM. Finally, the seventh principle is sustainability
(financial level), which promotes adapted, inclusive, and proportional mechanisms for
cost recovery and self-financing.
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Organizations and initiatives that appeal to DSM funds must reflect these guiding
principles, creating a type of benign consensus that can work to spread the principles of
alternative water security. The explicit focus on universality, democratic participatory
planning, and sustainability, are recognition of the mutual benefit that accrues from joint
participation towards a goal of spreading water security strategies across borders. While
DSMs are primarily designed for developing countries struggling to improve water and
sanitation services, the ethical principles upon which they are founded are universally
applicable. Indeed, the original DSMs were first implemented at the national and regional
level within European countries. In this way they are able to answer some of the central
criticisms levelled against MDGs, which is that they ignore problems of inequality across
the world, “ghettoizing” development as something only to be worried about in the global
496

south.

Instead the roots of GWS show that internationalist discourses of cooperative
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water security are being used in ways that can challenge the heretofore largely dominant
discourse of security.
It is clear that the principles expressed in the DSM charter represent a form of
hydrosolidarity, which is one of the emancipatory appellations present in contemporary
water politics. They constitute a shift to ideas that have previously been viewed as
inimical to the realization of water security. Whereas traditional water security
approaches have focused on national-level frameworks for managing scarce water
sources, some of the main sponsors of DSM and hydrosolidarity champion the
involvement of local institutions. This is an important factor in developing and
implementing strategies to improve access to safe water and sanitation, while also
increasing the involvement of local actors in securing basic rights and freedoms. Local
involvement, requiring high levels of dialogue and cooperation, are central requirements
for hydrosolidarity, and the ongoing progression of DSM into a more solidified global
framework signals one movement to re-engineer understandings of water security to the
individual level.
A key indication that alternative water security norms developed in the DSM framework
are taking root is seen by the commitment to expand the range and scope of DSM into a
global approach to combatting water insecurity. Leading up the 2012 World Water
Forum (WWF 6), it was decided by the DSM Steering Committee that DSMs should be
upscaled and replicated. This has led to the transformation of DSMs into something
larger called Global Water Solidarity (GWS). Officially launched at WWF 6, Global
Water Solidarity expands DSMs across space and time to assume a larger role in
promoting innovative, ethical solutions to global water problems. It does so by
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replicating, at a larger level, successful decentralized solidarity mechanisms.
Accordingly, financial resources are to be mobilized in order to be dispersed
internationally. It mandates increasing technology transfer and facilitating training
exchanges between decentralized authorities and technical services. GWS also seeks to
promote good governance and territorial development. All of these mechanisms are
undertaken with a special focus on the role of local governments and communities in
providing basic services. While IWRM remains the dominant water management
approach, DSM was singled out at the World Water Forum as an important contribution
that is both grounded in specific ethical principles and can help in the progress towards
achieving the minimum standards of Millennium Development Goal 7. It was for this
reason that such a concerted effort was made at WWF 6 to disseminate and replicate
achievements. Unified under the theme “Time for Solutions,” WWF 6 witnessed the
creation of GWS and its promotion was evident at numerous events. One official session
dealt with “Innovative Finance for Local Government;” one side event was called, “1%
Water and Decentralized Solidarity Mechanisms: Partnership Solutions in Africa for
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Water and Sanitation;” and another event looked at, “Villages for Solutions.”

All these

events were part of the ‘coming-out party’ for GWS.
Funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, and the Ministère des
Affaires Etrangères et Européennes de la République Française, as well as the UN
Development Programme, GWS is undertaken on a voluntary basis, as a gesture of
solidarity. The three funding organizations have championed the scaling up to the
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European level of a voluntary levy of 1 percent on water and sanitation services that was
already functional in certain countries, including France.

498

The funds generated are then

diverted to a variety of projects and organizations across the world with the aim of
improving drinking water and sanitation for vulnerable populations. The encouragement
of a 1 percent solidarity mechanism (a ‘voluntary tax’ in other terms) is one aspect of
GWS, but the platform is not limited to financial packages. The needs of water and
sanitation sectors require broader engagement than simple financial mobilization. GWS
thus also facilitates international technical exchanges, encouraging the cross-pollination
of best practices and the experiences from previous efforts. The closer links among
national platforms and decentralized authorities can leverage ethical responsibility into
real improvement in the lives of others. The emphasis on inclusive dialogue across
borders, regions, and watersheds, and the principal role that local governments play in all
aspects of the design and implementation of the platforms are indications of alternative
conceptions of the way in which water security can be articulated and practiced. A range
499

of actors across borders and continents, from Programme Solidarité Eau in France
500

Water and Sanitation for Africa,
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to Sahara and Sahel Observatory in Tunisia

to

are
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contributing to the process of re-defining what water security can mean. Going forward,
the task becomes one of expanding hydrosolidarity, catalyzing more north-south, southsouth, and north-north linkages through progressive financing mechanisms and capacity
sharing. The critical vision is such that these types of decentralized partnerships help
fundamentally transform the ends towards which water security is aimed, evolving over
time into new, vibrant alternatives that contribute to a good life for the entire community
502

of life dependent on water.

6.5

Conclusion

It is too soon to fully judge the outcomes of Global Water Solidarity, but at the outset of
its institutionalization, it seems to demonstrate emancipatory practices immanent in water
security. The eventual scaling up of solidarity mechanisms is in essence a re-articulation
of the way in which security can be constructed – away from more technical,
instrumental interpretations envisaged by IWRM and, even more fundamentally, away
from the traditional security discourse of exclusion and enmity. The commitment made
by Global Water Solidarity to increase individual water security by utilizing transnational
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resources (both human and financial) and combining them with a central role for local
communities signals an emancipatory alternative in ways that IWRM as a managing
doctrine simply cannot do or promise. While it may seem contradictory for proponents to
advocate concurrently for institutionalization and decentralization, both processes are
necessary for the hoped-for shift in water ethics.
Decentralization is necessary for the inclusion of disparate communities and in order to
better manage resources upon which they depend for their livelihoods. Local
communities can in theory provide more inclusive public participation and dialogue over
water issues. Such participation is vital for the increase in ethical and technical legitimacy
as well as the overall empowerment of local communities. It is clear that local knowledge
is essential to the planning and implementation of complex water security strategies.
Without it, there is the potential for marginalized groups to experience the effects of
power disparities – forcing them to participate and replicate the dominant orthodoxy of
the dominant group. Such orthodoxy is often inimical to deeply held spiritual and ethical
beliefs of local groups, and it may also continue to entrench larger discourses of national
security at the expense of emancipatory alternatives. The avoidance of past mistakes
compels us all to re-think the purpose and utility of traditional approaches of water
security. Shifting nationalist discourses of water security to the local individual, will do
much to promote emancipation, can contribute to a vision of the future that is urgently
needed.
This dissertation has shown that the problems surrounding water security are multifaceted
and complex. Global water problems are not just problems of inequitable or inefficient
distribution - though these are important components that require technical solutions –
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they are reflections of much larger attitudes and beliefs about how human society should
be fundamentally ordered. Water scarcity, water impurity, and unequal water sharing
practices exert wide-scale negative material consequences, but their continued prevalence
are social constructions that stem from intersubjectively created social processes and
ideas about what can or cannot be accomplished. The continued and growing distance
between water supply and demand requires a larger emancipatory ethical framework that
can promote values of sustainability, cosmopolitan responsibility, and hydrosolidarity. It
is not enough to promote technical solutions, or better management practices. For
entrenched practices, like IWRM, to adequately increase individual and national security,
they will need to increasingly acknowledge the role that inclusion, dialogue and
cosmopolitan ethics play in water management. This means that new practices, like
GWS, must continue to incorporate te nascent principles like hydrosolidarity into their
core operational guidelines. Otherwise, contemporary water management will be in
danger of replicating the failures of past strategies, which focus on technical,
deterministic solutions that do not integrate sustained ethical considerations into their
analyses. Furthermore, the rise of IWRM as a hegemonic discourse is troubling. It is seen
as almost heretical to question this new form of water practice in the large global water
conferences like the World Water Forum, World Water Congress, and Stockholm
International Water Institute.
This chapter outlined one promising alternative – Global Water Solidarity. Global Water
Solidarity is in its very early stages of development. It is too soon to tell what its
successes and failures will be, and just how much it can contribute to advancing an
alternative identity of water security that counters the exclusivist tendencies of traditional
water security. Expectations must be tempered. That said, it is but one example - perhaps
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an obvious one given the involvement of UNDP and state governments – of a progressive
shift in the manner in which water security is both deliberated and practiced. Its
promotion of the ethical norms of solidarity, decentralization, universality, and
sustainability in the name of protecting vulnerable populations is an expression of the
vision of emancipatory water security outlined in earlier chapters. Finally, it signifies
how the possibility for emancipation is immanent in any political context, even in one as
503

tightly bound to sovereign exclusivity as water security.
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7

Conclusion

There has been an increasing acceptance that water is a vital security issue. Various UN
organs and institutions have debated the concept of water security. It has been the subject
504

of a major national security report in the United States.

In 2007, The Government of

Australia released A National Plan for Water Security.505 And clearly, a large number of
think tanks, NGOs, and academic studies have pointed to water as a major threat to
security. Much of the talk of water is deeply connected to a growing awareness of the
dangers posed by climate change. In February 2013, the United Nations Security Council
convened a meeting to discuss and debate the security implications of climate change.
Chaired by the United Kingdom and Pakistan, the council heard appeals from UN
officials, think tank analysts, and representatives from the World Bank, Australia, and the
Pacific Island states of Kiribati and the Marshall Islands. The central argument, presented
by Tony deBrum, a minister and assistant to the Marshall Islands President, was that
climate change is, “a security issue, and not just an economic-political-social issue.”506
The impetus for this meeting was the continued pace of climate change and its attendant
effects being felt across the world since the last debate in 2011. The hope was that a
stronger consensus would be reached that acknowledged and set up action on the dire
security implications that climate changed posed. At the end of the 2011 meeting, the
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UNSC agreed on a vague statement expressing “concern that the possible adverse effects
of climate change may, in the long run, aggravate certain existing threats to international
peace and security.”507 The 2013 meeting, in contrast, was galvanized by an increasing
awareness that the frequency and severity of climate change effects, like hurricanes,
wildfires, droughts, monsoons, and flooding, required a new sense of urgency. Given the
deep connections between climate change security and water security, it is obvious that
the issue will be of paramount importance in the coming years. The stress placed on
water resources caused by exploitation, mismanagement, and climate change, will
undoubtedly lead to intense political pressures. The result of these pressures is unknown;
many argue they will lead to war and conflict, while others envision an increase in
cooperation and mediation. The point is not to predict the future, but to begin
constructing it. This study should be seen in this light.

The aim of this dissertation has been to reframe the concept of water security along
emancipatory lines. First defined by Ken Booth, an emancipatory vision of security is
holistic, non-statist, and de-emphasizes the use or threat of force. It involves, “the freeing
of people (as individuals or groups) from those physical and human constraints which
stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do.”508 It is obvious that the
significant constraints imposed upon individuals and groups from a lack of sufficient
water quantity and quality impede the potential to lead a full life. An emancipatory water
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security counteracts traditional security approaches that present water in terms of “the
coming anarchy.” It provides a framework for viewing water in a multiplicity of ways as something much more complex and important than as currency for war strategists and
forecasters.

Water is an inherently connective substance. It shapes and alters human relationships as
well as the ecosystems upon which they depend. Beyond human life, water is essential
material for the functioning of the earth system. It is not substitutable in ways other
natural resources are. Thus, a focus on water has the capacity to fundamentally transform
the terms of security in equally profound ways. There is a widespread propensity among
traditional security scholars and practitioners to view water as a strategic commodity. In
such readings, water becomes another factor in the state-led calculus of vulnerabilities
and opportunities. Such is the case of the highly securitized Nile Basin region, whereby
state officials, journalists, and academics contribute to the perpetuation of traditional
security narratives and conventional valuations of water.

While water is often pivotal to state security, such readings belie the much more complex
estimates of value. In fact, water’s worth is too multifaceted to label it primarily as a
conflict variable. Such maneuvers ignore its multiple, overlapping, and interdependent
values. Beyond the conventional understandings of water’s strategic and monetary value,
there lie broader community values that demonstrate its inherent complexity as a security
issue. Indeed, water also holds environmental, in-stream, and spiritual value. In
environmental terms, water is the lifeblood of the earth. It bestows upon ecosystems the
necessary materials required to exist and to thrive. It goes without saying that it plays an
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integral part in the functioning of the planet. Every life form derives its being from water
in some way. Therefore water has clear use for nature and for animals. Its environmental
value cannot be overstated. Within river flows, water provides a multiplicity of benefits –
both economic and non-economic. In-stream water values are apparent in terms of both
human and non-human life. Water for fish and habitats for other animals enables
necessary biodiversity. In human-terms, the uses derived from in—stream river flow are
enormous. Whether through fishing or transportation water is central to the well-being
and livelihood of a wide range of human river users. Finally, water also intersects with
deeply held religious and spiritual beliefs. As outlined briefly in chapter three, by
understanding the centrality of water within spiritual and religious belief systems across
the world, it becomes clear that water has an organic or inherent value.
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The non-traditional values of water indicate a highly complex confluence of differing
uses and understandings that clearly demonstrate the need for alternative approaches to
water security. The essentiality of water means that it cannot be relegated to one frame of
rationality. It is by its very nature a strategic resource, one that security analysts will (and
should) consider. But water means much more than just a strategic resource over which
countries, or intra-state groups will fight over. As Veronica Strang writes, “The meanings
themselves – water as the spirit, as life, as social, connective substance, as wealth and
power, as generative source and regenerative sea, as nature, id, emotion and unconscious
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– all of these permeate the interactions that people have with water.”

510

To relegate

water security largely to treatises on the inevitability of future conflict over dwindling
resources is to vastly simplify and overlook the social meanings and material properties it
encompasses. The argument presented in this dissertation argues against this by viewing
water security along emancipatory lines. Emancipation allows individuals and
organizations to envision and construct a world that moves away from fatalistic
proclamations and towards actions that reduce human suffering and ecological
degradation.

The meanings of water “seep into every decision made about water use, wash over every
aesthetic, religious or acquisitive vision of water, and swirl in powerful undercurrents in
every quarrel about ownership, access and control of water resources.”
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This is also

true of the concept of security. The meanings attached to the subject imbue the decisions
and choices made in its name. As chapter two pointed out, an unquestioned
understanding of rationality, knowledge, and ‘human nature’ grounds traditional security
paradigms. When these inconsistencies, contradictions, and inadequacies work to
construct a predominant notion of water security as Malthusian nightmare, it reveals
much about the potential and peril of dominant paradigms. But when we reconstruct
security along different lines and in different contexts we can see the multiplicity of
meanings possible. Such attempts are found throughout this dissertation. Chapters five
and six in particular are meant to convey the potential and possibility for imbuing water
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security with ethical components. It becomes clear then just how important the concept of
security is for managing water and just how useful water is for expanding our
understanding of the subject of security.

Thus, this dissertation should be seen as a modest attempt to reorient security away from
traditional approaches that consistently fail to critique the underlying assumptions that
portray water primarily as a strategic commodity. The intention is to acknowledge the
space for alternative theorizing in the field, bringing forth multiple visions of security.

Without question, water is a pressing security concern for a large number of individuals
and communities around the world. But often the reality of individual insecurity caused
by a lack of access to quality water supplies is obscured by discourses and policies that
reify and preserve the status quo of statist security. Unsurprisingly, evidence of this is
found in various national security strategies and in the debates held in intergovernmental
forums like the UN Security Council. Indeed, this dissertation examined one of the most
highly volatile regions of the world where water remains scarce –the Nile Basin – to
show how water securitization generates a vision of security dependent upon a
preservation of the status quo. The result of the continual focus on maintaining national
and international ‘order’ and ‘stability,’ enables traditional, dominant security actors to
position themselves as the most important security providers. More importantly, perhaps,
are the effects this has in engendering policies that privilege a vision of the state and its
leaders as the end of security, rather than the means: as the object of security rather than a
facilitator of it.
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Examining the linkages between traditional security and water leads to larger questions:
What does security do? Who is security for? How do we understand threats? These
questions are important for understanding how our conceptions of water security, and our
responses to those conceptions, are intimately tied to fundamental ideas about the
individual, society, and nature. While some question whether the concept of security is
itself useful anymore, this dissertation believes otherwise.
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In contrast to Neocleous’

notion of “anti-security,” which posits that security inevitably blocks politics,
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this

dissertation argues often that security is by its very nature political. However, the
political nature of security does not necessarily have to lead to its abandonment
altogether but can, with the necessary critical theoretical tools, allow for the
transformation of security into a desirable concept through which emancipation is
possible. It is thus argued that the political nature of security can in fact be harnessed to
produce normatively superior ends. The intention is to create ways in which the concept
of water security contributes to the emancipation of individuals around the world. This is
primarily the aim of chapter five, which produced a detailed theory of emancipatory
water security.

Indeed, the concept of security is absolutely central to the argument presented here: that
security as emancipation is something desirable and possible in human relations over
water. This argument stems from awareness that the monumental scale of the challenges
facing the global environment and human societies requires a reexamination of the core
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beliefs that condition our relationship to the world. The response must then be a
reorientation of security that can offer progressive and effective responses fundamentally
tied to ethical norms of inclusion, communication, and cosmopolitanism. In so doing,
cooperative and sustainable practices of water management can emerge on various scales
- from the local to the global.

This dissertation comprised two broad sections. The first section – chapters two, three,
and four – produced a critique of the concepts inherent in traditional accounts of
international relations, international security, and environmental security. They contribute
to the unsettling of imagined norms of the general concept of security and of the nature of
water security in particular. Chapter two began by interrogating the notion that the
disciplines of international relations and international security are reflective of natural
human tendencies towards war, violence, and strategic logic. Those interrogations are
necessary for later interjections that work to reconstruct the security of water towards
emancipatory ends. Chapter three built upon those insights but shines a critical light on
the widespread tendency to equate water security with the narrative of the coming
anarchy. Chapter four made the case that the prevailing securitization of water – seeing
water security in purely Schmittian terms of exception – are inadequate and normatively
problematic. All told, chapters two, three, and four worked together to deconstruct and
problematize prevailing notions of water security. They offer the comprehensive
groundwork necessary for the second section of the thesis – chapters five and six – that
constructed a framework for emancipatory water security. Chapter five developed a
vision of emancipatory security with three defining features: inclusion, communication,
and cosmopolitanism. As it is in the critical theoretical tradition, such features are not
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blueprints, but are part of a mutable, adaptable vision and meant to encourage reflection
and discussion. These features derived from and expand upon the contentions made in the
earlier chapters. They are representative of critical appeals to unsettle naturalized security
norms and to promote a greater awareness of the security of vulnerable populations who
are consistently denied inclusion and agency in water relationships. Chapter six took the
features of emancipatory water security outlined in chapter five and highlighted the
emancipatory potential embedded in contemporary water security by focusing on the
concepts of hydrosolidarity and DSMs.

Together, the two sections work in congruence to provide a nuanced picture of the
myriad complexities of water and security. They are linked together by the emancipatory
appeal. The first section draws upon a wide array of literature to deconstruct traditional
security, particularly in the context of water. The second section picks up from this to
present alternatives to the dominant paradigms. It buttresses the central argument – that
security as emancipation is desirable and possible in relations over water.

The manuscript presented here thus offers a three-fold utility. First, it produces a new
approach to water security – an emancipatory approach that is analytically and
normatively progressive. Secondly, it adds to our understanding of emancipation as a
critical security concept. To date, the concept of emancipation has been left only partially
examined. It therefore has become commonplace to dismiss its usefulness or to criticize
its as utopian and idealistic. By establishing a set of foundational components in relation
to an absolutely essential resource, the dissertation can answer some of the most frequent
charges against the concept of emancipation. Thirdly, it is one of the first international
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security manuscripts to apply hydrosolidarity in any sustained way. In this regard it
contributes to the spread of an important hydrological idea, though further theoretical
refinement and application is called for.

In sum, this dissertation has rather modest aims. It should not be read as a treatise for the
abolition of security, nor does it seek to take on very large philosophical questions
regarding the ontology of the individual. Rather, what is advocated are pointed
adjustments to our discourses of water security that show an appreciation for the myriad
ways in which it intersects with the ability to lead a good life. Moving forward, the first
steps taken in this dissertation are likely to contribute to a deeper engagement with
problems of human ontology, the materiality of water and inter-human relations, and
questions of security.

Water security is an aperture – a window of opportunity – for deeper explorations of the
social and power relationships that work to construct the world of international relations.
Accepting the existing state of human relationships as necessary signals a moral choice,
because reality then becomes essentialized. To argue the immutability of certain social
and political norms in security studies, like the international state system, the pursuit of
selfish national interests, etc., reifies and accepts specific configurations of power that
contribute to an unjust and dangerous world.

Traditional top-down, closed, and national-interest-based approaches to water
management, no matter whether they explicitly rely upon nationalistic imperatives of
sovereignty, or are hidden beneath the proclaimed values of hydrosolidarity, have the
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potential to be damaging to people and the natural environment. To overcome this, the
first step must be to uncover the deeply held assumptions that ground the analyses of
water-security relationships in terms most familiar to state strategists and policy-makers.
From there, considerations must be made that question the connections of security with
an objectivist view of knowledge generation and then seek to transform security towards
emancipation. Partial and atavistic articulations of security, like the ones associated with
territorial preservation of the nation-state and the threat and use of force, play an
important role in limiting the potential of individuals and groups to lead full lives. As
long as assumptions remain unchallenged about the primacy of states, the politics of
security, the universality of security as state security, and the benefits of objectivity, it is
doubtful that the world will be able to transcend contemporary water problems.

However, there is hope that alternative approaches can and will be harnessed to produce
normatively desirable, and analytically superior, evaluations of water security. The goal
has been to produce the means by which it is possible to conceptualize water security in
emancipatory terms. This approach disrupts “settled” norms of sovereignty, and points
toward more holistic, “nascent” norms such as emancipation. This holism can work to
incorporate ethical concerns and create a critical, continuous dialogical engagement; a
humble, collaborative, recognition of others. Water is seen here as an important site that
not only demonstrates the continued dominance of traditional security, but also the
junctures at which it becomes insufficient, illogical, and obsolete. Perhaps the most vital
impact of water is to demonstrate the complex, and multifaceted ways in which security,
the self, and the natural environment might coalesce to promote hopeful alternatives that
pursue emancipation as their core responsibility. Water can never be truly bounded or
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separated. It connects the world. The task then is to use water to catalyze and solidify
human relationships, with each other and the natural environment, that are built upon
shared understandings of a common future.
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